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ABSTRACT

POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN EXILE:
KARL MARX AND THE JEWISH QUESTION
OF OUR TIMES

MAY 19 88
DENNIS K. FISCHMAN, B.A., YALE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Jerome King

Karl Marx's philosophy of writing demands his

readers help develop his theory by questioning its
gaps
and contradictions.

A crucial question concerns Marx's

relation to his Jewishness.
In "On the Jewish Question," Judaism stands for civil

society and the transformative power of practical need,

Christianity for the "political state" and spiritual
solutions to material problems.

Human emancipation will

spring not from politics but "the negation of Judaism":

recognizing and overcoming barriers to fully human
existence.

Marx thus endorses a "Jewish" viewpoint which senses
reality as the Hebrew bible does.

The Torah conceives

human beings in dialogue with God as indispensible

partners in creating the world.
our action matters.

We are called to act;

Marx criticizes the Greeks and most

Western philosophers for their static, contemplative view

iv

of reality.

Any ontology which imposes
a truth beyond
social relations privileges
some people and needs,
excluding others. By rejecting
God Marx discredits the
God's-eye view that leads to false
universals.
,

He

retains the structure of dialogue
between the species and
its evolving needs.
Hegel had offered the young Marx a
dialectical
approach to reality, but Marx eventually
found Hegel's
ontology too Greek.
Rather than simply reversing Hegel,
though, Marx corrects him as though he
were subject to a
Jewish worldview. Marx's method resembles
the traditional
Jewish style of hermeneutics called midrash
It performs
.

the same function: restoring sense to a
chaotic world as

glimpsed from

a

particular tradition.

The breakdown of social meaning is central to
Marx's

theory of alienation.
Marx's urgency.

The Jewish theme of exile explains

A group is exiled when society constructs

reality to preclude it from expressing or acting upon the
needs that constitute its identity.

A society in exile

frustrates the realization of human purposes.

Both

workers and capitalist society are exiled.

To return,

they must believe the world can become human

— as

their

experience under capitalism shows it cannot.
Marx's personal exile is that his audience lacks the

Jewish context to recognize his theory of how we become

free.

Theorists continue his work by
listening to people
in exile and working out
different roads to emancipation.

vi
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INTRODUCTION

Suppose, playfully, as a kind of
parlor game, one
tried to answer the question, "what
single phrase of
Karl Marx's tells us most about his
life and thought?"
The reply for which I would hold
out comes not from
Capita1 nor The Communist Manifesto nor
any of his work
the public and scholars know best.
I would point to a
'

,

letter Marx wrote to his son-in-law Paul
Laf argue in 1882,
one year before he died.
in that note, he gibes,

"What is

certain is that

I

am no Marxist." 1

What did Marx mean by this extraordinary statement?
Even before making itself understood, it displays the

man's abiding love of paradox

— his

irresistible pull

towards ironic formulations and his fascination with

contradictory realities'.

Once in context, the remark

speaks of another, perhaps less endearing trait: his

biting sarcasm.

For the "Marxists" he puts at a distance

are his would-be disciples, the leaders of the workers'

movement in France, whom he disowns because of their
reformist and anarchist leanings.
the young whelps.

The old lion devours

To a theorist who is also a revolu-

tionary, his followers must be his most prized

possessions, since only through their efforts can his
goals be expressed in practice.

1

Yet incredibly, one can

2

hear "the cutting disdain with which
he pronounced the
2
word bourgeois" ringing through
Marx's sneer at "Marxists."

Granted that Marx never took political
disagreements
lightly.
Although a dot.ing father and a loving (if
unfaithful) husband, over his ideological
opponents he
often sat as a grim and implacable judge,
pursuing them

relentlessly in polemic after polemic.
argue, Marx's declaration

"I

Still,

I

would

am no Marxist" is there to

teach us something crucial about his theory and our

relation to it.

Without relinquishing its immediate message, we could

proceed nevertheless to read this remark very differently.
If we chose, we could hear Marx repudiating with this

statement, not only those particular interpreters, but
all the copyists and critics who would try in later years
to make "Marxism" into a system.

His continual revisions

are as much a part of Marx's writings as the texts them-

selves.

"I

find unsatisfactory a work written four weeks

before and rewrite it completely," he observes.
no mere quirk, no annoying personal tic: it is

philosophy of writing.
"that an author, if he

This is
a

"It is self-evident," he writes,
[sic] pursues his research,

cannot publish literally what he has written six months

previously."

3

The passage of time, Marx presumes, brings

change and growth, to the writer if s/he is fortunate; to

3

the text, always.

The meaning of what is written
lies

always in the future.
If we pursue this line of
thought,

of Marx's many books and essays
as

a

we can read none

finished work.

Each
refers to the next, to all the others,
and to works he
never lived to write or (perhaps) even to
imagine.
Just
as he labored over Hegel, Feuerbach,
and Ricardo, looking
for questions that demanded to be asked and
riddles

crying out to be resolved, so, too, did Marx
exploit his
own work as a mother lode of gaps and contradictions

awaiting further inquiry.

Writing his work, Marx also

read it; writing new texts, he read through and beyond

old ones.

Thus, Marx is no "Marxist."

But those of his

readers who codify his thinking, whether as votaries or
heretics, are.

And they have not learned all Marx has

to teach.

An amusing piece of wordplay, but...

to draw conclusions about Marx's theory?

is this any way

Even for the

sentence in question, we have one perfectly sound

explanation already:

a

political disagreement between

Marx and the French socialists.
else by it?

Did he mean anything

We have no obvious reason to think so.

After all, it takes an enormous leap of the imagination
to read one flippant comment as a theory in brief; besides,
it requires setting the actual circumstances or context

4

of the remark to one side.

Above all, even if Marx

considers his work as open-ended,
self-referential,
meaningful totality, is he right to do
so?

Does any

theorist have the right to set down the
standard by
which his or her own work shall be
judged? Unless we
treat Marx's theory as a set of positions
taken, how can
we come to terms with it at all?
These are serious questions indeed--perhaps
serious.

,

too

By any chance, might we entertain the possi-

bility of ignoring them?

I

think there are good reasons

for us willingly to suspend our disbelief in the
validity
of the reading we have pursued so far.

For one, it is

simply not true that we discovered Marx's philosophy of

writing in the phrase

"I

am not a Marxist" alone.

would have been impossible.

That

In order even to think of

connecting them, we first had to become aware of Marx's
work habits and publishing history and his way of

approaching his own and other people's previous writings,
and regard them as a problem.

At the same time, we had

to come to wonder what in the world

means, coming from Marx.

"I

am not a Marxist"

Only that initial noticing and

wondering could move us to join the perplexing phrase to
the odd theoretical attitude in order to search for their

shared interpretation.

We did not explain

"I

am not a

Marxist" by a previously known theory, nor did we prove

.

the existence of the theory
by the single citation.
Instead, we groped about for
a way into Marx's thinking
that would let us make sense
of both, together.
Finding
that way in, our next step
should be to travel it back
through the dense undergrowth of
Marx's theory in general
to see whether it can lead us to
an understanding of that
theory at least as clear and convincing
as any other

approach.

There is nothing strange in this
procedure: it
is a variant of the famous hermeneutic
circle, with the

difference that we start by puzzling over what
we do not
understand about the text rather than clarifying
what
,

we do

4

Suppose we do go ahead and make the attempt to apply
our tentative insight to the task of understanding Marx.

Inevitably, at the same time we inquire,

"Is this really

how Marx conceived of what he was doing?", we will be

asking and framing
question,

a

definite opinion on the related

"Was he right?"

For if Marx can plausibly be

thought to have intended to include future developments
of his theory in the theory itself, then his intention is

part of the theory.

To disregard that intention

distinct from disbelieving it) would be to commit

breach of faith.

(as
a

If we come to affirm that Marx did

regard his work as stretching into the future, beyond the
printed page, then we would have to treat that self-

.

6

definition as a kind of "performative
utterance": i.e.,
it does what it says it does.
When an authorized
official says, "I now pronounce you
man and wife," it makes
no sense to ask if s/he is telling
5
the
truth.

Similarly,

if Marx intends that we readers
should get caught on the

surface irregularities of his theory, not
plane them down
to a smooth superficiality, how can
we legitimately
do

otherwise?

To read Marx literally is to falsity
him.

in

order to read him truly, we must lend him
the use of our

imaginations
In his recent work on Marx's critique of culture,

Louis Dupre urges a similar approach.

He writes:

But the lasting effectiveness of Marx's analysis
invites us to an active dialogue. This distinguishes
him from past figures whose impact has long been
absorbed by our culture.
Descartes steered modern
thought in a new direction, but he has ceased to
inspire cultural innovation.
Marx's critique
continues to challenge our attitudes today. He
remains a living partner in the sociocultural
discussion.
But precisely on that ground he demands
to be treated as a contemporary that is, critically
rather than deferentially. 6

—

Certainly, this philosophy of writing we have

ascribed to Marx grants an incomparable advantage to his
social and political theory over against the more

straitened formulations of other thinkers.

By accepting

it, we agree to "learn from" Karl Marx not only what he

teaches us explicitly,

7

but anything we infer or invent

to make sense of his teachings.

In return, Marx becomes

"

extraordrnarily vulnerable.

On the same assumptions,
he

has no choice but to bend
to any plausible
construction
with which we burden his
theory.
There are limits, of
course, both to our license
and to our debt, his obl
lga tion
and his claim to respect.
An argument can oppose
Marx's
logic instead of restoring
it, clash with his themes,
not
harmonize with them. The burden
of proof shifts-it falls
on those who would narrow the
orbit of Marx's teachingsbut it is not done away with
altogether.
stil]
the
,

boundaries of Marx's theory, just as
its persuasiveness,
finally remain a matter of judgment,
not proof.

They are

"essentially contestable," and so each
person's decision on
where they lie is intimately related to
her
or his own

identity and concerns in a way that argument
alone is
unlikely to change. 8
In this essay,

then,

I

will explore the social and

political theory of Karl Marx from
perspective.

a

non- "Marxist

That means, practically speaking, that

I

will

start out from one of the many unsolved riddles about

Marx's thought and try to read through and beyond it, as
he might have, in order to learn where the theory has to
go next.

Now, there is no more obscure question about his

theory than its relation to his Jewish background.

Jews

and Judaism obviously provide a potent symbol for the

organization of Marx's political thinking.

It is to the

"Jewish question" Marx turns
when he announces his
break
with Left Hegelianism, and
again when he renews his
fire
at Bruno Bauer in T he Holy
Family

.

m

the succinctly

worded theses, on Feuerbach, Marx
takes the time to chide
his opponent for considering
practical activity "only in
its dirty-judaical manifestation." 9
Overt references to
Judaism are fewer in his later writings,
yet
on careful

reading even Capital exhibits the
stance Marx earlier
identified as "Jewish": the assertion
of present human
need against the claims of philosophical
idealism

that it

had already made humanity free.
Yet studies of Marx tend to deny any relation

between Marx's Jewishness and his theory.

Saul Padover

offers the most simplistic account: Marx was an antisemite; therefore, he could not have learned anything
from

Judaism.

"Marx's hatred of Jews was a canker which

neither time nor experience ever eradicated from his
soul." 10

it "reflected nearly total ignorance, possibly

willful, of the lives and faith of the people from whom
he descended." 11

I

Marx is nothing like

will demonstrate (in chapter
a

1)

that

simple antisemite, that his

attitude is much more ambivalent than it seems, and that
on the whole he comes out supporting the claims of

Judaism against those of Christianity.
is

somewhat beside the point.

All this, however,

Antisemitism in no way

9

precludes learning rrom the Jewish
tradition, especially
in tne case of internalized
antisemitism on the
part of

one who was born into that
tradition.

The really

interesting question would be: how
did Marx's conflicted
relationship to his own Jewishness
affect the manner of
his learning from Jewish thought?
This is where more serious objections
arise.
David
McLellan offers one.
According to him, marginality, not

Jewishness, was the element of Marx's background
which
shaped his theory.
"Marx was all the more predisposed to
take a critical look at society as he came
from a milieu
that was necessarily excluded from complete
social partici-

pation." 12

A stress on the outsider status of German Jews

in the nineteenth century tends to downplay the signif-

icance of the content of Jewish identity, and this is
McLellan*

s

intention.

He contends that Marx shows

"virtually no sign of Jewish self -consciousness in his

published writings or in his private letters." 13
Some students of Marx believe they have found the
key to Marx's whole system of ideas in his rabbinic
ancestry; but although some of his ideas and even
— u~*.i J - tJ
~*
life-style
this traditi<
intellectual
to reduce Ma:

—

——
j

—

Shlomo Avineri roots Marx's theory firmly in one

specific part of the "Western intellectual heritage,"

namely "his Hegelian antecedents."

Hegel's philosophy,

10

argues Avineri, is "a unique
synthesis between the
theological traditions of the
Judeo-Christian

[sic] world
and the intellectual achievements
of the Enlightenment." 15

In order to grant any importance
whatever to Marx' s

Jewishness, Avineri first demands

a

solution to

"th<
ie

problem of Marx's own awareness of those
specific
traditions held responsible for his own
views." 16

Avineri

and McLellan represent a widely-held
orthodoxy as to the

irrelevance of Judaism to Marx's theory. 17

They would

undoubtedly endorse the following summary by

a

sociologist

of religion.

Marx was not a Jew in any religious, national, or
cultural sense. He knew nothing about Judaism and
showed no interest in the subject. Nor did he
"inherit" any rabbinic or talmudic qualities or
properties.
These are acquired skills, no more
transmitted by birth than a knowledge of philosophy
or geology would be.l 8
As literary theorist Susan Handelman writes,

"To try

to prove that a Jewish background has some influence on

even the most avowedly secular Jews is a difficult and

complicated task." 19
though

I

I

shall not attempt it here, even

believe (and will show in chapter

"irrelevance" argument is much overstated.

tracing influence, though,

I

1)

that the

Instead of

will outline the structural

affinities between Marx's thought and the worldview of the
Jewish tradition.
2

and

3,

Marx's ontology,

I

suggest in chapters

makes much more sense read through the particular

11

notions of being and becoming,
space and time which
animate the Hebrew bible. His
peculiar use of language
(what Bertell oilman, after
Vilfredo Pareto, calls "words
that appear like bats") 20 likewise
seems almost familiar in
a

Hebraic context.
In chapter 4,

view Marx's philosophy of writing in

I

light of midrash, the classic Jewish
style of hermeneutics.
In both these cases, the purpose
of the comparison goes
beyond mere coincidence towards the discovery
of new
meaning.
My assumption is that it makes a difference
if
we find that Marx's theory becomes richer
in the matrix of

the Jewish tradition than in the Greco-Christian
tradition

of philosophy taken alone.

The difference that it makes

becomes clear in our changed conception of Marx's overall
project.

Chapter

5

attempts to reconstruct that project,

drawing on the added understanding that an acquaintance

with the plotline of the biblical narrative (with its
themes of exile and return and its Messianic promise)
bestows.

Finally, in the conclusion,

I

consider how we,

today, must reinterpret Marx's task in order to fulfill

Just to be clear: when

I

it.

suggest certain elements of

Jewish thought can serve us as an appropriate context in

which to read Marx,

I

do not wish to deny the interpretive

usefulness of other approaches.

The way we will take here,

though, is practically unexplored.

To pursue it, we may

.

12

find ourselves far afield,
even temporarily out of
sight
of the well-trodden paths of
Marx scholarship.
That need
not bother us.
We know the way back, and we
can leave it
for later, by the hearth's
glow at the end of the journey,
to try to trace the routes on
the same map.
For now, we
must simply follow our own trail.

Nor need we stumble on the mistaken
notion that if
an idea of Marx's is not solely or
exclusively Jewish, we
cannot read it in the context of the Jewish
tradition.
Part of what it means to participate in a
tradition is to
be sensitive to how one part of that tradition
comments on

and is enriched by all the others.
agents.

ideas are not free

We understand their content and their signifi-

cance in relation to the complex of other thoughts and

themes in which we are accustomed to finding them.

If we

decide to relate Marx's writings to Jewish thought, we
open ourselves to a whole world of allusions and associations, and we begin to make out an already ongoing

conversation in which old statements may resonate with
new meanings.

wants to be

The question for us is not whether Marx

a part of this

conversation, but whether

we do
One more caveat: when

I

propose to explore the

structural affinities between Marx's thinking and Jewish
thought,

I

am not subscribing to any of the rival

"

13

"structuralist" or "post-structuralisms"
which have
recently deluged social
theory.

As

x

understand Marx,

dichotomies like "structure
vs. event" or "form vs.
content" have little help to
offer us
n°
*
P
engaging with him.
° orter
As for the tack I am taking
here, a non- "Marxist

m

approach to Marx through the
question of his relation to
Judaism, it leads immediately
towards two potential dangers:

misreading Judaism to make it
foreshadow Marx or misreading
Marx to make him somehow more
Jewish.
With respect to the
first, presenting a living religious
culture as an ideology,
to some extent limitations of
scope make this unavoidable.
To compensate, whenever relevant,
I will differentiate

among movements and periods in Jewish
history.
at all times to indicate when

I

will try

I

am offering a controversial

perspective on Jewish belief, whether that
perspective is
my own, Marx's, or belongs to someone else.
Yet controversy is an integral part of the Jewish tradition,
and
innovations can sometimes claim the authority of something
"already told to Moses at Sinai "--even mine.
As for the opposite danger, what McLellan calls

"reduc [ing] Marx's idea to
I

secularized Judaism,

do not see how exactly it could be done.

is no part of my intention;

counter to
I

a

a

confess

I

Certainly, it

indeed, it runs directly

crucial feature of my interpretation.

understand Marx as

a

political thinker in exile

:

For
a

man

14

trying to express the truths
of one reality in the
language, the concepts, the
grammar of another. Caught
between what can be done... and what
must be, misunderstanding his own predicament,
compelled to write,

fated not

to be heard, Marx never found
himself a home in either

philosophy or Jewish thought.
a

His work remains unfinished,

legacy to generations of seekers.

if we attempt to

recover the meanings of Marx's thought which
only emerge
from the context of the Jewish tradition, it
is not to

simplify his project, but rather to elaborate it for
the
purpose of taking it up anew.
To quote the most subtle of his biographers:

Karl Marx was not merely a revolutionary, a
theorist of socialism, or a figure in the history
of economic or political theory.
He was
and
remains an exemplary presence in the development
of modern consciousness, whose significance is not
exhausted by the truth or falsity of the specific
doctrines he propounded. His life exemplifies the
link that joins thought to action, and the gap
that separates them. 21

—

—

Because in modernity, we live our lives in the midst
of that divide,

struggling to forge that link: because we,

too, are strangers in a land not our own, our dialogue

with Marx goes on.

2

:

CHAPTER ONE
FOUR JEWISH QUESTIONS ABOUT
MARX

Anyone who has seriously studied
Marx has read the
essay "On the Jewish Question,"
perhaps only once, or
perhaps too often.
whether one time or many, we
have been
taught to read it in a special way
that an innocent reader
would never think of alone.
This peculiar consensus echoes
in the words of David McLellan
when the writes that the
"central problem" of "On the Jewish
Question"
is

"the

contemporary separation of the state from
civil society and
the consequent failure of liberal politics
to solve
social

questions."

1

Louis Dupre defines the essay's theme this

way

Attacking Bauer's proposal of total secularization
as the solution of the Jewish problem in Germany,
Marx claimed that the secular, democratic state is
tne modern version of the religious illusion.
It
maintains the same relation of apparent dominance
and real subservience to civil society which exists
between the religious sphere and the profane world.
Both these writers agree that the liberal notion of

freedom is Marx's real target in "On the Jewish Question."
They construe that notion as the real subject of the
essay.

Accordingly, Jews and Judaism enter the picture

only incidentally.
"a

McLellan considers the nominal issue

convenient peg on which to hang his [Marx's] criticism

of the liberal state," while Dupre locates the "Jewish
15

16

question" within Marx's
general o ritlque of
religion
Together with Shlo mo Avineri,
who ignores Judaism
altogether in his exposition,
they delirait what has
the orthodox approach
to the article.,
article
Tt
it is an approach
"hich has proved enormously
powerful in extracting
theoretical resources from
the rough terrain of
Marx's
rhetoric.
Like any extractive technology,
however,

^

•

it

leaves a changed landscape
behind it.
If we were to read "On
the Jewish Question" for
the

first time, naively, we surely
would not blurt out, "what
is Marx saying about freedom?
How does he relate the
state to civil society?"
Instead, I imagine we could
almost not help asking, "why
is this man so antisemitic?"
That he is shockingly antisemitic,
the essay appears
to leave no doubt.
True
irue, in its
i-t-c
first, longer installment
(responding to Bruno Bauer's book Die
Judenfrage
Marx's
animus reveals itself less blatantly.
He sins by omission
only, repeating without comment
Bauer's claim, "The Jew,

m

i

)

by his [sic] very nature, cannot

be

,

emancipated ... since

he opposes his illusory nationality to
actual nationality,

his illusory law to actual law." 3

m

the second section,

though, Marx seems fairly to bristle with
anti-Jewish

sentiments.

He begins by substituting for Bauer's inquiry

into "the capacity of present-day Jews and Christians
to

become free" the question:

"What specific social element

6

.

17

is

it necessary to overcome in
order to abolish Judaism?" 5

Jews, says Marx, can only become
free when, as Jews, they
no longer exist.
It would be a mistake, however,
to think Marx

advocates genocide, or even religious
assimilation, as a
solution.
If religion in general (read:
Christianity) is
the opium of the people, in Marx's view
the Jewish religion
in particular lacks the power to produce
even illusory
happiness.

Religious Judaism is

a

mere nullity which

"would evaporate like some insipid vapour in the
real life-

giving air of society," if society were as it should
be.
Indeed, totally disregarding the content of Jewish belief,

Marx identifies Judaism completely with the economic

arrangements he finds prevailing in capitalist society,
and the abolition of Judaism with the transcendence of

capitalism.
Let us consider the real Jew: not the sabbath Jew
whom Bauer considers, but the everyday Jew.

,

Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his [sic]
religion, but let us seek the secret of the religion
in the real Jew.

What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical
need, self interest
What is the worldly cult of the
Jew? Huckstering
What is his [sic] worldly god?
Money
.

.

Very well: then in emancipating itself from huckster ing and money and thus from practical Judaism, our
age would emancipate itself.
,

"

18

"Money,.' writes Marx,

»

is the Jealous gQd
Qf

beside which no other god
may exist."
In order to speak of
the growing power of mo ney
over polities, Marx carries
the
association to its outer
outpr limits: society,
he declares, has
become "Jewish.
f

Tt^ttr sss*- r\
r
Uiusory g&V" ^ f
niusory

becorthe

has

goi

a

S

bill of exchange.

7

.

18

It onr y

On this account, Marx finds
nothing incongruous in speaking
of "the effective domination
of the Christian world by

Judaism."

on this point, he can even
quote Bauer with

approval:

"...in theory, the Jew is deprived
of political
rights, while in practice he [sic]
wields tremendous power
and exercises on a wholesale scale
the political influence
which is denied him in minor matters." 8
Because "the Jew"
functions as a symbol for Marx's thinking,
he does not

really mean to subscribe to a Jewish conspiracy
theory,
but the overtones are still ominous.

II

The question as to the reason for Marx's antisemitism

brings a second, equally troubling question in its wake.
Why is it that writers on Marx leave his anti-Jewish slurs

unchallenged, even unexamined?

Not unnoticed

,

certainly:

nearly every commentator mentions antisemitism in passing

—
19

(again with Avineri as a notable
exception).
They bring it
up, however, only to denounce
it or to excuse it, never
to
confront it as a problem in itself.
it is as if there

never were a "Jewish question,"
as if the substance of
what Marx says about Jews were
entirely unimportant.
We may take McLellan 's book once
again as the epitome
of how Marx's anti-Jewish harangue
is usually
treated.

"It is true," he admits,

"that a quick and unreflective

reading of, particularly, the briefer
second section,
leaves a nasty impression." Furthermore,
Marx is known to
have "indulged elsewhere in anti-Jewish
remarks— though
none as sustained is here."

On the other hand, McLellan

notes, in the same year Marx wrote "On the Jewish
Question,"
he lent his support to a petition for Jewish
rights,

commenting to his associate Arnold Ruge

"The point is to

,

punch as many holes as possible in the Christian state and
smuggle in rational views as far as we can."

In fact,

suggests McLellan, the whole antisemitic line of thought
in

Marx's essay may be largely accidental.

word for Jewry

Judentum

— has

"The German

the secondary sense of

commerce and, to some extent, Marx played on this double

meaning." 9

To some extent!

The implicit conclusion is clear.

Marx's anti-

semitism has been exaggerated, and in any case is

tangential to his main point
it.

.

No harm

^^

Time to move on.

The problem with this way
of reading Marx is
that it
takes for granted the same
dubious assumption that Marx
relies on: that we can learn
something from the "Jewish
question" without actually
paying attention to it. At
first glance, it might seem
Marx is simply following the
same procedure we used earlier
in interpreting his
utterance "I am not a Marxist."
Out of the social fact
that German Jews seek emancipation,
he divines a new
meaning: that the liberal state
must ever fail to create
freedom for all of its citizens because
it depends for it
own power on an inherently unfree
and unequal economic

system.

in our exegesis,

though, we kept the original

situation in plain view even while we departed
from it.
Our resulting interpretation added a new
layer of meaning
to the tension between Marx and his
followers at the same

time as it opened up the new question of how
Marx wrote.

Marx's reformulation of Bauer's topic, though, makes the
original controversy invisible, and the Jews, its subject

along with it.

What is more, by adhering to Marx's

explicit argument, commentators like McLellan obscure the

Jewish question of "On the Jewish Question" even further.
And this is too bad, for two reasons.

The first is that when
a Jew makes
antiseptic
-marks ana no one disputes
them, even the
well-meaning

wonder if they are not
true

^^

^

win

^

probably no individual, from
Abraham and Moses to Herzl
and
Martin Buber, to whom the
epithet 'Jew has been more
persistently applied than Marx...-"
Born in 1818
anoient city of Trier, Karl
Marx descended from three
oenturies of rabbis on both
sides of his family

^

tree,

including scions of the
illustrious Heschel and Katzenelenbogen families. 11 His father,
Hirschel ha-Levi Marx,
changed his name to
Heinrirh nnon
„
^ neiancn
upon k-;^
his conversion
to
Christianity about a year before
Karl was born.
Hirschel «s
baptism was a matter of economics,
not faith: the Prussian
government had begun to enforce its
requirements
that all

lawyers be Christians.

Paris vaut bien une messe

.

The

Jewish faith also had held little
attract ion for him. A
staunch rationalist, in philosophy a
follower of Kant,
Hirschel believed in a simple deism, "the
faith of Newton,
12
Locke, and Leibniz."
Yet his ties to the Jewish people

remained firm enough that in 1815, he drafted

a long

memo randum to protest an edict aimed at bankrupting
Jewish
mon eylenders, while in the following year he
unsuccessfully
sought

a

special exemption to allow him to keep both his

religion and his livelihood. 13

in all probability,

Marx's father was one of the many Jews who converted

Karl

22

"without really relinquishing
their Eamlly and
with the [Jewish] community." 14

^^

Karl's mother, Henriette
Pressburg Marx, remained
even more stubbornly
entrenched in her Jew.sh
identity.
The daughter of a Dutch
rabbi, she probably spoke
Yiddish
in her parents' home;
whether she continued doing
so in
Trier is uncertain, but we
know from her letters that
she
never bothered to learn to write
German grammatically.^
She resisted conversion until
1825, nearly eight years
after her husband's baptism and
almost a year after her

children's (including that of Karl,
who was then six and
half).
From her correspondence, it is
clear

a

that the

Marxes retained their Jewish contacts,
especially with
Hirschel's sister-in-law, the widow of

the rabbi of Trier,

and her children.

Even in 1853, a full eighteen years

after adopting the Lutheran church,
Henriette could write
to her own sister about Karl's sister's
departure for
South Africa:

"And it seems that the lot of the People is

again being realized in

me— that

my children should be

scattered throughout the world..." 16
As for Marx himself, one biographer asserts:

Karl Marx spent his earliest years in a
religious division was a witness to the
power over men's livelihoods could play
their self-conceptions, forcing them to
convictions. 1'

family whose
way society's
tricks on
deny their

.

Whether for that reason or
some other, Marx never
studxed
Hebrew, even though the
language

Wsium

was taught at the

he attended at by a

(Christian) member of the

Casino Club, a pro-French
organization to which Hirschel
Marx also belonged. 18 In
Berlin
,

^^^

jurisprudence under Eduard Cans,
one of the founders of the
Wissenschaft des Judentums movement,
and it was under that
instructor that he first paid
serious attention to Hegel. 19
In later years, Marx would
cross paths with an extraordinary
selection of "non-Jewish Jews,"
including Heinrich Heine,
Moses Hess, Ferdinand Lassalle, and
Ludwig Kugelmann. He
also made a friend of the rationalist
Jewish historian
Heinrich Graetz.
More crucial for our purposes than Marx's
relations

with other Jews, however, is the fact that
others recognized Marx as a Jew. A sponsor of the Rheinische

Zeitunq

.

the Cologne paper Marx edited in 1842, gives us
this

description
Karl Marx from Trier was a powerful man of 2 4 whose
thick black hair sprung from his cheeks, arms, nose,
and ears. He was domineering, impetuous, passionate,
full of boundless self-confidence, but at the same
time deeply earnest and learned, a restless dialectician who with his restless Jewish penetration
pushed every proposition of Young Hegelian doctrine
to its final conclusion. .. 20

Aside from his "penetration" and his hairiness, Marx
also sported

a

swarthy complexion which gave rise to his

interesting alias.

Writes Engels, '"The Moor* was Marx's

nickname from his University
days on...
lf , had ever
called him by some other
name, he would have
thought some
misunderstanding had arisen between
us." 21 Yet all his
intimates understood "Moor"
as "a veiled reminder
of his
Jewish origins." 22 His
daughter Eleanor undertook
to lift
the veil by learning Yiddish
and "talking union" in the
Jewish quarters of London.
There, she was known to declare,
"I am a Jewess" 23 -which
was not literally
true,

since

Jewish religious law counts
descent through the mother. So
vivid was her conviction of her
beloved father's Jewishness
that she freely took the identity
on herself.

If modern writers on Marx leave
his scurrilous attacks

on Judaism unanswered, then, they
run the risk of helping
to perpetuate them.
Along with Freud and Einstein, Marx
is the world's figure of the Jew.

Who should know better,

the naive may justly ask, what Jewish
faults are than the

Jew Karl Marx?

Ill

Besides the moral obligation to combat antisemitism,
there is another reason to be astonished at Marx scholars'

neglect of the Jewish question, one that touches directly
on their theoretical concerns.

Let us say that Marx's

real targets in this essay are the liberal notion of

freedom and the modern separation of state and civil

25

society, as is generally
supposed.

commentary on these themes in

a

Marx achieves his

marvelously indirect

manner.

At every step of his argument,
he makes his point
by manipulating the various
meanings he imputes to the
symbol "Judaism" and by contrasting
them with the meanings
he ascribes to "Christianity."
it would seem, then, that
we have to unpack those heavily
laden symbols in order to

understand what Marx is saying about
politics and freedom.
But that is exactly what has not
been done.
"The German Jews seek emancipation.

emancipation do they want?
4.-

rion.

.,24

what kind of

Civic, political emancipa-

From his opening sentences on, Marx looks
to the

case of the Jews to shed light on how people
become free.
Bruno Bauer had argued that Judaism, with its
arrogant

peculiarity, prevented Jews from participating fully
in
the life of the state.

If they would agree,

for instance,

to attend legislative sessions even when they took
place

on Saturday, then they would be eligible for the full set

of rights political emancipation implies.
If, thereafter, some or many or even the overwhelming
ma jority felt obliged to fulfil their religious
dUties such practices should be left to them as an
absolutely private matter. 25
,

Precisely because it preserves religion as

a

private

duty, Marx rejects political emancipation as an inadequate

formula for human freedom.

The Hegelian ideal of the

state which motivates Bauer calls for politics to be

a

.

26

sphere of universality, in
which all the higher needs of
the spirit are met.
To Bauer as well as to Marx
himself,
"The existence of religion is
the existence of a defect." 26
If Jews (or Christians, for
that matter) hold onto their
religious practices, it is prima facie
evidence that the
state is not fulfilling their needs,
and that the nonpolitical still exerts great power over
their choices.
The incapacity of purely political
means to make people
free is not confined to the state's
defeat by religion,
however
The political elevation of man [sic] above
religion
shares the weaknesses and merits of all such
political
measures.
For example, the state as a state
abolishes private property (i.e., man [sic] decrees
by political means the abolition of private
property)
when it abolishes the property qualificat ion for
~
electors and representatives...
But the political suppression of private property not
only does not abolish private property, it actually
presupposes its existence. The state abolishes,
after its fashion, the distinctions established by
birth_, social rank
education occupation when it
decrees that birth, social rank, education, occupation
are non-political distinctions; when it proclaims,
without regard to these distinctions, that every
member of society is an equal partner in popular
sovereignty, and treats all the elements which
compose the real life of the nation from the standpoint of the state.
But the state, none the less,
allows private property, education, occupation, to
act after t heir own fashion, namely as private
property, education, occupation, and to manifest
their particular nature. 2/
,

,

,

Instead of real universality, the state makes

manifest "the illusory universality of modern political
life."

28

Just as Jews do not become emancipated by the

27

ballot if they still need
the synagogue/ sQ
seif _
interested individuals do
not become free,
rational
citizens simply by acquiring
politic&1

^^

*.w and the bourgeois
remain subject to an
external power,
be it religion or money,
even if in their
alienated way)
they embrace it as their
own.
fact, because politics
has failed to create a
home for the human spirit,
the only
sensible thing to do is to
hang on to one's private
good.
(

m

S^^

aiSm
'

°

r

^

tSiC]

bG aSkSd to

abo^sh

Remarkable is the sympathetic tone
Marx adopts toward
his fellow Jews at this stage
of the argument.
it is
almost as if he were cautioning
them not to sell their

birthright (on which he spends such
harsh words later) for
the mess of pottage that is modern
citizenship.
He

reproves them, not for their religious
faith, but for
their political credulity.
If you want to be politically emancipated,
without
emancipating yourselves humanly, the inadequacy
and
the contradiction is not entirely in
yourselves but
in the nature and the category of political
emancipation.
if you are preoccupied with this
category you share the general prejudice. 30

IV
But of course, Marx does discover a real form of

-

28

freedom for which he thinks
giving up Judaisra would
be
amply worthwhile: namely, hunsm emancipation." oddly,
in
all the essay, he affords
it only one paragraph
of its own

K S^aHan^icfL^aS
his

2en;

Ufe

"

e

WheD

r- 0
*<^dividual *
b

r!n

f

||2|£|s) as s|cial powers so that
he no l5n^irS thlS S ° Clal
?° wer from himself as 'political
power?31
This is an enigmatic passage,
to say the least.
it is
difficult to say what Marx means
by "human emancipation,
except that it will overcome the
fragmentation and

insufficiency of communal life that
political emancipation
only feeds.
The problem for the reader is to
discern
that underlying the distinction between
political
and

human emancipation is an even more basic
divide, between
"civil society" and the "political state."
Or, to be

even more precise, we need to realize that

a

society which

splits life into these two spheres differs dramatically

from a society in which they are united.
What is the "political state"?

In the Contribution

to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right

,

Marx

traces the emergence of a sphere of politics, centered on

government, laws, and constitutions, which lies alongside
the parts of human life concerned with survival "without

materially permeating the content of the remaining, non-

29

political spheres."

Hegel claimed the state
subsumed and

transcended all the particular
activities of material life.
Marx debunks this claim of
universality. As "political
state," he argues, the state .merely
puts itself forth as
one more fragment of national
life, in no way integrating
or integrated with the rest.
In monarchy

for example, and in the republic
as a
f ° rm ° f State
P^itical
man
sic]
has hL P
Ulf
° f he±
alongside unpolitical
man man
n as a ° private
individual.
Property contract
marriage, civil society, all appear
he?e_is
particular modes of existence alongside the
political
state as the content to which the
political state is
related as or ganising form; properly speaking,
the
relation of the political state to this
content is
merely that of reason, inherently without
content
which defines and delimits, which now affirms
and now
iZ
e

^

Par 1CUl r

™

V
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^

'

denies

.

According to Marx, "The abstraction of the state as
such belongs only to modern times, because the
abstraction
of private life belongs only to modern times."

Other ages

and other cultures did not split off the "political

constitution as distinct from the material state or the
other content of the life of the nation."
Greece, for example,

In ancient

"The res publica is the real private

affair of the citizens, their real content, and the

private individual is

a

slave"

—

i. e.

,

only slaves bore the

brand of an identity having nothing to do with their role
in public life.

During the Middle Ages, again,

"The life

of the nation and the life of the state are identical,"

30

but only because one's
membership in an estate,
a guild, or
a corporation
determine one's political
status.
"what
distinguishes the modern state
from these states characterized by the substantial
unity between people and
state,"
to Marx, is "that the
constitution itself has been
developed into a particular actuality
alongside the life of
the people-that the political
state has become the constitution of the rest of the state." 33
The quest for a fully
human existence is severed from,
and set against, the

activities which. secure existence
itself.
The same historical dividing up
of social life that
produces the political state at the same
time gives birth
to civil society.
in "On the Jewish Question," Marx

specifies that he means by civil society
"the sphere of
human needs, labour, private interests,
and civil law." 34
From human needs, the other elements follow.

Since Marx

assesses human needs in two distinctly different
ways, he
also holds two opposed evaluations of civil society,

neither of which, however, can stand without the other.
Human needs are first of all for Marx

a type of deprivation,

an absence of something the lack of which frustrates human

powers and stunts the development of the species.

At the

same time, though, needs spur human invention, open up as

yet unrealized capacities

— in

short, spur human development.

Xnaee d

,

acguiring

_^_

^
^

°f what Marx thin:.
progress is aU
Civil society, the
sphere of human needs,
reflects
both the ne g ative ana
the positive evaluation.
shorn of
"even the
of a g eneral content,^
civll soclety
a realm of
p ure egoism.
Within it each
±_
"an individual
separated from the community,
withdrawn into
[sic], who ilv preoccupied
with his private interest
and acting in accordance,
with his private caprice.""
the political state
fails to provide universal
freedom
civil society never
aspires to it. Paradoxically,
then,
Marx goes on to argue
that civil society and
not politics
forms the real basis for
human emancipation.
Political
man sic is only abstract,
artificial man, man

se^

»

,

^

^

»Wlf

„

as an

allegorical, moral person." 3 *

civil society, the world
of

practical need, constitutes the
effective reality in which
people actually live.
Narrow and selfish it may be,
but
only changes in civil society
can be powerful enough to
move the species beyond civil
society and political state
alike, towards an integrated,
meaningful, species life.
Both civil society and the
political state are human
inventions, as Marx sees it.
Neither is natural nor
inevitable; both are becoming obsolete,
yet Marx

champions the importance of civil society
for future

emancipation, not because it is good but because

it is

"

effective.

His commitment embraces
the nasty but real
over the nice but fictional.
The dialectic between
political state and civil
society helps us to understand
what Marx means by human,
as opposed to merely
political, emancipation.
Political
emancipation deepens the split
in social life while
human
emancipation overcomes it,
reconstituting social relations
on the basis of what people
require in order both to
survive and to live humanly,
without the concepts "civil
society" and "political state,"
Marx's reply to Bauer
seems perverse, or simply meaningless.
Thus, it is

striking that no one has explored

a

crucial element of

these concepts as Marx presents them
in the essay-that the
political state is "Christian," while
civil society
is

"Jewish.

39

Marx contradicts the liberal notion that
separation
of church and state removes politics
from the influence of

religion.

Instead, he sees in liberal democracy "the

perfected Christian state," more Christian even than
"the
state which is still theological" which is merely "the

Christian negation of the state." 40

By privatizing

religion instead of abolishing it, the political state
helps perpetuate the Christian projection of human powers

onto a transcendent God. 41

In order to end this alienation,

the state would have to
become involved in answerxng
the
unmet needs that drive people
to the private solace of
religion.
For the political state,
though, that i,.8
impossible, since (Marx argues)
its whole claim tc

emancipate rests on its refusal
to take private differences into account in the way it
treats its

citizens.
There is neither rich nor poor,
Jew nor Gentile, to the
political state.
For Marx, that fact alone speaks
volumes
about the origins of that state
"under the sway of
Christianity, which objectifies all nation,!
natural,
moral, and theoretical relationships. 1,42
.

We have already seen that Marx does
not think any

more highly of Judaism than of Christianity
as

a faith.

Indeed, he tends to dismiss the concept of
Judaism

altogether.

How, then, can he identify civil society,

the effective reality of social life, as "Jewish"?

draws

a

Marx

distinction between "sabbath" Judaism, the

theology he considers an "insipid vapour," and "everyday"
Judaism,

"the particular situation of Judaism in the

present enslaved world." 4 3

Just as civil society is the

social engine that the political state aims to veil, so
the everyday Jew, in Marx's formulation, is the secret of
the Jewish religion.

Marx sums up the Jewish situation in

19th-century Germany as "practical need, self-interest." 44
The Jews' place in the economy forces them to make self-

.

34

preservation through money their
truest faith.

^Sli^J^^i^

as well.

But

is the principle
of civil socrety"

It is for this reasonj

^

assertsj ijuaaism
attains its apogee with the
perfection of civil society;
but civil society only
reaches perfection in the
Christian
world."
In other wordS; „ Jewish „
civn soc ety Qniy
dominates the •Christian"
political state once Christianity
succeeds in separating the
state from
.

civil society.

By

attempting to banish human need,
Christianity succumbs to
it

?P peara y> Ce that Christianity overcame
t0 ° refined to ° spiritual to
eiiminatP fhl Cr SneSS of
need except by
raistnf it into
.
raising
the ethereal realm. 47
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Reading what Marx has to say about Jews and
Judaism as
if it mattered enables us to make two
interesting discoveries concerning the thinker and his theory.
First, we

learn that Marx's reputation as an antisemite
obscures the
true complexity of his views on Judaism immensely.
Judaism
as a religion,

he holds in greatest contempt.

Judaism as

social force, on the other hand, Marx regards as supremely

important.

What Marx chooses to call "Jewish" is nothing

less than the driving force of his social and political

theory: the reality of human need, as expressed in the

contradictions of capitalist society.

a

!

3b

It is indeed no
lonqer a<^koH. u- v
Judaism or Christianity?
8 free
On
T***
ntrar
asked: which makes
y' it is now
^°
freel-the n~ gatl
° n of J ^aism or
the negation of
ChristianUy 4

"

th^

?

Marx's answer is clear
clear.

The negation of
"Judaism" is
essential to emancipation,
whereas the negation
of
"Christianity" leads to
nothing-because the „ christian „
Political state is itself
a nothing, an
illusion possessed
of no power to produce
anything substantial.
Marx's
tribute to Judaism is the
xind of recognition one
grants a
skilled and potent adversary.
From a man who lists his
idea of happiness as "to
fight" and of misery "to
submit,"
this is a compliment, indeed. 49
,

As a

corollary, though, we must
realize that we have
not understood what Marx's
theory means until we understand
what Judaism means to Marx.
We know that it symbolizes
the
gritty details of how people
make a living, the historically

unresolved problem of human need.

But why this symbol? 50

Such representations do not, as
a rule, arise from nowhere:
they are prepared by associations
in the writer's mind
which grow more vivid at opportune
moments, only to fade
when they begin no longer to be needed.
Jerrold Seigel
points out one reason why Judaism may have
seemed particularly relevant to Marx in 1843: his opponent.
If Bauer was a former religious Christian
who had
freed himself by denying Christianity, Marx was
in
origin a secularized Jew who regarded himself as

liberated from "practical Judaism," self-interest.
Marx's claim against Bauer was that his own personal

standpoint--grantinq all it c a„<=
tS ~~ rather th
Bauer's, provided the
° lnt of
point
of entr
J
P
liberation. 51
y for true human

«

certainly, there is
something to this.
argument and Marx's reply
reseni>ls

mng

^
Bauer's

so

^^

that rngenious medieval
trial by ordeal, the
deputation. Like the
Christian clerics Bauer
tsauer claims
Judaism has outlived its
reason Eor being and
only
on invincible stubborn
refusal to see the facts.
Harx
argues like a rabbi who
is mindful of the
monarch's eyewithout claiming any
positive virtues for the
faith, he
finds reasons nevertheless
to justify its existence
and
thus bests his accuser
at his own game. 52
while this
desire to score points on
Bauer may tell us something
about
Marx's motivation Xt stlU
c+--in ieaves
the content of Marx's
symbol "Judaism" wholly
unexplained.
l

,

'

Our reading of this essay
therefore leads us to ask
yet a third question: the
"Jewish question" itself. What
did 19th-century Germans mean
by "the Jewish question"?
What did the phrase mean to Marx?
What was Marx's own
experience of Jews and Judaism outside
his immediate
family, and how did it color what
he
had to say on the

issue?

if the

"Jewish question" is tied up in Marx's

thinking with his ideas about how people
become free, then
what does his stance towards the emancipation
of the Jews

tell us today about his notion of freedom?

At the beginning of
the 19th century,
when German
liberals inspired by Prench
revolutionary ideals were
agrtating the Prussian
monarchy for a constitution,
the
status of Jews throucrhontu
rougnout +-h^
the kingdom remained
unchanged
since the Middle Ages
Jews were not citizens
in Germany.
Under the law, they were
not even human.
They existed as
^£Xi_£amerae, " serfs of the chambe ^„
•

.

^

Property of the king, to be
disposed of at his pleasure.
German rulers valued their
Jews as an unending source
of
revenue: they zealously
maintained the autonomous Jewish
social structure so as to
make entire Jewish communities
responsible for tax levies collectively
rather
than per

capita.

Non-payment was likely to result
in the taking of
the rabbi or other local leaders
as hostages.
Like other
serfs, Jews could not move from
one town to another,

marry,

or have more than one child
without permission.

Because

of their international connections,
however, Jews were

officially encouraged to settle in Germany
with
facilitating trade.

a

view to

Periodically, to assuage Christian

merchants' resentment, the government turned
a blind eye
while pogroms, anti-Jewish riots, decimated the
Jewish

population.

Invariably, a new set of Jews would be

invited in to continue the cycle. 53

Under Napoleon, after a lengthy investigation of
their allegiance, the Jews of Germany became citizens

before the law
-POttily.

.

In practice>

^

Because of its originS;

^_

emancipatiQn
was stigmatized by
tne concept
cnnno^-t- of
*
Y the
tyranny which in the
eyes of the aentile nnnni,^
population was attached
to all acts of
the Napoleonic

^..54

_^

^

newish trade which aroused
Hirschel Marx's protest;
1817
the decrees against
Jewish lawyers which
moved hi m to
convert.
the y ear Karl Marx was
horn, anti-je„ 1S h
riots broke out in p ruS
si a and continued
into the next
year.
(Because some Jews,
=w S especially
esneciaii,, veterans
of the
Napoleonic wars, fought
ougnt back,
bark the
n,„ whole
u
Jewish community
of Wurzburg was expelled. 55
In December ua2f
Frederick
William HI barred Jews from
teaching at universities or
56
schools.
The advocates of Jewish
emancipation were
forced to realize that noninal
citizenship would

m

,

•,

)

not

suffice.

They turned their efforts
to tearing down all
invidious legislation standing
in the way of full Jewish
participation in public life.

Before they could grapple with
the laws, though,
they had to confront centuries-old
prejudices against the
Jewish people.
"The image of the Jew prevailing
in the
public mind," writes leading Jewish
historian Jacob Katz,
was the image of the popular Christian
tradition,
combining the theological tenets of the Jews'
guilt
in rejecting the Christian message and
an aversion to
tne foreign tradesman whose greed and cunning
remain
unchecked by a common brotherhood in the one creed 5 7

That this caricature
convinced many educated
Germans is
borne out in the history of
the term "Jewish emancipation."
The Jews, initial thrust
at citizenship was called
by the
name of "naturalization,"
implying that all Jews had been
aliens in Germany up until
then.
An enlightened Protestant
minister then introduced the
nomenclature "civic betterment " ^£ge_rliche verbesserung)
which became widespread,
partly because it left ambiguous
who was to be bettered,
society or the Jews.
(The term "advancement" in
the name
of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored
People shares some of the same
uncertainty.)
Jewish
(

advocates finally took up the term
"emancipation" because
it "implied that natural rights
had been withheld
till

then from those concerned, and that
these must be

restored to them unconditionally." 58

Precisely for this

reason, opponents of Jewish rights objected
strenuously
to the label

"emancipation."

Jews, they contended, already

had all the rights they could handle: as Jews, they
were
too morally degraded to be equal to full citizenship. 59
The fear and suspicion of Jews that led to denunci-

ations such as these did not only arise from the popular
images of Christ-killers and Jewish moneymen, however.

Cultural differences made the Jews and Christians of
Europe strangers to each other, all the more incompre-

hensible for their apparent similarities.

From the

«
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Christian side, the
"Jewish question"
question t-h
therefore took on
the form of the query,
Are the
t-ho Jews
t
Y, "Are
congenitally
unsociable and rude, or
are
re tney
thev tM
this way as the result
of
being segregated into
60
ghettos?"
gnettos?
t u
John
Murray Cuddihy
calls this emphasis on
thee unseer.lv
m
unseemly manners
of the would-be
emancipated Jews "the
t-iic ordeal
.,.
oraeal of civilitv
"T,
h is
ty "
Th
problem,"
h e writes,
Stems ultimately... from
a
«=

^

'

_

.

-

..

disabung inabiuty

of Judaism to le
gitimate culturaUy

culture and society

" 61

^

dlfferentiaUon Qf

Put more simply: the
Jews of
d,,*.

Europe were unable, un„ill
ing

,

^

or failed tQ

need to privatize their
particular concerns and
characteristics in order to become
good citizens.
The politeness
of public life in the
Christian polity, "the fragile
solidarity of the survace we
call civility,
created a
schism in the lives and the
personalities of the Jews who
first encountered it.

«

m

'

:n-r^-nge „orl1rtf^fr^?L1e-1e

observing a strange halakha [code
Y
examine this world in^ImlTy with of conduct l?hev
wonder anger,
anger
and punitive objectivity 63
.

The Christian world, of course,
returns the compliment,
judging Jewish behavior by its own
standards as "public
mi sconduct," and resisting every
attempt to violate its
no rms of what can be spoken of and
what, for the sake of

decency, must be kept silent.
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The Jewlsh guestion
in Germanyi
C hristian puzzlement
as
tQ

— ——

Peopie W ho are unfitted
tQ b£ free

r

cts

us

theo1

_

treat an entire

Now
,

aithou

_

^

he shares the
conmon

assessment of the JSW1Sh
Tott-i cu
rehgl ° n
**-d, his strictures
on "Jewish Jesuitism"
descend in a straight
straicrht line from
the
Gospel imacre of tne
the Phari
Pharisees via Paul's
anathema on "the
Law" in the name of
64
"the Spirit."
About the
ADout
fh(3 provenance
of this stereotype,
at least,
YP
le^t there is no
mystery. Marx
also accepts the stock
picture of the Jewish
right down to the term
jJidentum for "commerce."
Even if
he does twist its usual
meaning into an indictment
of
Christian society for its
own - Jewishness - he
can only
achieve this end by agreeing
to identify Jews and
money.
What is curious about this
is that nothing in Marx's
native milieu would naturally
lead him to this
-

.

-

i

i

•

,

,

conclusion.
His birthplace, Trier,
contained only 260 Jews out of
a
Population of 12 000-a little
higher than the national
average, but still only roughly
2%.
Among the more urban
Jews of Trier, the statistically
most likely occupations
would have been artisanship and
innkeeping, not money65
lending or trade.
There was little scope for high
finance in Trier anyway: located in
the heart of the
,

Moselle wine country, its economy was
primarily agricultural,
in fact, though a higher percentage

of Jews

n° n - Jews

Uved

ln

—
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*• Je „ ish population of
the government
distriet centered on
Trier
or more than two .6S
thirds

^

^

„

'

what he really
experienced, neither his
negative
f .cation of Jews
and "huckstering,.,
nor its double,
Judaism as the elemental
social rorce
force of h,
human need, would
have been possible for
him.

VI

The symbols -jew" and

..

^

Judaism „ in Rarl

the Jewish Question" owe
their existence to „idel y he id
stereotypes rather than
empirical example. „ a rx
employs
them as literary terms of
art, playing on their
various
nuances to denigrate the
political state (because its
existence implies that of
"Jewish" civil society)
to
,

deride political emancipation
(because it leaves "Judaism"
in control), and to assert
the superiority of his own
approach ("the negation of Judaism")
to the problem of how
to make humanity free.
Having said
this, we still have

left what Marx meant by "Judaism"
in doubt.

For, within

the boundaries of those stereotypes,
there is simply no

room for the positive connotations the
unity with practical
need sheds on Judaism in Marx's theory.
Instead of

ennobling Judaism, one would think the link with
casuistry,
greed, and outlandish manners would demean civil
society.

.

Vet for Marx, altho ug h
the

..

Jewishness „ q£

^

i- an argument for
transcending

^

ter is what mak es its
transcendence (and that
cf the
state, and of the rift
hetween the m poS si ble
Apparently
the Jewish defects of
civil society are its
virtues as
well.
How can we understand
this?
,

.

We must remember our
earlier observation that
for
Marx to plaoe value on
any social phenomenon,
it must
really exist, i.e., produce
material effects.
(Marx's
view is. no simple utilitarianism:
effective reality is a
necessary condition of his
esteem, but not always
sufficient.)
By this standard we can
readily see that
ish rudeness" must indeed
be judg ed a virtue
In "On
the Jewish Question," as noted
earlier, Marx declares

^

,

Christianity "too refined, too
spiritual to eliminate the
crudeness of practical need." 67 it

takes no great leap of

the imagination to read this as an
indirect swipe at Bruno
Bauer, since ignoring the power
of practical need over
political life is Marx's precise reproach
to his former
teacher.
By calling attention to the brute
economic
facts, Marx violates the norms of Left
Hegelian discourse
an d states unwelcome truths in an obnoxious
"Jewish"

manner
Nor does he let the matter rest.

Family

,

In The Holy

the interminable polemic against the Left Hegelian

,
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"critical Critics" fh
= f Marx
\«
that
and Engels compiled
in 1844
the authors attach
Bruno" onoe again.
tad once
Marx chooses the Jewish
qu e Stl on as Ms
battlefield.
This
time, though, he draws
a tight oonnectlQn
betKeen
vulgaris, and the ability
to see the mean.ng
of real human
freedom, the Kind that
onl y communism he
new asserts) can
achieve

^

^

(

in

Ch * lns

"the idea" and that

^

massT^xTsrfnc"

m

measure at once the «itira?
Profane

co^s^d

'

m
gines
that is biriifUT

1 ™****
1*?™
S atement
^

all

°ne can

SiSSH^^'

^H|££_lheory as an
illusion, and desires So?
besides the
idealistic "win " verv
Very P al Pable, material
condifinno 68^'

™?

L^i^^T'

The Jews are "massy"
they lead

a

(of

"massy existence"

.

the masses, plebian)

and

(lumpish, material, real).

They cannot imagine real freedom
on their own: that is
left for Marx himself to do.
Even they are capable of
seeing, though, that Bauer's
proffered form of freedom
stems partly from the desire not to be
"embarrassed"

by

them any longer.

For their cramped but secure mode of

survival, Bauer offers "emancipation in mere
theory ."

We

can hear Marx warning, as he did in "On the
Jewish

Question," that the Jews must hold out for the real thing.
Even more, however, we can recognize an unexpected parallel

Marx is drawing between
profane sociaiism
Profane socialise in
fact seems fco be
its insistence on
changing "very palpable

Md

t

^

^

,

conditions..: the same
p r0 g ram whlch

,

materiai

^

one year
Marx had called "the
negation [or abolition
or
,
cendence] of Judalsm
Marx's success at co m inc
„
to grips
wxth the real issue ,as
he understood
,

.

it,

of hurnan

freedom is here connected,
not with his education,
nor
with his class background,
but with his Jewishness.
later works, he tries
to dodge the issue of
his own
consciousness, but here, between
the lines, he hints at
an
explanation.

m

When we consider the argument
of The_Jip y_Family in
i
conjunction with the line Marx
pursues
Question," the example of the
Jews tells us vital
elements of Marx's conception of
how people become free.
One predisposing factor is
certainly the position they
occupy in civil society, or what
Marx calls

T^nT^ish

"the particular

situation of Judaism in the present
enslaved world." 69
Another such factor would be a standpoint
which is not
"too refined, too spiritual" to concede
the vicissitudes
of human need; a perspective, a set
of cultural resources
that direct people to take material
conditions seriously

without being cowed into accepting them as immutable.
Over his lifetime, Marx oscillates between granting
one
or the other the primary role.

When revolution looks

imminent, he credits
objective social relations,
rP l,K
while when
the prospects of upheaval
dim, he turns to blame
the
ideological limitations of
70
the masses.
In general
though, his attention
shifts to the study of
political
economy, and as it does,
the proletariat takes
center
stage, while the Jews
disappear into the wings.
Continuously throughout Marx's
writings, however, we
find a tension in his notion
of freedom that appears
first
and most clearly in "On the
Jewish Question" as we have
read it.
Everyday, practical Judaism
is rooted, according
to Marx, in the realities
of civil society during
a

capitalist age.

For that reason, its negation
goes

lockstep with the superseding of
the conditions that
maintain it: the power of money, the
exchange system,
ultimately, capitalism itself.
the

m

Jewish perspective which had

freed world, the

criticized the old society

and helped the new one to be born would
lose its reason
for being.
Both in its sabbath and everyday versions,
it

would disappear, the former exploded, the
latter deprived
of its material basis.

The "particular situation" of

Judaism would be dissolved.

The Jews themselves would be

absorbed into the species as the abstract citizen

is

absorbed into the individual.
And yet... even from the standpoint of human emancipation,

"Can the Jews be required to abolish Judaism?"

.
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Emancipation, as Marx
describes
68 it
n
Xt
P^ceeds by reading
°- s "particular situation „
cioseiy
s
Poss ibiliti es, and
reinterpreting it through
° rder
bSCOme
oannot succeed,
however
«- re-reading, the author
'

«

"

—

_

•

»

is

is it that becomes
free'

Marv>
arX

c
S

^

^^^^ ^

^

,

if

annihUated __ for

« wn
°

^entity is bound up
with the "Jewish"
activity of
„
or critiri
criticizing
alienated human
ixfe.
what possible world
would his anxiety over
trading the substantial
Jewish perspective for
an Ul usory
freedom finally disappear?

m

All of which presents
us with a fourth and
final
question about Karl Marx.
Could it be that Marx's
sooial
and political theory in
general is structured by
assumptions and patterns of
thought which can also be
found
within the Jewish tradition?
How would recognizing these
affinities have transformed Marx's
understanding of his
theory? how might it affect
ours? This is the Jewish
question about Marx we will
explore in the following

chapters

"

.

CHAPTER TWO
THE POWER OF THE TONGUE
Are we Jews? Are we Greeks?
in th.
e
difference between the Jew and We live
?
n
Whi
° h is
perhaps the unity of what is
canL l^'
live in ana of Jf f

L

erencV^? Verify.

r e WS
re
?
re We
tn o t a ch ronol o gic al
bu

T

S?

What

?

«^

?
Are we
question) first
6S the stran 9 e dialogTIe—

raa /^logical

Jews or first Greeks? And
between ETJew
S
for, of th e TsoTuVl

.

U^li^^l^r^
taut^gf

e^rL

heterology...

^

*>rma?

Or,

on the contrary

ano^

dnp^

infinite «epa«?ion
of
the unthinkable unsayable
transcendence
of the other?
Tn what
wh^f horizon
J
To
of peace does the language
which ask
"
Fr ° m Whence do s
t
energy of its question? Can it
enerav'of
account for the
C
C
P
and Hel l-nism? And
^' q ° f JUdaiSm
what is the
tL legitimacy,
what is the meaning of the
n
r ° P0Siti0n fr0m
P erh *PS the most
H^HiTfan nf
6
n ° VellStS: "'-greek
greekjew.
'

•

"

T

^^

^

SKs—Jacques/ ^

"

me'et"?

Derrida,

"Violence and Metaphysics 1,1

The tradition within which we generally
read the

writings of Marx is called "modern political
thought."

it

is a line of descent that stretches from
Machiavelli down

to the present day.

Modern political thought can trace

its origins to Christian theology.

Either by continuing

it or by reacting against it, modern theorists
acknowledge

this inheritance.

Because of its Christian roots, the

understanding of reality on which modern political thought
has nurtured itself

ontology

— rests

—what

philosophers generally call an

on the attempt to combine Jewish thinking
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.

with GreeK which has
characterized so m uch of
christian
religious thought.
Derrida's pointed questions
suggest, however, that
neither the theological nor
the theoretical enterprise
squarely confronts the question
of its own possibility.
What if Jewish and Greek
thinking were radically and
irreconcilably different, and to
synthesize the, would be
to do violence to both?
order to consider

m

that

possibility, it seems, theorists
and theologians alike
would have to renounce the dream
of absolute knowledge,
whether of the world or the cosmos.
One clear picture of
how things are could only arise
if, from the right
perspective, the whole of reality made
a single sense.
if,
though, the ontology on which we relied
were fundamentally
in tension with itself, then truth,
too, would speak in
many voices, and it would have to be heard
that way, as

well

Derrida argues that, faced with

a

bedrock conflict

between Jew and Greek, theorists should feel enormous
pressure to question their motives for doing theory.
What interest, he asks, compels the enforced detente

between the two modes of though?
peace" when there is no peace?

Why do we cry "Peace,
In the reduction of two

divergent species of thought to one and the same

— and,

most keenly, in the expulsion of the specifically Jewish,

"
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and the consequent bodily

«

rsi on of Western
thought in

the baptismal waters of
the Greco-Christian
traditionDerrida detects a kind of
Inquisition.
He opposes this
"ontologic.1, or transcendental
oppressron 2 which does
not consist of imposing
one ontology on another,
but
rather of posing "ontology"
(reality as Being,
,

a peculiarly

Greek notion) as the only way
reality can be understood. 3
Whether or not we confirm the
full range of Derrida 's
suspicions, we find that, in
order even to ask whether
Jewish patterns of thought
re-emerge in Karl Marx's
thinking, we shall have to rescue
the difference of Jew
and Greek from disuse in modern
political theory.
By

itself, however, that will hardly
suffice.

if modern

political thought does indeed move
within the "horizon of
peace" of which Derrida speaks, we
would be foolhardy to
expect the difference to reveal itself
at a glance.

Jewish

and Greek modes of thought are not "entirely
discrete

functions that can be neatly peeled apart for
inspection—

apparently, like the different colored strands of electrical wiring." 4

Especially for

a

thinker like Marx, who

stands in ambiguous relation both to Judaism and to Greek

philosophy, the illusory unity that philosophical language
forges out of the two traditions becomes an inescapable

feature of linguistic reality.
sets limits to what

a

The identity of the two

thinker can say, write, or even

think, if

s /he

entirely unexpected way,

^ce"

^^

means to be intelligible<
.,

Theory

<as Marx puts

^

_

The theoretical
practice of

collapsing Jewish assumptions
ontology insures that

^ ^

^

^^

reauty

^

exhibit neither in any
unalloyed fo rm
mistaken to look for pure

.

^

We would be

samples.

How, then, can we go
about inquiring into
the

affinities between Marx;s
ontology and traditional
Jewish
thought, if comparing them
directly is only a first
step?

propose we use the special
hermeneutic style characterized earlier as a
non-»Marxist reading of Marx:
to
seek out gaps, discrepancies,
rough spots, incipient
contradictions in Marx's ontology
and to read through and
beyond them to understand what
that thought now means.
I

In the following discussion,
we shall be concerned

with the incapacity of more orthodox
readers of Marx,
grounding themselves in the
Greco-Christian tradition, to
reach all of the complexities of the
real that Marx
either displays or presupposes. Where
they
fall short,

we will investigate whether placing Marx's
theory in the
context of Jewish thought gives a more satisfying
account.
We can employ the method of interpreting
the gaps in

Marx's writings that a Greek-oriented reading leaves

unnoticed even if we suspect that the first one to

r

SUCh 3 r

—-

of wrrtrng we identified
earuer

1UXUry
meaning.

°

f

bel

^

the

«•

^

^

The phllo£ophy

aoes

^

arbiter of his own

Resnprt-fnii,,
Respectfully, we may
dispute his self-interpre-

tatron.

indeed, respect may
demand that we do so.
If
in
the process of searching
out the hidden
implieations of

understanding of reality, we
find affinities with
Jewish
thought, refracted though
they may be

,

his

we will then have

reason to question Marx's
inattention to the relation
between Judaism and his own
thinking.
From examining the
interstices of his writing, we
would then turn to probing
the curious absences in
his life and thought,
adding
another, less obvious dimension
to the Jewish question
about Marx.
Let us turn first, though,
to exploring exactly how
Jewish and Greek thought diverge,
and where they lead.

II

Life and death are in the power of
the tongue.
--Babylonian Talmud"
In language there lies a petrified
philosophy.

— philologist

Max Mueller 7

The disjunction between "Greek" and "Hebrew"
modes
of thought has been recognized in the West
for centuries.

Matthew Arnold, in

a

famous essay, declared, "Hebraism and

Hellenism— between these two points of influence moves our

world." 8

^

in

the earlier part
nart of this
century, with his
magisterial Israel- ti-<? Hf Q
^-i^-iiif^-^ll^ult^, Johannes
Pedersen devoted four
volumes to a historic
nistorical examinatiu
on
which presumes and
reinforces this contrast.*
The classi c
exposition, however,
arrives with T horiie f
soman's Hebrew

»^Compare<^^

Despite

^

some of it justified,
this work renins the
indispensable
starting point for
discussion of Jewish and
Greek thinking
Therefore, we will go into
it in some

Boman sees the contrast
between Hebrew and Greek
thought as fundamental.
As he conceives it,
"What in each
of the two peoples remained
identical with itself curing
the people's entire
mental-spiritual history was more
essential than the later
alterations and transformations.-*0
Although he recognizes the
different complexions each
tradition can wear (Aristotle and
Homer, or Exodus and
Ecclesiastes)
he affirms that each possesses
an underlying
unity.
For Boman, the Greek conception
of the world
reaches its fullest expression in the
works
,

of Plato, so

that he treats Aristotle, for instance,
primarily as a
later Platonist. 11 Similarly, the thought
structure of
the Hebrew bible, as he interprets it,
regulates his
concept of Hebrew thought in general.
an antithesis which, he says,

He thus constructs

"is already there, but it

does not lie

intone,

word or

viewpoint; yet it extends
throughout tne whole
to eve ry
1Z
"
detail
.

The opposition between
Hebrew and Greek,
moreover,
applies not only to
thought
gnt, but to t„,
feelmg and judgment.
interesting, in li ght of
our earlier finding
•

that

"-deness" ma de the emancipation
of the European Jews
impractical is Boman

'

s

following observation:

From its own] viewpoint
Greek mental activity
,„n ^
appears harmonious, prudent L^f
?
to the person to whoS
Cef ul
P
the Greek Kina
klnd^f^hH
of thinking
occurs nlainlv
a~
„
and its
mannersor expression^' HebreW thinki
Srated
--derate
discordant
|

"

i

,

anTin

i

,

;

^

Cad^^^ f^

'

.

,

What divides these two
great cultural styles so
sharply,
the first place, it is their
ontology, in the
strict sense of "notion of
being." Boman describes Greek
ontology as static-or, in its
own terms, harmonious.
What really is, for the Greeks,
always

m

is.

^

therefore
9
rest and in harmony, and
an higher
hfh
all
being is unalterable and indestructiblethere is also a certain order of
rank among all
existing things.
The more original a thing is,
the
more being it has and the higher is
its dignity."

Examples spring to mind of how Greek
philosophers

constantly presume that what changes or passes
away is not
as real,

true, or good as what remains fixed and
unmoving.

In the Timaeus
a

,

Plato assigns the creation of the world to

lesser divinity, or demiurge, carefully keeping the

ultimate persona of his god above the process, as if

.
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action and material
substance were medla
medis to ° gross for
the
highest reality.
in tk„
the cSyjmpc^ruj,, he
ydiscusses how
human love can become
divine b y ascending
gradually from
the incidental beauty
of an individual to
the idea of
beauty itself, which never

^

m

^

^

doctrine of the forms
emphasizes that true being
manifests
Itself only imperfectly, as
shadows on the walls of
a dimlyUt cave, as long as it must inhabit
physical
bodies.

Bodies age and decay, matter
crumbles, but reality is
eternal

Aristotle's teleology, or doctrine
of final ends,
stretches the "order of rank
among all existing thingsover time, so that any being
in his philosophy may
eventually reach the peculiar
excellence of which it is
capable.
addition, the idea of a telos-as
opposed to
that of an eidos, or form-lifts
some of the stigma of
mortality from bodily human existence.
The notion of
teleological development allows for the
human life-cycle;
it even sets a value on growth and
change,

m

as long as they

conduce to the final end.

In light of this, Western

theory has celebrated Plato as the philosopher
of being and
Aristotle as the philosopher of becoming.
On Boman's view and by comparison with Hebrew
thought,

however, Aristotle's conception hardly seems such

departure.

Plato's "forms" set

a

a

great

standard for the good

life which is given
before anyy and
ana all
.
all attempts
to live it
Aristotle's -ends" ana
"excellences" do the same.
„e ither
thrn.er permits human beings
tQ determine
determining) our own goals:
we are only
onlv t„
to *
discover them
and to embody them, as
far as we are aole.
ln this manner
Boman implies, Aristotle's
ontology, like Plato s
rests on
the disposition to reqard
realit-u
*r,A the
±u
u
reality and
y
human role within
17
it as essentiallv
xxy iixed.
\7
fixpd
& v, consistently,
very
therefore,
Aristotle reserves his highest
ethical rung for the
followers of the contemplative
life, who fix their attention
on the immutable truths the
universe displays for the
edification of human reason. 18
the Greek tradition,
spiritual realities befit the
concern of the most noble
persons, and the saintliest souls
are those who devote
their lives to those things they
cannot change.
'

^

,

,

m

For the Hebrew thinker of biblical
times, in contrast,

reality is dynamic and constantly in
motion.

Boman states:

"Motionless and fixed being is for the Hebrews
a nonentity;
19
it does not exist for them."
To illustrate this proposition, he points to various peculiarities of
the way that

verbs function in the Hebrew language.

For example, the

verb root sheket can translate into English both as
"to be
silent" and "to become silent."

Neither, Boman argues,

really fits the character of the verb as

willfull activity":

"a

conscious,

"to hush," with its studied ambiguity
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over who is hushing
whom, is the best th«
the lan 9uage can
20
"It
°is really m0 re
correct
i

baling here neither with
with

to say that we are

a

'being- nor a

.

beC o ming

.

but

a

dynamic third possibility,
therefore
tnererore mn
more an
1,21
'effecting
i

1

.

This third possibility,
i„ which the
distinctiQn
between being and becoming
is "experienced ...
as a unity,"
is the touchstone of
Hebrew thought as Boman
outlies it 22
What is, to the Hebrew
mind, is not always

the same: it
moves, it changes, it acts
and responds to action.
"To
be" and "to become" are
the same word in Hebrew,
and that
word, hayah, is » a true
verb

^^

f

^^

Through countless examples,
Boman demonstrates that hayah
virtually always means action-the
producing

of an effect.

Consequently, the idea of ontology
as "study of beingmisleads us when we examine that
which is real to Hebrew
thought.

In biblical usage,

in so far as

"being" is

something real, it is also "becoming,"
while being as
distinct from becoming hardly seems
real at all.

Boman provides a further example of the
dynamism of
biblical Hebrew: its verb tenses. Modern
Hebrew follows
the pattern English speakers know best.
It divides all

actions into past, present, and future.

The bible,

however, knows but two tenses: perfect and imperfect.

The

first designates action which has reached its completion;

"

the second refers to
action the effects
eirects of which
h
u
are "still
in process of coming
24
and becoming.
,

l

Just as Hebrew thought
treats continuity and
change as
one, similarly, Soman
understands it to consider
actions
together with their lived
conseguences
As long as a deed
continues to make its influence
felt on the course of
current events, it is present
and incomplete.
.

Thus, the

structure of Hebrew verb tenses
moves the Hebraicallyminded thinker to think of
reality as somehow still
unformed and pliable, yet capable
of imposing an obligation
to act.
Reality may even manifest itself
most strikingly
where it is most incomplete, since
that is where action is
most demanded.
Not surprisingly, then-even if
it deviates from the
practice common to Greek and most European
languages-

Hebrew tenses operate "from the standpoint
of an experi25
encing person," be that person human or
divine.
Whether an
action has reached its fullness does not
depend
on the

essential qualities of the activity, nor on the
detached
judgment of some hypothetical observer.

Rather, it is

determined by how the act resonates in the life of someone
caught up in the process which it sets into motion.
Therefore, it is entirely possible for different people to

view the same situation as ended or not yet complete,

depending on their relatiQn
to
categorizing it.

^

their

^

The dynamic-static
distinction Boman draws
between
'Hebrew and Creek thus
separates two opposed ways
of looking
at reality: one which
calls movement, action,
and change
prrmary and includes "mere
being" as a moment in
the
process of becoming, versus
one which privileges
balance
and immutability and
which regards true being
as eternal.
Now, this fundamental
disagreement plays itself out
over a
number of other related areas.
Pirst: according to Boman,
Greeks and Hebrews differ over
the right way to conceptualize space and time.

.

For us

[sic]

space is like a great container
that
holds everything together^
space is also the place where
we can live breathe
X
elY
****
*
He grewsf5t

HZT'

ar

" n * e ?'

-

^

Is Boman perhaps waxing overly
poetic here?

£?%V

Obviously, the

ancient Hebrew like anyone else occupied
three dimensions
in space, lived in them, and
traveled through them. What
he really means to show is that Hebrew
thought identifies
time with the events it contains, while
Greek thinking, in

order to come to grips with time at all, must
express it
in terms of space.

Consider the time-line, a conceptual

device that maps our complex and often confused sense of
time's passage onto the physical distance between one point
and another.

Boman traces the origin of this spatial
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metaphor to Plato's definition
of time as
moving i mage
of eternity" and Aristotle's
insistence that temporal
existence is represented best
"by the image of
movement
2
along a line." ? A line is
infinitely thin, because each
of its points occupies no
area.
it also stretches on
to
infinity in both directions simply
by juxtaposing po.nts;
it never relates them one
to the next, nor melds
them into
any larger entity.
They remain discrete. what
matters
for this conceptualization
is not what kind of
time one

passes but simply how much.

Amounts of time, in turn,

come to be gauged according to
the language of distance,
by how far one "point in time"
lies from another.
In constrast to this formal and
quantitative approach

to time, Boman explains,

"The Israelites understood time

as something qualitative, because for
them time is
determined by its content." 28 Instead of attempting
to

stand apart from events and watch them shuffle
by

fixed

a

point marked "the present," Hebrew thought anchors
its

conception of time to the interests of the person experi-

encing the action.

Events mark time's passage, engraving

specific moments in memory.

Of course, biblical Hebrew

can still tell noon from midnight, or one year from

another.

Far more important, though, are the expressions

which do not merely define

a

period for us but actually

acquaint us with it: "wartime, peacetime hard times
,

,

time

1

of mourninq,
9,
h K1
biblical

f
P = cf
reast

4-^^^
time,

£

favourable tune...
time

.

.

,

Hebrew discern.

times and activities
6S
'

Bcclesiastes,

" To

through the

,,2y

^

4_

^

h

!;

*

Furthermore,

lntr «sic connection
between
sc ln the *
35
famous verse from
•

everythlng there

SVery PUrPO
time to die

^

«

™=

•

^

^

^^ ^
^

to be born ana a

K^
The
p urpose of particular
moments
rp

l ife

experrence of societ.es
and .ndividuals
Because Hebrew thought
perceives different
as internal^ related
rather than as mere
"points in time
Boman believes it immensely
advances "the capacity for
experiencing contemporaneity." 30
Historian Yosef Hayim
Yerushalmi has observed that
up until the modern

-

era, Jews

hardly relied at all on the
writing of history to
preserve
group memories.
Instead, in evocative ceremonies
like the
Passover Seder, "Both the language
and the gesture are
designed to spur, not so much a
leap of memory as a fusion
of past and present.
Memory here is no longer
recollection,
which still preserves a sense of
distance, but reactualization." 3
a similar vein, Boman claims
that biblical
Hebrew usages facilitate "the feeling
of contemporaneity...
when the psychical content of two
periods

m

of time appears

identical."

32

He emphasizes, however, that this
capacity

does not imply an objective pattern of
repetition or

"
62

recurrence in history.
y

indeed
maeed, „h*«what links different
historical moments in
the Hehr,^
ebraiC mind 15 their
import for
the fulfilment of
divine commands.
Just
Ubt as individual
.„
and
socxal purposes organize
fche human
•

i

,

•

,

eve ryday life

,

so does

^

^

^^

t

^

fchink GQd s
,

understand them structure
the Hebrews
history.
..Hence in the framework
of Hebrew piety
eschatology is just as
necessary a oonciusion
as Mutable
eternrty is for the Greeks
who think reli i ous l
-

^

,

g

y

.

From his stress on the
Hebrew regard for time's
content (as versus its
formal quantification,
one might
think that soman would go
on to suggest that Greek
is to
form as Hebrew is to content.
He does come perilously
close to such a broad equation.
Looking
,

closer, though,

what he is really arguing
is that whereas Greek
thinkers
make much of the dichotomy
between form and content, or
form and matter, the writers
of the Hebrew bible minimize
the difference. Neither form
nor content interests them
by itself, and empty formality,
in particular, counts as
less real in their thinking.
How can
this be?

Is it

possible for an intellectual culture to
survive without
making formal distinctions?
Boman never denies that Hebrew thought
can devise

classes with which to group objects at

a

higher level of

.
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attraction.

„ e does maintain

^

HebraicaUy . minded
thinkers arrive at
abstractions by , very
than those Western
philosophers usually take
and
formal definition need
not lie along its
way.
When we [sic] draw a
w» f
.
9'
draw the outline with tree-trunk
of a11
two
that we can even see
WS believe
the
error, however, for when contour
eally in
he tree and
P to thfV
go around it, we can see we go k nv
and wood but n °
kind of strokes
°° ?
ThUS these are
only auxiliary lines
whicn
tr°
duce
voluntarily
into what we see in order
tn m i?
re P re ^tation of
the visual impression
Accordfno t

^
^

mSLfr"

l^'

i

is Precisely

wnaf tnf

^
TiT^
,

'

'

^^t^o^ure W

The correctness of Boman^s
art theory is not at issue
here.
His point is evident: drawing
lines around reality
may not finally depict it any
more clearly.
instead, we
may strive to view the form
of an object and its matter
as
coextensive.
Thus, in Hebrew a boundary, for
example, is
not a line of demarcation, a
"thus far and no further,"
but rather a natural landmark,
such as a hill or tree,
that actually belongs to the area
it bounds.
As with
territory, so with ideas. Boman notes
that the word

"definition" comes from the Latin findo

,

or "split":

if a

piece of wood is split into two parts and
they are put
back together, there is a boundary line
between the two
pieces, a line which takes up no space."

So,

too, Greek

thinkers abstract from matter to create abstract repre-

"
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sentations which, unlike
real OD]ects
obiect«.
drawing boundaries.
"it

'

«
ca n

u
„
be
defined
by

is in such
*nnh acts as
these that

Greek, Indo-European
logical thinking consists." 35
Hebrew thinking, by the sa
me token, is like
perception
without auxiliary lines:
at its sharpest at
the center of
its field of vision, it
"diminishes in clarity in
all
directions until it ends in
imperceptibility 36 To
"define" something in this
mode is to progress from
its
clear, paradoxically definitive
center in one's own
experience of it toward the
fringes of one's relation to
it.
.

If Hebrew thinking does
refuse to separate form and

content, then one might expect
three other disagreements
between Hebrew and Greek thought:
on the relation between
thought and thing, on that of word
and deed, and on the
nature of truth. Boman does, in fact,
find evidence of
such disagreements.
On the one hand, to the Greek mind,
"The thing is a means of knowing.

The one who seeks to

know is not attemptina to alter something
or other in his
fsic] environment, but he is trying only
to observe how

it

really is."
the divine:

37

To reflect on true being is to partake of

indeed,

"The standpoint of the spectator is

already divine in itself." 38

To the Hebrew, however,

"Things have a meaning; they are symbols given in

nature." 39

A Hebrew thinker would fail utterly to

comprehend Goethe's epigram,

"All that is transitory is

.

only

symbol," because seeking
find a guide
« to action
y to tmd
in the fleeting events
of Uv. is paying
attention tQ
precisely what is real
from tne
a

4Q

,

Likewise, where the
Greek philosophers
complain of
the inadequacy of
language, to the Hebrew
thinker true
speech is synonymous
with effective reality.
One term,
d-var. covers the meanings
thine,,
and

^

^

lie for the Hebrews is
not as it is for us
[sic] a nonagreement with the truth..
For him [sic], the lie
is the
internal decay and destruction
of the word."*! Language
has power, end truth is
the word's result in
action.
"That which is powerless,
empty, and vain is a lie:
a

spring which gives no water
lies." 42

Hebrew thought

accordingly seeks truth in
trustworthy relations between
actors in the temporal and
material world, while Greek
thought looks for truth in valid
perceptions

of the eternal,

spiritual reality.
The distinction could not be more
clear— but it must
become much more precise before we can
inquire where, in
its terms, the thinking of Karl Marx
stands.

Ill

Boman's comparison of Hebrew and Greek thought
makes
very strong claims, and it has drawn criticism
of equal
intensity.

Linguist James Barr attacks, not the "thought

contrast" itself

hnf
'

three »a ln grounds.
.

1

r
""

and Greek is

langUa9S

SSmantlC

"

—— —
First

^

-Wortln,

he argues> Boraan

,

matic

^

,

it on

s

—

Boman fails to
examine

.

«~-

UKe

statie and
absolutely instead of
along a cQntinu
languages, an d makes
his comparisQns
would produce nonsensical
results iff applied
.
t
to ancient
Egyptian or modern German,
43
I

"

^

^

i

for example.

Second, Barr raises
serious doubts about
whether
language and thought
directly
rectiy corr,i
af
correlate,
as Boman constantly
r Boman s habit Qf contrasting
wxth its alleged
^plications with Greek thought
and not in
the first place with
Greek linguistic structure"
only
obscures the issue rurtner.)
44
further
n=
Barr
warns of f'the danger
of taking a sense of a
word along with its context

P-u^.

^

.

)

and

suggesting that the significance
which is given through
associations of the context is in
fact the indicator value
of the word." 45 That danger
he contendS/

is fche confusion

,

of end use and meaning.

To use language at all,
people

must structure their utterances
according to "linguistic
form and type," which may have
nothing to do with
"distinctions in the actual objects."
Grammatical gender,
for instance— the rules by which
various languages

determine at what points to assign

a

gender to objects, or

to maintain a correspondence between
gender and

sex— "is

a
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prime example of

a lin guistic

structure
ure w nich cannot
be
taken to reflect a
thought problem.
„ particuNot
1NOt a11
t
larities of a lanquaqe
ge tell
tell »«
us anything about
the way the
speakers of that language
think. Barr explains:
Even on the most general
^
fh 0 .
1 lGVe1
relation is assumed to
if a
exist
IT**
etWeen
the mental
pattern of a certain
structure of ?heir JaJanf Stl ° gr ° Up and the
° ne Would h ^e
choice of at least It
the
"owing simple relations:
a) that the m
by the
linguistic structure;
ottVat he
h
lin
guistic
structure is dpto™^^
u
that thfy
C
Under c) can perhaps
lnt eractive.
y
2
be Lflofl 11 f
d) that the
ther al ternative
interaction is not
MStant and unif:orm,
but occurs only hanhazLJ ,
°=
and therefore for
P ° ints
reasons
have to be

«

!

.

.

.

.

'

lin.
JT^
'

a^^^^^T™'

>

/^" ^

LT,
separate^e^T
1711^11^
i

Third, Barr attributes
to Boman a vested
interest in

the Hebrew-Greek
distinction arising out of
the desire to
prove "the uniqueness of
Christianity. » scholars
grouped
under the rubric of biblical
theology ma ke much of the
fact that Christianity tries
to combine Hebrew and
Greek
thinking, an apparently
impossible task.
They therefore
try to show that Christianity
"belongs with Jewish thought
as a roughly homogeneous entity
clearly set apart from the
other currents of European thought." 48
This preconceived

notion heightens the reader's
awareness of any linguistic
feature which seems to make Hebrew
thought more idiosyncratic, at the same time classifying
evidence which does
not bear on the issue as neutral. 49

.
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B—s

criticise ana cautions
serve the useful

Purpose of alerting us to those
instances

^^^^
ntua^for^^^^^^^
^

Boman

_

s

tnese excesses, we
oan f ind an
emanation in Bo.an-,
very Cree* approach
to distinguish^
Greek

^

or demarcation
between the m

^fining- them by mutual
exclusion after the fashion
"<s
he calls
cans in
In others
"InaoEuropean logical thinking.-"
By taking the
identifying
" 3rtS
e m ° deS ^selves,
he reinvents Hebrew
ana
Greex as abstract types.
He can then see the
examples he
Cite, as the m atter that
embodies the for m al
categories
ana this makes easy the
over-interpretation of which
Barr
complains
,

^

^ "

Beyond that, Boman

historical change.

•

s

typology fails to allow for

His concepts "Hebrew" and
"Greek-

reside in some timeless and
universal dimension of thought,
as in reality languages
can only do once they are
dead.
This atemporal perspective
inclines Boman to locate his
comparison of the two modes within
a world of ideas and
thinkers in which Hebrew and Greek
exist as opposing
essences, always have, and always
will, even (one
suspects)

if there had never been any Jews
or Greeks to

instantiate them.

Consequently, he lays himself open to

Barr's methodological reproach.

"

^

Whereas Boman overestimates
his ability tQ
Hebraically, Barr makes
no effort at a,
311 ln tfc
th at direction.
„
u
hlm " hether r
Greek thought differs
°
from its
Hebrew counterpart is
a guestion that
oan only be settled
thro Ugh Gr ee k - liKe
processes of definition

"

"

.

i

i

'

To Barr,

for instance,

^^^^

the m eanin of a
g
word properly

consists of its "indicator
value," a Kind of
Piatonic
^eal of the word that transcends
an y partrcuiar
context in
which it mi g ht visi bly
appear.
The Hehraic sanation
that
proper meaning mi ht actually
g
be constituted by
context
would seem to him absurd.
Barr, therefore, stands
in the
uncomfortable position of Alioe
beyond the loo klng - la S s,
g
in the Red Queen's garden.
"When you sav
niii,
y 'hill
ij
i

you^u call
"No

•

+-v,~ ^
the
Queen lnterruni-ori

"

thaVa^fle ".^"^

»t

1

shouldn't," said Alice, surprised
into
at last: "a hill'can t be
a
valley, you know.
That would be noEseKie--"
The Red Queen shook her head.
"You may call it
nonsense' if you like," she said,
nonsense, compared with which that "but I've heard
wouldT^as
sensible as a dictionary "52
I

contracting her

'

!

The Red Queen,

exactly right.

infuriating though she may be, has it

To a mind which, like Barr's,
conceives

truth as never varying regardless of
persons,

a

hill

cannot be a valley, and the dictionary is
the final

arbiter of meaning.

53

No wonder he thinks the Hebrew-

Greek distinction "over-dramatized.
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HOW, though
S

°

^

,

—

could we go abQut
reading

t0 C

intended proiecf?
Jecr
that when he

PhiXosopMca! writings of

e.

Thus

an d co mplete his

^
^
^ ^ ..^

At his most precis n«
Precise, Boman
recognizes
says „ Greek> „ he
-

^

**«

,

but With texts

he ls
.

actuany deaung>

»Bo m an.sana lysisof

^^
theHebrewmind>

however, does nof »+•
=n touch upon
at all
the concept of the
text
itself and the Jewish
relation» to it,
e
it » as
a, Susan
Handelman
rightly remarks. 54 in
ordor to raise the
order
question of how
"Hebrew thouqht"
gnt enters
entprc into the
thought processes of an

m

up the typology in
three dimensions.

"Hebrew" will descend
into the material world
and become "Jewish."
"Thoughtwill travel through time
and come out as "tradition."
Finally, "textuality" will
emerge from between the
line
those auxiliary lines that
Boman forgot to erase-to
take
on weight and substance and
a specifically Jewish
55
coloration.
For, as Handelman intimates
it makes all the

—

,

difference that the text we are
scrutinizing is the Torah
and that the tradition of reading
through which we will
seek the meaning of the text is
the Jewish tradition.
As
one bible scholar observes,

reading is more than reading:

"For the Jewish tradition,
it is a love affair with the text."56
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The

~

IV

-

-ws a Pply to the five
**
boQks
Moses, or Pentateuch,
and inabroader

W>U.

fro m Ge ne sis

t

oC to „ icle ,

_

^

^

^

^^

These writings
the constant source
of Jewish cuiture.
Every week in
syna gogU e for the last
two thousana yea rs,
observant Jews
have heard a portion
of tne Torah reaa
aiouo in Hebrew.
The portions fall i n a
cycle that
i-h*+- „
completes the five books
and begins again annually.
A11 other Jewish
cogent on the Torah in one
way or another.
Indeed in lts
broadest sweep, the name
"Torah" encompasses
,

all the

Prophetic writings, legal
interpretations, guides to daily
conduct, poems, legends,
folktales, and mystic
doctrines
that ever have elaborated
on the text, as well

as those
that have not yet been
uttered but will be in the
future.
Torah, therefore, is not only
text but interpretive

process, too-better, it is text
understood as process.
For the religious Jew, Torah
summarizes the history of the
Jewish tradition: because every
generation studies it, the
text and its readings to a considerable
degree, constitute
57
the Jewish experience.
According to poet and translator
Joel Rosenberg, the books of the
Hebrew bible

generated a cultural legacy, and the cultural
experience they embody and the literary modes
they
employ are familiar to the Western thinker
partly

72

^^

Because each successive

all over again,
the meanings that
wi its Heh
a
Hebrew words acquire

-socrai

meaning of the words

•Jewish cultures
uxes

-

^

^

Hebrew
-pk 0 k a
The
literary art=
u
art that
has
gone into the

certain wa y or
understanding reality,
and study reproduces
that understanding
in one wave o f
readers after another
The text aiso employs
an especiali
y effective device for
constructing lasting sets
of shared meanings:
a system of
leitworter. or "key-words,"
"s,
i
nlavs a. large
plays
i =
part in the
Torah's narrative strategy.
stratum
ok,i.
Shakespeare
critic Bruce Kawin
^ows how in King^ear key-words
port "the meaning they
have acquired with them
into their present and
future
contexts, immensely complicating
and inter-relating the
concerns and actions of the
play."" So alsQ
Torah.
just as the imperfect tense
of the Hebrew language
leaves an action hovering in
the air until its effect is
no
longer felt, so the use of
key-words in the Torah also
calls the reader to attend to
hidden influences

^^
and

consequences
When

text uses words in this fashion,
they gain an
importance over and above their narrow
linguistic meaning.
To understand truly what view of
reality the Torah provides,
a
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therefore, we must
reunite our care
dre tor
for the ontological
.
implications offtheHeb
the hpk.
0
-« lan guage with our att
bibl
biblical
content. We must
ask what we can
an learn about
the
T
Jewish sense of rne
the won
a
*
world from the
plot
ut
c
h,r a ,f
p
characters,
and
themes of the biblical
story. 60

....

,

,

.

1

•

,

'

At first, though,
we might wonder
whether we can
discern any coherent
philosophy in such a
1+
multivocal
body
of work as the Tor^h
Torah.
Rosenberg, for
^stance, warns
against too "ideological"
a reading.

m

Given the enormous variety
o-f SUb
u
forms in the Bible
? ects
literary
and tL
Pan ° f time in
which the Hebrew Bibie
as
! °W
kn
it is impossible
lt coa lesced,
to stall
6 tL message of
narrative. 61
biblical
1

^

^

The best summary of
biblical narrative, he
explains, is
the narrative itself.
The Torah already uses
an extremely
compact, highly allusive
style, at some points
bordering
on the cryptic.
if we attempt to soak
the distinctive hue
out of the warp of its
fabric, we risk dissolving
the

threads altogether-a risk
inherent in any attempt to
draw
a moral from a piece
of literature, but immeasurably

sharper in biblical exegesis.

Nevertheless, the same

author concludes, with great
care,

"it is possible to

speak of 'preoccupations' in
biblical narrative, and as
such to determine what the
narrative is saying." The
Torah recurs repeatedly to some
themes while yet others
seem to influence the story throughout,
so that without

74

the*, the text would
be unimaginable.

legate

It ls entirely

to spel! out these
central themes and
vi tally
necessary to do so i f we
wish t0

^
^^

^

understand
structures of thought differ
from the Western
what relation Karl Marx
stands

^

to eaoh.

The touchstone of reality
in the Torah is the
active
dialogue between God and
humankind. By ..dialogue"
we must
understand, first, actual
conversation between two
part.es
the storytelling style
of the Torah, dialogue
predominates.
Where the text could have
related events

m

in its

own voice, it most often
.axes its characters recount
the,
instead, even if that leaves
the narrator only to
summarize
or confirm assertions already
made or just about to be
made
in speech.
The Torah relies on dialogue
rather than

description in order to characterize
the actors in its
dramas. What individuals say or

fail to say, and when, and

how, tells us who they are.

Dialogue also suspends the

progress of events and allows for
extended scenes of
tension and dramatic irony: one need only
look to

Abraham's words to Isaac as they ascend
Mount Moriah or
discourse of Joseph and his brothers in
Egypt for
examples. 62
,

Even poetry, that most individual form of

expression to the modern way of thinking, speaks in
the
Torah "as the end result of dialogue."

the

^

which he adds. Thus
° h hS
hp
His audience, as
COm
alone,
his collaborator, bearers oTtradi^
cor>stitutes
who interact Wlth
bringing to his words
the P oet hy
derii^
8
them both shape and
10 " 2 th
lend
sub^tancetsl^

L

"^

in short,
8

r"""

^erything

in the biblioal
WO rld ultimately

tOWard dlal ° 9Ue
'"

for good reason

"

—

"

r

puts it -. and

To the ancient
Hebrew writers,

'"tv>

speech
seemed the essential
human faculty: by
exercising the
capacity of speech man
sic demonstrated,
however
imperfectly, that he was
made in the image of
God.""
Beyond actual speech
n
thnnnh
aF
trto
ugh, dialogue
means the
inescapable relatedness of
persons which is what
makes
communication between them
possible, desirable, and
urgent.
Martin Buber, who gave
the world
wnrlH the concept of
y ve rne
-,

'

an "I-thou"

relationship, calls dialogue
"this dramatic over-againstness of God and man sic
on which the faith of
Israel is
,

grounded." 65

Already in the Talmudic period,
poring over
the biblical text, the
rabbis had asked the question:
Why
did God create the world?
They answered: because
God was

lonely.

So the divine Person created
human persons, and

so the story which the bible
tells begins.

The dialogical situation comes
about "because God's

purposes are always entrammelled in
history, dependent on
the acts of individual men and women
for their continuing
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realization."
is

c
i_
inf , p j_
faince
the
creation,
_

.

in thP
T 0t
u
hS Jew
ish
view,
•

-™ - - -— ~ -»

......

it

-

Within the Torah, human
beings are tlrst
fi rst .
„ foremost
,
and
persons in dialogue
with the divine
vine.
Ths
That, communication
is
What makes us ourselves,
shaping our identities
f rom the
-re. The relatlon of
goQd
^ings.
the Torah concentrates

^^

„

^
^ ^^
^

^

^

that is because, for
the divine experiment
as the text tells
of it, they form a
sort of laboratory
sample in relationships.
If this stiff-necked
people oan learn to love
and
be loved by God the
story intimates, then
there is hope
for everyone else as
well.
,

As a way of engaging the
universe, though, dialogue
implies several orientations
which seem astounding next
to
any Greek-like model of
ontology. The Torah demands
of its
readers that they seek to know
God, not as an eternal
set
of esoteric truths, but as
a distinct personality
who
speaks and wills, acts and interacts,
and to whom they are
already committed for life, like
a parent or a spouse.
The

Torah is relatively lacking in theology
preceisely because
the question of what God is lacks
interest to the Jewish
tradition.

Only things merely

is not a thing.

are,

if even they,

The Torah tries to evoke

a

and God

sense of what God
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SSt£. ana any aspect

of Cod that aoes
not bear on our
personal acquaintance ana
history together is
pushea to
the periphery of its
attention.
Being buman, we thin
k in
human terms,
very well: « The Torah
speaks
language,', as one rabbinic
dictum puts it." It
presents
God as someone enough
U]5e ourselves

^

^

^

^

consulting
own experience of what
people are li ke will give
us . clear
deal with God.

But then, what is a person,
in the woria the
biblical
story presents? Soman had
already remarked, "The
person is
an active being who is
perpetually engaged in becoming
and
yet remains identical with
himself [>io] .«8 Ja language
reflecting a dialogical grasp of
reality, we might rephrase
it: People become who they
are in the process of relating
to others who are also changing
and growing over a period
of time.
Now,

this does not sound at first like
a particularly

Jewish idea.

Aristotle, in his Ethics

,

writes of how one's

friends crucially affect the development
of one's character
for good or ill. 69
his analysis, however, one person
causes changes in another in a predictable,
almost mechan-

m

ical way.

Even if the person influenced influences the

first person in return, the effects all take
place within

each individual soul.

Moreover, by

a

certain age,
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Aristotle belipupc
ueves

-to

un
f
the

ner^iu

gears of personality u
have locked
place: one is what one
gQing
'

—

ogue, on the other han d

" 1U

th8mSelVeS

u

^

throughout life.

*

,

^ ^

^

P resu m es that bQth

~— - -a

Each person

^

^

just to each other

certalnl
certainly change; it
is
.

the relation that will
continue.

mere

Tfle re

is also
a] .„ a further
.
u

difference

T

1Ct ble and ch ™<3^
nature of character i
e
J
1
1
personages cannot Lve ?ixed
HoTrTo" 6pithets (Jac <*
is not "wily Jacob,"
Moses is no?"
13110 1
strat^.L^
9
recrements of the immediate contextMicS?

^i "

^ ^tl'dSSr^^^"")

S^-'L^iS-^SrW^'
If God,

universe,

iS

^"daughter

the creator and origin of
meaning in the

is conceived in the Torah
as a person and there-

fore as an essentially relational
self who changes as we,
God's partners, do-if God, too,
is a "center of surprisethen relating to God and
participating in the divine
purpose must be radically unlike
gaining knowledge of the
cosmos and contributing to the
achievement of a telos.
Both surely imply a degree of aim and
intention; both

demand movement in

a

predetermined direction.

Teleological

development, though, aims at a fixed goal
which human

beings can only discover, not shape, while
partnership
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with God allows for
discussion, revi
vlslon
slon
and reconciliation.
'

'

i
d
disagreement

Teleology hinge s on
epistemology
one can only
succeed at reaching one's
highest s.tate if one
can
correctly ascertain that in
which it consists and
those
intermediate steps one must
.

take to arrive there.

For the

dialogical relation, though,
the best parallel is
probably
a good marrrage.
The lovers, over time,
learn each other
intimately, even if they only
learn certain important
facts
about each other after many
years, or never.
They know the
important things-what makes the
loved one happy,

depressed,

nervous, serene, comfortable,
irritated, frightened,
secure -in a rudimentary way from
the beginning, or nearly
the beginning.
what they discover is the range
of one
another's reactions, not the rules
of them.

Day by day,

they take note of the changes in
each other's lives and
work to meet them together. At times,
unavoidably, one or
the other will become withdrawn, fall
out of synch; their
commitment to what they share carries them
through.
On the

basis of trust, without needing or seeking
perfect knowledge,
they create a small world that shelters them
both.

The dialogue which the Torah records between God
and
the Jewish people

humanity)

(and potentially between God and all

aspires to exactly this kind of marriage for the

renewal of the larger world.

As Buber puts it:
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The real communion of
man r=i~l
th God not onl
has its place in the
Y
worlV
£ !
^
God speaks to man in
3 sub ^«.
the thinos
lng that He
sends him in life; man
answers in r f, tl0n to
these things and beings."!
3 ust

^k^

^

\

One final lesson the
Torah teaches us about
the Jewish
sense of reality, we
must not overlook.
In the bibUcal
story, human action is
undertaken freely even
though Cod has
purposes which only human
beings can work out.
»P,Jt most
simply," says Rosenberg,
"persons are free to act
as they
will, but their actions
are fateful."" By
creating
world in a fit of loneliness,
the God of the Torah has
voluntarily become dependent on
the notoriously perverse
and inconsistent powers of
human will and action.
As compared to Greek myth (in which
mortals and gods alike await
the designs of Fate)
Greek philosophy (in which the

^

,

universe allows for excellence but
neither promotes nor
needs it), and those elements of
Christianity that stress
predestination, original sin, and undeserved
divine grace,
the Jewish themes of dialogue and
partnership in creation
mean that people and their actions matter
.

the cosmic importance of human action is

a

That sense of

thread that

leads us straight into the Marxian labyrinth.

CHAPTER THREE
AND HEBREW IN MARX'S
ONTOLOGY

When we examine the body
of Marx's writings,
we find
(in works as dissimilar
as

Tl^erman^olog y

ana his

doctoral dissertation,
hints that Marx himself
recognizes
a Jewish-Greek
distinction among views on
the nature of
reality
As regards Greek thought
and culture, we do not
have
to look very far to
discover what importance Marx
attaches
to them.
For nearly ten years, from
1837 to 1846,

classical Greece figures prominently
in Marx's writing.
Unlike his contemporaries, though,

Marx treats Greece as

cautionary example.

He dissents from

"

a

the admiration,

even worship for classical Greece"
which had buoyed
German literature in the late 18th
century and which still
left its traces on Hegel. 1

Marx regards the Greek city-state, or
polls, as an
attempt at freedom that failed. The lesson he

draws from

its collapse is that trying to reunite the
worlds of

thought and action by means of philosophy alone is
futile.

Philosophy inevitably raises up some partial, one-sided

view of reality to the level of Truth, suppressing other
equally compelling perspectives.

vocabulary stands for

a

Thus, Greece in Marx's

typically "Greek" bias in
81
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linking, according

~ered
"«

fco

the

of Qreek thought

in the last chapter

cr lt ic 1Z es the Greek

.

By

^^^^

fche

ws

ar.se from something
disUnctly

^

^
^
token

_

^^^^
_

^

of vrew on what can
plausibly be called
real.
F°r many of the German
Romantic thinkers of
the late
"CO-., according to Charles
Taylor, the ancient
Greeks
presented an inspiring
portrait of
a mode of life i n
which the hichest ir. „
his aspiration to form
S1 °
and expression
was at one with his
clarity
nature an
a£d° !n
S nature,
all of
was an era nf „„,4.
it
harm
°
n
which thought
y withi " »an. in
were one? in which the ? 9 mo 5 alit y
sensibility7
fo ™. whlc h man stamped
his lifl wither Lr«?
on

\ T

"

'

n

Iff

'

Hegel, the "gigantic thinker"
of Marx's young adulthood, offered a more nuanced
but scarcely less laudatory
3
version.
Like the Romantics, he saw
the polis as both
the realization of the human
essence and its most adequate

expression to date.

At its height, he theorized,
being

and thought did not conflict in
classical Greece, nor did
the individual and the community.
Citizens knew their
place in the natural and the political
order and acted in
keeping with that knowledge. Human beings
related to the

polis in which they lived, and its ideals,
as particulars
to a universal: they lived as instances
of the state, and

its existence embodied itself in theirs.

They enjoyed

freedom, not in
unrestraint, but in
the achievement
of
the v.rtues
praised by the ethos
"
immunity.
Political Ufe,
H, rn Hege^s
pioture of Greek
culture

SUPPUed

-

-ose

Preconditions for human
freedom.

m.

-

the

it

—

Taylor

many
-

-

-

s

„ egel argued
that

^^^^^

any Greek
«

a

~^ty.

toWeVer:

the
"r:

'

h a PPy unity as
envisiongd

'

om y

virtues, and nenc

words)

„

way of life: their
own

—

the

-

expense of reflection.

rea

Mos t

^

^ ^
u

er

a

veness was achieved

cities

knew onl y one

^

in time, some deeply
spiritual individuals,
most

notoriously Socrates,
would rebel, seeking
a lar g er unity
a consciousness
too broad for any one
polls.
As sinQle
numan beings, though,
they could not embody
universal

-

truths.

Simply by being individual
and part cular
contends, they would be
inadequate to
.

the task.

_

Heaei

So

thev

challenged the societies in
which they lived to
transcend
whatever limited notion of
the good human life their

citizens uncritically accepted.
these universal thinkers
began

m
a

doing so, however,

tragic struggle which

sometimes destroyed them (as it
did Socrates) and always
fractured the unified, if one-sided,
cultures that had
given them birth.
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Hegel celebrated the
achieve.ents of the
polls and
-oumea its passing. but he
thought Qf
necessary for the recapture
of hu m an freed™
at a higher
level.
In , sense
his philosophy
a cQimitmsnt
to the idea of a
society in whioh neither
Socrates
Jesus would have had to
die in order for their
.essaoes to
gam an audience.* al l nations,
c i asse s, an d
philosophies
would find a ho me within
the co mp lex structure
of such a
oulture.
The state he hoped for
would express, and thereby
reconcile, the totality of
its citizens' beings,
while
their lives would give
substance to the ideal

^

,

^^^^^

^

of an

expressive unity.
Marx takes over Hegel's idea
of

connection between
the ancient Greek republic
and the ideal of unity when
he
"goes over to" Hegelianism in
1837, but with a dramatic
difference.
From the outset, Marx treats classical
Greece
a

as a failure in the pursuit of
that ideal,

and not as a

historically limited form of its realization.
Marx's distinct viewpoint emerges most
clearly in his
analysis of the position of the philosopher
in Greek
culture.

Hegel had considered the classic thinkers of

Greece shoots of

a

living culture from which they drew

their intellectual and spiritual sustenance.

Their

thinking, he believed, reflected their civic life.
draws the opposite conclusion.

Marx

"The Greek philosopher is
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a

demiurge," he writes in

uissertation.

„

a

Drenar*^
preparatory
note for his

His[sic]

flourishes in the natural
sun of substantial
existence. -«
The very idea of wisdom
in ^j.eece,
Greece according
.- Pftr( ,
to Marx,
arose from individual
thinkers' reflection
^nection on their private
experience, in abstraction
from the life of the
community
Far from exemplifying
the unity of the ideal
and

^

the real

in Greek communal life,
re,

thesp QorvK^-;
tnese
sophoi negated it by walling
themselves off in a wnrlri
world o-f
of 4-v,~their own imagining and
calling it "spiritual truth."
In their own persons,
the
Philosophers estranged thinking
from living.
They also
created a realm of pure thought
called philosophy and
fenced it off from the public
domain.
If the Greeks had ever
experienced the wholeness

Hegel envisioned for them, Marx
dates it far earlier than
the classical age, possibly even
before philosophy was
invented.

By the time of Socrates, certainly,
the "split

between reason and existence reached
full expression" in
Greek communal life.
Socrates, Marx writes, is
not a

victim of

a

society which he challenges.

Rather, he

embodies the inner conflicts of the polis and
succumbs to
them.

"Divided within himself" so deeply that his own

spiritual impulses seemed to him
spirit,

a

daimon

,

or indwelling

"condemned" to generate chimerical visions of

good that his own nation could not make material, in

a
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Marx's judgment,
Socrates

^

death ln vain.
His
fate reveals "the
relationship
of
P
Greek Philosophy
k-,
to
Greek life and thereby
by its inner
i„„ a
contraotion into itself." 7
In the main body
of hi = dlss
"
^tation, Marx frames
his
f
GrSek th ° U9ht
3 di
erent
I°» the opposition
of thought and lif
e played
lives of two lesser
Greek philosophers,
Epicurus and
-mocritus. Each of
to
the dilemma, and eaoh
lands himself in a
web of insoluble
contradictions. Epicurus
as
,

.

T

"

"

^J
*

^ ^
,

dogmatic idealist.

"e,

_^^

^

^^

ln his theory of
nature,

in a literal sense,

J

^

atoms-which

the basic units of
reality-must

tend to swerve fro, the
paths the forces of gravity
and
mutual repulsion mark out
for the, si mp l
y to show that
true being does not wholly
submit to m aterial laws.
No w,
the unpredictability
Epicurus 's view i mpl i e s should
have
impelled hi m to examine the
physical world in search of
contingent truths. To do so,
however, he would have had to
concede that the ability of any
individual consciousness to
get at the truth depends on forces
external
to the indi-

vidual, in the material world.

But admitting that material

considerations determine the reality we
experience would
mean denying the basic principle
which, on Marx's reading,
led Epicurus to hypothesize the
atomic swerve in the first
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Place.

Consequently, Marx argues,
Epicurus
neglected empirical studies
and led

a a st
BtaH
atic,

"id untroubled life.

Detritus, on

sedentary,

8

the other hand

,

lf ,

stamch

i.t.

He founds his atomic
theory on
atoms are law . abidlng

fche

parUcles

-plain

.11 that exists.

Democritus confronts

a

assumpt on
.

.

the r

s

^

^
^

^

i

on;;

As Marx taxes him,
tho ug h,

paradox: ne also

in

i

natural phenomenon makes the
presence of atoms Obaarvabl,
to the human eye.
The materially-based
regularities never
disclose themselves, while
the apparent world, „ hich
the

senses cannot

deny,,

is all chaos and deception.

™&
^^^^^^^^

Tusl

" ,R 0rn r,,<> fr <™ ,, <"
ent 1 ft in its autonomous reality;
St
at 2hi
the !i«,1
same !?
time it ?is the unique, the real
object
and as such has value and
importance. 9
,

I

>

i

i

licitP
>

i

'l

1

,

-

1

^

Consequently, Democritus roamed the known
world, mastering
a variety of sciences and
accumulating endless data about
the "subjective illusion" which is ail
the
reality

vouchsafed

'<>

him.

Legend has

it

tl,,,|

j,,.

ended

h

,.
j

fruitless quest for positive knowledge by blinding
himself,
"so that

the sensible

Mghl

sharpness of intellect."

in

the eye would not

darken
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According to Marx's proqno^i,
prognosis, n
Democritus, Epic.
-curus
and Socrates all fail
becau^
<-u
because o-f
of the same cultural
bent in
Greek philosophy:
the belief that
P Y
fK = ^ thought
can comprehend
-self in isolation from life,
or, more concretely,
that a
thinker can discover the
truth about human
nature outside
of his or her social
relations with other human
beings
This feature of Creek
philosophy
is also one of the
ma : or

differences between Jewish and
Greek thought, so it is
significant that Marx uses it
to indict the Greeks.

Marx also accuses modern
philosophers of repeating the
errors of the ancients.
Once again, he charges,
they
pretend to be able to devise a
better world without
engaging the one they presently
inhabit.
Modern philosophy,
it seems to Marx, has inherited
the Greek disposition to
exalt the stance of the spectator,
and to choose contemplation rather than interaction as its
preferred way of
learning about reality. This, too,
ranges Marx against the
Hellenic influence from a standpoint which
resembles the
Jewish one.
Since he groups moderns with Greeks, he
passes
harsh judgment on nearly all political thought.
The one great exception is Hegel.

For the youthful

Marx, Hegel had promised a way "to seek the
ideal in the

real itself," and thereby to avoid the "inner
contradiction
into itself which he thought had doomed Greek philosophy." 11

Up until 1841, in fact, Marx prescribed Hegel's holistic
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approach as the
<q«+.
cne an-n
antidote
to metaphysial
e
p ysical systems
which
philospher s consciQusness

-e-

^^
4.

,

the usefulness of
Hegel.

m

the

mm

^^ISPhiL^fRight
~
2__,

written h,n
two years after
his dissertation and shortly
before "On the Jewish
Question," he
accuses his former mentor
with reducing the
individual to
"his heard and Mood"
[si ,] and abstracting
f
contexts and relations. 12
,

_

^

Marx's putative break
with Hegel has been
much
explored, but one thing
that has not been widely
discussed
1- how, in order to settle aooounts
with Hegel, Marx begins
to read hi m more and
more as a Greek.
In the Critique
just
mentioned, Marx likens Hegel
to Socrates.
Neither, he

declares, is "allowed to
measure the idea by what
exists;
he must measure what
13
exists by the idea."
In the 1844

Manuscripts
,

he expands on this comparison.

Both Socrates

and Hegel display "the
opposition, within thought itself,
between abstract thinking and
sensuous reality or real
sensuousness." 14 where Marx had earlier
honored Hegel as
the philosopher of "the whole," he
increasingly rereads him
just another partial thinker.
Like the ancients, Hegel
takes his own end (defined by Marx
as "constructing the

hereditary monarch out of the pure Idea")
society.

in addition,

15

for the end of

Hegel begins to resemble Epicurus.

As Jerrold Seigel points out:
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With Hegel, "abstraction
«
S
abstraction and to have a resolvp,
S
n*<nature free from
abstraction." But iust
ln the end me rely
gave objective form to
hit llt^l thi
Hegel, too...natSre
so for*
already SX
exxs?ed
Sted ln th e thinker's
mmd as an imaqe
of his own
i
9
ty * nd " What he
has really le
m Le r ! h
° nly this
abstract nature ? only n^?ure
"

?

L

^'

Z

being of thought ..." 16

-

^
'

fc

ls the other-

Later, when Marx shifts his
theoretical stance even
fUrth6r in The_Germ^n_
he continues to differ _
I
entiate himself from former
associates by pointing out the
specific defects they share with
the Greeks.
He and
Engels, for instance, deride the
German "true socialists"
by claiming they convert the
practical program of the
French party into a set of timeless
truths.
it is worth
noting one of Marx's favorite axioms
at work here: that an

d^^

isolated group of thinkers will tend
to propound an
impossibly unconditional notion of human
freedom.

of Marx's day, he asserts,

Thinkers

follow the Greeks in inverting

the real relation of being and thought,
and they do so

necessarily once they eternalize their own
perspective in
a

characteristically Greek way. 17
In short,

something very like the typology of Jewish

an d Greek thought we discussed earlier shows up in
the

ce nter of Marx's critique of German philosophy.

Typically,

he does not endorse the one and decry the other so much as

pronounce

a

judgment on the effect of adopting either.

Marx clearly regards the "Greek" attempt to establish the
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~al

on a higher plane
than

Chlmera
'

3

^

^

&

^ ^

Vet even if this
specu .

^

lative vision o f reality
conformed fco
still provide no oasis
basis tor
fnr t-v^
u
the harmonious
order its
Proponents see, to achieve.
To s ay that all
P eo pl e and all
-Cities in society contribute to
an expressive unity
of
existence, out that only
P e ople who are philosophers
(or ordinary people
only while thinking
philosophically,
oan experience it as
such, is to say that
no such unity
exists, by any standard
Marx would accept.

^

-an

As long as a society
systematically excludes certain
categories of people, activities,
states of mind, or human
experiences from its normative
version of what is real, it
is still parochial,
abstract, an d less th a n fully
human.

Therefore, Marx demands that any
acceptable ontology
provide for the possibility that
humanity can achieve a
genuine social whole (which he calls
"species-being" or
"human emancipation," and later
"communism"). Anything
less is self-defeating.
Therefore, also, he is drawn to
the sense of the real he associates
with civil society and
with the Jewish outlook.
In its emphasis on human action
directed toward the effective overcoming of
practical

human need, what he terms the "Jewish" viewpoint
offers
Marx a more trustworthy guide than philosophy
to what
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mustbedone
-

startin

^-^t,

hebelieveshecan

realize the social
wholeness o £ which
philosophers may
only dream.

II

The way of understanding
reality that Marx calls
Jewish fits the pattern of
Je wish thought much
as his
notion of Greek culture
fits Greek thought as
a type.

Turning to the Jewish side,
though, we cannot see
the
relation unless we once again
make a distinction between
"sabbath" and "everyday Judaism."
Marx, as we noted
earlier, holds no brief for
the Jewish religion,

nor does

he think it an important
phenomenon as

a

religion.

This

judgment does not necessarily
stem from ignorance, either.
Often, when Marx needs a good
pungent example in order to
make a point, he reaches for the
name of a biblical charac
ter: Moses, Joshua, the Levites,
Adam, Esau Habakkuk and
Ezekiel all pop up in his writings. 19
These references
demonstrate Marx's familiarity with the
bible as literature (probably attained in Gymnasium
under a Lutheran
teacher).
Clearly, though, they have no bearing on his
,

ontology.

,

Any educated German of Marx's day would have

read the bible along with Shakespeare and Goethe,
these

being regarded as the cornerstones of German culture.

Nor is there anything
t
u
y particularly
^ iticuiarly Jewish
about Marx's
handling of his biblical
allusions.
It is or
J-t
of int
interest that
Marx rarely, if ever,
resorts to tne
the Gospels
Go.n.i
or any part of
the Christian canon for
an illustration.
His bible is
strictly "Old Testament." 20
still
. cannot
"ill,
on e
make much of
that.
Paradoxically, then, at those
moments when he
touches on the content of
the Jewish faith, Marx
tells us
virtually nothing about his
relation or non-relation to
Jewish thought.
•

m

Perhaps, though, Jewish thought
exerts itself in
Marx's theory the way that
atoms do in Democritus's
physics:
as a "principal element
[which] does not enter
appearance"
but which nonetheless unifies
all the rest.
when we look
at the terms in which Marx
criticizes Greek thought and think

about the perspective from which
they could arise, we
notice that Marx could write exactly
the same attacks if he
were presuming a Jewish relation to
reality.
This observation applies all the more strongly if
we remember that the

outlook Marx calls "everyday Judaism" in "On
the Jewish
Question" resembles the paradigm of Jewish thought
on
every significant point.

So, we could argue that Marx's

critical stances, his differences with the Greeks and
their modern epigones, themselves show the structural

relation of his theory to Jewish thought.
In fact,

though we can see the relation quite

directly if we are willing to read Marx the way Marx set

about reading Epicurus

„

.

Even

^

^^

give
their work a systematic
form," Marx wrote, »...
the t]:rue
inner structure is totally
dif£erent form
the philosopher consciously
presents it.-" Por Marx>
fche
key to the Epicurean
philosophy was the atomic
swerve- it
revealed the Greek philosopher's
notion of freedom. The
"inner structure" of Marx's
theory, which shows its
affinity for Jewish thouqht
"iwuyuu, is nis
hi* rm*«i
ontology.
Bertell
Oilman has summarized its main
points.

^^^

First, Marx views the world
as

relations.

a

^

system of internal

Nothing exists on its own, discretely,

independent of all else, nor do things
simply happen to
come into association by external
contingency or chance.

Anything which is, is by virtue of
its interrelation with
other features of reality.
Marx's

m

take on

a

theory, things only

definite existence thorugh interaction.

To be

exact, though, we should call this play in
the fabric of
the universe " inner act ion " since all the
reciprocal
,

effects which finally characterize any particle
of reality

occur within the totality of things real and not primarily

between real units.
For Marx, however odd it may seem, things as such do
not exist.

All the factors he examines, he first has to

distinguish out of the whole; furthermore, for different
purposes, he individuates them in different ways.

It

follows that in
Marx's ontology
a thing
Y
thi
will not be
defined by listing
its aualiM
y -Li-i,
qualities.
inst-o^
•
Wlll vary
attributes he cQunts
.

'

-**

—

J"

^

scrutiny

*

'

*«

t0 a
"

dependin on the
depending
specific set of
relate
is looating it
at the

^

jUSt 33

-notion., on

s^ectmg

»

control of

the laborer .„

"™
-^_^

°f his

-

means of

&

m

Marx's

fun theoretical

^

conception, of conrw
^ means both. 23
course, lt
explains

As 011man

Essentially, a change
of focus h ao occurred
viewing independent
from
factors
h are related to
viewing the particular tJ whH^h
?1
they are rel ated
in each factor
to graspiL ^hf
meaning conveyed by^hf
*^. aS ? art ° f the
concent
Thls view d °es not
P
rule out the existence of =
°
ore
notion
factor, but treats th?=
for each
"° ti0n itSelf
cluster of relations 2f
«» «
r

^

^

When Marx actively
determines which relations
he will take
to constitute a thing
under discussion, he is
only doing
what he believes human
beings do all the time:
namely,

appropriating the world.

The ten. ..appropriation"
points

to the special place
Marx's ontology assigns to
human
beings.
Like all the animals, species
homo sapiens

intrinsically belongs to the natural
world.
" A bei ng
which does not have its true
nature outside itself," Marx
proclaims, "is not a natural being
and does not share in

the being of nature." 25

Nature is "Man's

(sic) inorganic

Vet humanbei ngs

environment, either

__^

r^h -gnitively

Physical
and

acti
ar
grapple
with nature in ways
that -terrally
.
change it, and
ourselves as
a
part of it.
-if
other annals
coexist with their
,

-

process of appropriate
marks off those
relations hy
we will hencerorth
recognise the real
existence of
-ose factors that we
incorporate into our
own
F
MarX
™OSt ^-acteristioally
human way of

-ch

"

labor.

'

m

merely looking at
y

a
d

beanHftn sunset, for
oeautiful

example, we change
ourselves hy heightening
our sens.tivity
to beauty, and so
we appropriate
it
,

^

^

us.

^^

If we go on to paint
the sunset, though,
or picture
it in words, we
"capture" it in a richer,
deeper way.
By making the object of
our sense perceptions
into the
object of our expression,
we br lng a wider range
of our
human capacities to bear
on it.
Thus we

establish a
more all-round, fully human
relation to the sunset and, in
the process, „e become more
human ourselves. 26 Marx views
things as the summary of
relations, and therefore, he can
equally well call human interaction
with nature "the
appropriation of the human essence." 27
Human beings only
,
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in relation to the
world;
•

may be by acting on
objects.
What is

tM.

we can nm
only reveal what
we

"human essence „ of

Marx denies that any
fixed

m

wMch

^^^^

_

Qf
to hum anity in all
ages ana counties.

^

.such a stereotype is one of the items
he comprehends under
the label
as a whole possesses
a definite set of
shared needs.

Human needs impel us to
appropriate the world.
"The need
of a thing," writes Marx,
"is the evident,
irrefutable
proof that the thing belongs
to my being..." The
needs we
feel, he proposes, stem
from the powers we possess.
Human
powers range from the exercise
of the five senses to
procreation, will, judgment, sex,
love, and other varied
30
capacities.
Marx declares that even the most
basic
faculties, such as smelling and
tasting, can be employed
in either an animal or a human
fashion.
Progress consists
in part of satisfying needs in a
more human manner and in
part of cultivating new needs that extend
our range and
bring us more fully into relation with
the world.

While individuals must make an effort to realize
their intrinsic powers, the progress of which
Marx takes
most note is owing to changes at

a

social level.

The mode

in which a society produces, trying to satisfy
human needs,
is not subject to individual choice.

The mode of produc-

98

tion, however, sets
human beings

relations, ana thes e in
turn

^

win

gQ

a

^
^^^

generating one's current
needs
Par.H
Paradoxically,
how human
beings conceive of their
own powers
rs Wlil
p
will At
A
depend
mainly on
how the mode of
paction
.

.

>

(whrch people

twelves

erect

and maintain) teaohes
fp^rhoc them to
understand their own needs
Under capitalism especially,
a social formation
which
people create reacts back
upon them to limit their
further
social creativity cruelly. 31
Carol Gould has called
Marx's theory a social
ontology
an "analysis of the
nature of social realityTT^nT^T""

socially interpreted categories.

Most people, according

to Marx, do not operate
with such an analysis.

instead,

they take their cues as to
what they need and what they
can
achieve from what they observe
to be possible under existing
social arrangements.
They are thus brought to deny
the
impulse to develop their human
powers, those very same
powers which brought them to their
present pass.
Private property has made us so stupid
and partial
that an object is only ours when we
have it, when it
exists for us as capital, or when it is
directly
eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc., in
short,
utilized in some way. JJ
As Marx argues, though, when we opt for our
present

practical needs, people (e.g., the Jews in "On the
Jewish
Question") are not simply deceived.

The mode of production

by which we survive actually contradicts the need to

become what one needs
to be.
Popular consciousness
popular
accuratelyY reflects
reflp^fc an impossible
reality.
Pe ople
eXP6rienCe
W ° rld
°ver P owerrng because
it
has really beoome
alienated

™

•

•

-

them.

Because

-

^^^

Mao,

ontology takes relational
human berngs
socral Processes, and
changing human needs as
it£ basic
natter, it is simultaneously
an ontology and a
theory of
hxstory. Human history, i„
Marx's telling, shares
many
features with a „el 1 -recounted
narrative.
Its protagonist
15
e SPSCieS; itS villai
" *• disintegrated existence.
Its plot revolves around
the conflict between human
needs
and the unsuccessful attempts
to fulfill them which have
become necessary to survival.
if, in the famous slogan
which opens the Communist Manifesto
all history is indeed
"the history of class struggle,"
that is because each
class, in accordance with its
place in the mode of production, seizes on certain powers, needs,
and ways of appropriating the world and fights to reorganize
society so as
to emancipate these particular human
potentialities. 34

"

,

The purveyors of these partial solutions,
even when they

achieve

a

revolution, typically do not realize the full

significance of their own actions.

For Marx, though, one

can only "realize" meaning— that is, make it real—through
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action.

He takes practice and
not consciousness
as the
true expression of what
the species has
become.

The most human way to
create social structures,
nonetheless, is in full
awareness of the needs we
see, to
meet, and the ways certain
kinds of practice succeed
better than others at that task,
and (to the extent to
which we can anticipate it) the
transforming of human
powers which will result from
such practice.
Marx sees the
alienation of labor as a force which
both prevents and
demands this kind of awareness.
Theory, on the other
hand, aids its rise.
Theorizing, then, is a part of
making
history, and thinking, acting human
beings are the heroes
of the story.
To break out of the trap set by
alienated
laboring and to return to the free, yet
directed pursuit
of species-being: that is the purpose
that relates one

moment of history to the next.
Human needs first induce us to break up reality
into

units that pertain to us.

Exactly in appropriating reality

so divided, though, we expand the needs that have
been

driving us and lay claim to what we still lack.

Steering

by our renewed sense of need, we reinterpret our solutions.

By starting from a sense of something to be done, Marx's

ontology leads on to the conclusion that only by doing it
can we learn what we need in order to live freely and

humanly
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III

Over and over again, we
find that Marx's sense
of
what is real escapes the
confines of the Greek
conception
of "being."
Ultimate reality fcQ

^

to Marx,

^

it must be rooted in
material.

in Greek thought has a
single essence;

^

Each real thing
in Marx's view,

all

things are constituted in
relation to one another.
Observing and contemplating the
world are the highest
human activities Greek thought
can imagine, and theory is
their expression.
For Marx, though, human beings
at their
best strive to appropriate and
transform
the world,

through productive practice.

;•

Consequently, Marx thinks

of the realization of the world as an
inherently social

endeavor, unlike the Greek pursuit of truth,
which is
task for individual philosophers.

a

Also, Marx finds

meaning in historical change, in contrast to the Greek
view that only the eternal and the immutable truly
signify
Finally, because of the dialectical quality of

human needs

produces

a

(that one set of needs, being fulfilled,

richer set)

,

Marx cannot project

a

Republic, an

Absolute State, or any vision of the world made whole once
and for all.

form

,

Human history is not approaching an ideal

nor a telos

,

nor any goal given in advance and

always potentially present.

Instead, as Marx understands

102
Xt, we are tacking
towards a goal which
changes as we
near it-and so do we. 3 *
within the constraints
of

serial

conditions which our past
actions have helped to
shape, impelled by needs
we ourselves
have in part

Produced, we continually
redefine the good human
life we
are seeking.
That notion of human
activity sets Marx
apart, both from thinkers
who give human life a
predetermined end, and from those
who make all ends a matter
of arbitrary and individual
choice.
It sets him apart, though,
only if we allow it to do
so.

Many, probably most, of Marx's
commentators look at
Marx's ontology and do not recognize
the dialogical shape
we have traced there.
Both those who speak on Marx's
behalf and those against him agree
that he thinks tele-

ologically— that he

is working towards an end which

itself propels history to

a

given conclusion.

Oilman,

for instance, assigns communism a
foundational role for

Marx's philosophy.

Not only does he measure everything by

the standard of "after the revolution," but he
insists we

must understand every part of Marx's ontology in terms
of
its contribution to producing "communist Man" and his

powers. 36

So limitless are the capacities he ascribes to

this new breed, too, that he opens Marx to the charge of

making people into abstractions all over again.
surely no service to Marx.

37

This is
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For it is precisely in
reaction tc this kind
of
"Marxism" that Taylor
Y or, for ™=
one, claims Marx's
concept of
freedom must be ultimately
incoherent.
Marx's theory
according to Taylor, can only
point out any purpose
for
human effort as long as
the ends of the
,

theory-the

creating of the conditions
for human freedom-are
not met.
"But once the conditions
aree Ieailz
reali 7 Pd
ea, » he

^

argues,

"the

Marxist notion of freedom is
of no further help." why
is
this?
"The overcoming of all
alienation and division
leaves man [sic] without a
situation"; that is, without
any "predicament which sets us
a certain task
or calls
for a certain response from us
if we are to be free."

Marx's theoretical end unravels
itself, and so, Taylor
contends, Marx's is a notion of "an
utterly empty
38
freedom.
We can appreciate the force of Taylor's
argument.
In effect,

he is arguing that Marx,

despite all his

efforts, has produced still too Greek
end,

a

solution.

it still fails to emancipate the real,

human beings.

At the

individual

Marx could not shrug off this thrust; it

strikes at the heart of his concern and the reason for his

theorizing.

Moreover, he himself provides support for

the indictment: in the later pages of Capital

,

where he

speaks of expanding the realm of freedom and contracting
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the realm of necessity. 39

Thi.
ThlS a PP^oach clashes
harshly

with his main argument
that needs sour
spur i-h«
the khumanizing
of all human activity.
The idea that

we can, and should

minimize the portion of our
lives devoted to need
suggests that freedom consists
of acting

without reference
to the specific powers
whose exercise we care
about and
which have historically defined
what it means to be human.
This freedom certainly resembles
Taylor's "situationless
freedom"; it even smells of
Nietzsche "passive nihilism." 40
Like Oilman's exaggerated defense,
though, Taylor's
critique takes for granted that the
teleological reading
of Marx is the only one we can
accept.
what if we choose
not to do so? we have before us
an alternative: the

dialogical reading.

dialogue has

a

As it appears in Jewish thought,

direction; it leads somewhere we want to
go.

But the goal, hallowing the world, is
itself

a

process

which calls for ever freer and more purposeful
dialogue.
In the dialogical relation,

progress and

that is to say, we can make

perceive that we

are

without measuring it off against

a

making

progress

fixed goal or telos.

Similarly, Marx's theory of how people become free does
not have to depend on a final smoothing out of contra-

dictions for us to feel its emancipatory thrust.

We can

accept it as an interpretation without requiring any
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other "proof" than its
ability to
«
Dtu
capture
° ca
for us our felt
needs and the tasks they
impose-wW
„
-what Marx
y impose
himself might
call our "situation in
the present

„

«

enslaved world

We might therefore
read Marx's theory
as a story
with a plot and a climax,
hut no ending: only,
in Taylor
terms, "a hent in things
whioh inolines without
necessitating."^ This sort Qf
reaa ng wQuid
.

^^

paradox of a freedom which
dissolves once it is fully
achieved.
But, one might ask, what
motive does this
reading leave for revolution,

,

s

^

lf we are always ceaselessly

pursuing the realization of our
needs, only to develop
new ones, why should it matter
so much whether we live
under capitalism or communism?
Obviously, to Marx it
matters enormously.
Within the paradigm of dialogue,
the Jewish tradition
recognizes the possibility of a condition
known as exile
which interrupts and distorts the I-Thou
relation from
which human life draws its meaning. I
will compare
exile to Marx's theme alienation in chapter
5, making the
case that revolution in Marx's theory is
structured like,
and takes the place of, return from exile in the
Jewish

tradition.

For now, let us only challenge the thesis that

revolution, for Marx, must mean the creation of situationless freedom.

Let us propose that it may mean the

I

creation of a better »^v^'
predicament"
realizing human freedom,

f ron

(It,

which tQ beg n
.

instead.

This kind of reading,

^

non- "Marxist
Marxist " appropriation
.««
of
Marx's ontology, makes
room for
a

^

historically concrete

h uma n

decisions about how they

^

beings to i„ fl uence
their

win

go about becom ng
.,

^^

what to do with that freedo,
once they en joy it.
since one
of Marx's criticise of
Greek and mo dern theorists
is that
they shut out real people
and their experiences,
ad m itting
the m only as "the other-being
of thought,
a reading of
Marx which lets then, in can
plausibly clai, to keep faith
with Marx's project.

«

The interpretation developed
here also gains credence
from its affinity for the theme
of partnership with God we

encountered in Jewish thought.
real actor in Marx's theory.

God nowhere appears as

a

Nevertheless, in Marx as in

Judaism, human beings take part in
the continuous creation
of the world.
Human action bears a cosmic significance.

People are engaged in

a

historic mission, and we sense

a

direction to our actions which seems both to respond
to
our wills and to something real and effective
beyond

ourselves.

With all these points of contact, would it be

surprising if Marx's sense of reality embraced one more

Jewish theme:

a

goal which we help shape, even as we

struggle to make it real?
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IV
is Marx's ontology
Jewish?

rt isS

,
an
and
yet it is

not
Despite his remarks
about "the6 ne
neaatio
<? at ion
of* Judaism" as a
startmg point, Marx does
not select1 the
th* Jews
t
a s his chosen
„
people.
The history
he
ne
find., mQ
Y
finds
meaningful is economic,
political, cultural, but
rpii
not religious
and
'

.

•

not Torah.

God

disappears from Marx: what
stands in dialogue
with human
need is a complex of

^ twg

continuing to work on
!+
nn it.

.

and

»
Nature
x.

.

^

^

and past human actions

compose the human situation.

They set the conditions
and
provide the impuise and the
raw materials for
fulfiUing
human needs.
Ul needs are human, thou h. There
g
are no
others

Marx thus sets himself the
puzzle of meeting the
demands a Jewish sense of
reality sets upon him while

rejecting the traditional source
of answers for how to do
so.
His is a dialogue with an
exiled God.
The
rabbis of

the Talmudic period faced

a

similar crisis of interpre-

tation, and they resolved it by
subjecting the Torah to a
series of daring ^interpretations 44
Marx's solution is
even more difficult: he must do his
exegesis on the "text"
of the social fabric itself.

As a first reading, though, Marx can and
does engage

the special part of social practice which
encapsulates the
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rest: the writing of
theory.

As a reader Qf

^

^

partioular, Marx brings into
profane political theory
a
style of her.eneutics which
is and
is not the same ag

rabbinic mo de of interpretation.
spring fro m

a

Not only do

^

Ms

refracted version of Je
wish reality, but his

methods do, as well.

CHAPTER

FOUR

READING AND WRITING MARX

Readers who have followed
the story of the
Jewish
cuestion about Marx up to
this point may now
he wondering
why we have passed over
an obvious question:
namely, what
about Hegel? instead of
postulating
a

convex and

conflioted relation between
Marx^s theory and Jewish
struotures of thought, could
we not traoe Marx^s divergences from Greek ontology to
his being influenced
by

Hegel's philosophy?
The idea that in order to
produce his own theory Marx
simply inverts the Hegelian
system has its origins with
Marx himself.
"My dialectic method," he
asserts in an
afterword to C apital
"is not only different from the
,

Hegelian, but is its direct opposite."
To Hegel, the life-process of the human
brain,
i.e., the process of thinkina, which,
under the
name of "the Idea," he even transforms
into an
independent subject, is the demiurqos of the
world, and the real world is only the externalreal
phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me, on the
contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the
material world reflected by the human mind, and
translated into forms of thought.

...With him [the dialectic] is standina on its head.
It must be turned right side up again, "if you would
discover the rational kernel within the mystical
shell.

Twentieth-century writers who treat of Marx's debt to
Hegel take Marx quite literally, assuming that he
109
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invert
motions.

the idealist dialectic

^

^

Avineri, for instance,
states:

eW the <""-ence
Seen^lrand^f
i° t ^ " ect
reduced to Marx's
c an be
P
rejection ^
f

?

s

the Hegelian
about the existence
postulate
D
lstorical essence,
Absolute Spirit, and
to hiTl
*
C
S
0n that the
^fbebung [transcendence]
^i
If
?^
n ta
r
haS
While He5Sl
ha d ll? eaay
o°cu°rred 2

^

.'

And in fact, it is
possible for the theorist
reading
«arx to assimilate much
of Marx's ontology
to Hegel's
^lectio. Like Marx and unlrke
many thinners of his
trme
Hegel understands the world
as constituted by
tensions
between opposing (oE
"contradictory", f orces
He looks
for these contradictions
to produce new
configurations of
events and of ideas.
Hegel's philosophy is
dynamic (it
studies reality in fl ux and
procressive (it "gains in
richness" as it examines each
era of history in turn, and
it also "moves toward the
realization of a final good"). 3
It is therefore intrinsically
temporal and historical,
unlike Greek thought and like Marx's.
For all these
reasons, commentators have generally
agreed that Marx's
theory begins as a materialist critique
of Hegel's
.

)

idealist logic, and that wherever Hegel
writes Spirit,
Marx simply substitutes Man, and proceeds
from there.

Since so much of Marx's thinking about the
nature of

reality can plausibly be read as Hegel turned
right-side
up, and since that reading carries the weight
of a long

Ill

and venerable tradition,
what

suggest an alternative,

^

Primarily,

^ ^
u ^ ^

sense that the accepted
formula is just tQ

^

^

transposition it demands
sounds too smooth to
describe the
way any thinker draws
on another
tner let
P f alone the
way that
Marx reads Hegel, when
Marx himself expl ains
his compulsion
to transcend his teacher,
as we have already
seen, he does
criticize the letter's
•spiritual" bent,
i

i

'

but he also

condemns Hegel's ontology
because it is "Greek."
It
excludes certain basic aspects
of human life and
therefore
certain persons in society
from full participation
in human
freedom.
The vision of the whole
which
Marx, justly or

unjustly,

i mput es

to Hegel makes truth-and
consequently,

freedom-accessible only from

a

philosophical standpoint:

either to philosophers or to
those who adopt
God's-eye viewpoint on the universe.

a

similar

For Marx, this is a

deformed understanding of human
emancipation.
Reading Marx, then, we observe him
attacking Hegel on
two fronts: on his casting Spirit,
and not humanity,
as

the hero of his story, and on his
willingness to exclude
major elements of human life from his ideal
of human

freedom.

At best, a reversal of Hegel would only
answer

the first of the two charges, leaving the second
unopposed.

Furthermore, these are not trivial points: they strike
at
the heart of Hegel's theory as Marx interprets it.

Is it

he read Heqel
y x

anH that
=
4-u
and
the main Faints
points nf
of hhiso own theory
to ni m only a£ the „
direct
'

i

occurs

E^iiM^OiohtT

^

-What can Marx mea „
by

.,

^

turnina

Hegel right side up again"?
in order to answer
these questions, we
must listen
very olosely to what the
memorable

phrase about Hegel is

saying.

To speak of the dialectic
"standing on its headis to employ a trope of
inversion, reversal, or
exchanae of
Place.
Like an hourglass in which
all the sand has fallen
to the bottom, the
expression implies, the
dialectic as it
is found with Hegel can
be righted, so that what
had
settled can be set into motion
once again.
Once "right
side up," though, neither the
structure nor the content

will change.
So,

The two sides of an hourglass
are identical.

if we were to read "standing
on its head" as a simple

metaphor, in Marx's theory we would
expect God to take the
Place of Man and Man of God, and all the
relations between
them to remain the same, although flowing
toward
the

opposite pole from before.
This is not what happens when Marx reads Hegel,
though; indeed, it is hard to imagine how it
could be.

in

Hegel's dialectic, human beings in their finitude and

morality embody

a

necessary moment in the process by which

Spirit becomes real in the world.

Although that process

reaches on beyond the,,
human be.ngs are
among its
constituent elements.
They could not be
left out
For
Marx, matters stand quite
differently. Unllke
humankind
the dialectic of Spirit,
God is not essential
to the
development of the human species
-rather God (or
the

,

belief in God)

^

is an obstruction to
that development.

Human emancipation does not
incorporate religion but
abolishes it, instead.
it does the same

to the state,

thus

dispensing with an institution
Hegel regards as crucial to
the realization of Absolute
Spirit.
Even culture and

consciousness, the other denizens
of Hegel's "realm of the
spirit," take on a shadowy half
-life in those parts of
Marx's writings which are a critique
of
Hegel.

it is as

if Marx were so offended by
Hegel's subordination of

humanity to "the Idea" that he could not
stand to focus on
anything else in Hegel for long.
If we want to understand why Marx
has to remove Spirit

from the dialectic and not just reverse its
place within
it,

we may consider a crucial presupposition of
the

Hegelian philosophy which Taylor describes.
The universe has many levels because it is the
unfolding of an inner necessity in external reality.
The infinite end is realized in finite ends. And
that is why we can see the end of Reason both ai~
always realized and as always having to be realized
The experience of finite subjects is that the plan
of reason has yet to be fulfilled.
They strive
towards it. But if we rise to a vision of the whole
we can see that this very striving is part of the
.
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plan and that as a whole
it
=
i
appearance of unrealizedness
Y realized
The
is
err r a deception;
and yet this deception
?
itself ?«, £
Idea, as is the overcoming
b° Ut by the
9
of
ot
thisT
g
thls error £
by ourselves. 4.
This is a comforting
conclusion In order to
arriye
at it, though, Hegel has
to make two further
assumptions.
F«.t. there is a .'vision of the
whole," a privileoed
perspective from which "external.,
reality all makes sense.
Second, we can know that
this perspective is the
true one
and that the more mundane
perspective which sees the world
as still fragmented and
incomplete is "an error, a
deception."
positing a point of view which
is both true and
certain, Hegel aspires to what
we called a few pages ago
a
"God's-eye view of the universe."
-i

™

-

^

'

m

When Marx removes God from the
dialectic, though, at
the same time he rejects the God's-eye
viewpoint
or

anything like it.

"The experience of finite subjects"
is

all we have to go on.

Denying our finitude would lead us

to spin cobweb worlds out of our own
heads, as Marx

accuses the Greek philosophers of doing.

On the other

hand, denying that we are subjects in the plural
and not

some singular world-spirit would open the door
again for

some class of people falsely to proclaim itself the

universal, ignoring the experience and the needs of others.
So,

from the beginning, the theoretical move that excludes

God from the dialectic has

a

political bearing.

If God
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did not exist, Marx
=fin would be
arx stl
forced
Ced to de ny

H

'

r

^

,

90dUke

«

beings.

By now, though, we
begin to detect
Lect
which „ arx s swerve
away from

a

—

Him— in

/.

human

^

Pattern into

.

y

rits.

it is DUSt the

same turn Marx makes
from Bauer
uer in "On
,
On the Jewish
Questionwhen he denies that
political emancipation
political
from religion,
property, and so on is
rP ,
a real
liberation. Marx is
also
exhibiting the same penchant
when he reacts the
claims of
the political state,
"the perfected Christian
state," to
unify and to free society,
and again when he
leaves the
Pp^is and Greek philosophy
behind as models for
fulfill
human life and thought.
Capital, Marx returns to
expand on the same Drnnrpcdo^
tt
progression. He
reconstructs the
commonplace notion of free
exchange in the marketplace.
He reveals by its absence
what that notion leaves out:
the
laborer in the factory.
Then, he restores the
ignominies
of the exploitation of labor
to the picture.
Suddenly, in
his ironic description, market
freedom seems as "spiritual,"

m

^

,
>

i

i

•

m

as unreal,

and as irrelevant as Absolute
Spirit, and Marx

treats it, too, as an illusion.

5

Marx seems constitutionally incapable
of doing what
he believes Hegel would like him to
do: of
"rising to

a

vision of the whole" that is achieved by making
some of the

parts— Jews, workers,

the labor process— invisible

.

We can

recognize this attitude as
consonant with Marx's
ontology
wh.ch we have understood as
sharrng its key dynamics
with
traditional Jewish thought.
Reading Marx side by
side
with Hegel is like comparing
Hebrew with Greek-at
least
if we read Hegel the way
Marx does.
But this brings us

back to the question: how
does Marx read Heoel?
For, after
all, Marx does purport to
be performing some kind
of'
operation on Hegel's writings.
if he arrives at Jewish
conclusions, that should make us
all the more curious to
know how he gets there from where
he starts.
if Marx is
not standing Hegel on his feet,
then what is he doing to
him? And where does Jewish
thinking enter
into it?

We can tell what Marx is not
doing.

"Hegel is all wrong.

him."

He's too Greek.

Nor is he saying,

He is not saying,

Let's dispense with

"Hegel has corrected the faults

of the Greeks: let's embrace him."

Nor yet is he saying

that Hegel has most of it right and only
needs correction
on certain points.

In fact,

the more we read Marx on

Hegel, the more difficult it becomes to encapsulate Marx's

reaction in any simple formula.
Marx seems rather to be responding to various bits
and fragments of what Hegel wrote, finding opportunities
to express his own recurring themes in the course of his

commentary.

At moments when Hegel leads to Greek-like

conclusions, Marx takes issue with him as if it were

b

He9el had an obli9ation
to

COnStralntS

WMCh

hS

—

**

~« «*-

^

He gel evidently
does not

Those constraints,
furthermore, arise out
Qf
^logical view of the world
and his Jewish
insistence on
the necessary
effectiveness
of the real.

Where does Marx discover
this strange procedure?
cms
in
terms of his actual
biography,
we are unlik.l
t- i,
unlikely ever to know
for sure.
For the present, though,
we would
do well to

explore the affinities between
Marx's way of relating
to
texts and the traditional
Jewish brand of hermeneutics
known as midrash.

II

Midrash means the creative
style of textual interpretation developed by the rabbis
of Palestine and Babylonia
in the 3rd-6th centuries
C.E.

its meanings.

At least, that is one of

Like the term Torah, midrash
expands and

contracts, depending on context.

exegesis of one verse or part of
"midrashic" methods.

Midrash can mean the
a

verse using certain

It can refer to the product of
such

an exegesis, whether that is a one-sentence
gloss or a

series of alternative readings of the same bit
of text.

Midrash also includes book-length anthologies of
these
shorter midrashim

,

arranged in the order of the verses on
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which they cogent.
,ives

an

Genesi s

(Bereishit^bbsh, for
instance

the classlc midrash
on

^

book

^

Bereish

;

t<

^

.

When so m eone speaks of
"the Midrash,"
furthermore,
they usually mean the
entire
tire bodv
body of *-u
these midrashic books,
as well as the
tne qfnriap
stories they contain.
Indeed, it is a
COmm ° n miStakS t0
fc
° «V
story that concerns
characters or events in the
Torah as a . ld rash.
So m e of
our conte.porary literary
critics, on the other
hand, focus
on the character of mi
drash as

«*«

text about text.

They use
the ter m to suggest the
construction of a piece of
writing
as a commentary on,
nr r-r-o
=
or
Y on
creative
misappropriation of, a
+- ;

Precursor author's work.

They also employ the term
midrash

to point out the belated
and allusive nature of all
writing
and to encourage its
7
deconstruction

What ties together this bundle
of usages is the
activity of doing midrash. The Hebrew
root of the word,
drash, tells us that midrash is
about asking, seeking into,
demanding, requiring a response, investigating
deeply.

When a reader does midrash on

a

text,

s/he wants to know

more than what each word and sentence says or
what the
author intended to say.
S/he also goes beyond the historical circumstances of the text's production and the

literary art by which it produces its effects.

All these

points may interest the midrashist, but they do not
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^^

satisfy on their own

T h P rSader
a
who is doing

midrash
wants to discover
how the text nCan u
h6l P her or him
to face
the problems of
everyday l ife: ner
her or
Qr his own
,..
personal
and the
°<
here and now
;
idrash - maker seeks
*•
a guide t0 re _
engaging
ogue with God
By
scriPture though
the reate has alreaay
begun to re:oin
e
Midrash thus becomesS not- «
° nly 3 c°™unication about
actio,
but an aotion in
itself an
Qf
•

-

;

-

—
i

,

——

^

.

^

,

I" order to understand
midrash

(and what the person
doing midrash is doing),
we need tto
2.J
„ „„
^
consider
again the
unique status of tne
the Tnrah
;„
tu
Torah in the Jewish
tradition.
We
have already remarked
that the Torah continuously
generates
the vital themes of
Jewish culture and that
within that
culture, studying Torah
is conceived of as
trying to find
out what God wants us to
do, in order
,

to respond.

The

Torah is not merely the written
covenant of the Jewish
partnership with God; it is the
place and the moment of
dialogue
Any book which can play such an
active role in
a f fairs of cosmic
significance is no mere book.
the
m idrash on the first verse of
the book of Genesis, the
rabbis accord a new status to Torah:
it is the blueprint
of creation.

m

,
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s

a
a

d ° es not bu
according to his own w?=h
Hd
records
he has Plans and
order
know how
corridors.
r ° oms and
The Hoi v One hL
-e. ^He looked ln to°tne rorT
d

L

£

t"^

1^ -

legendary hrstory, such
as the revelatiQn
as ex is ting before
creation itseif

t

^

^

Wnea

Utters of black flre upon

a

backmi

_

^^^^

^

^

^

_
Qf white
another rabbinic source
puts it." The world
t.
according to a ground pl
an which we can
drscover in Torah
Hence, say the rabbis
who brought m idrash
to an art
if
you want to know anything

the Torah:
it."

u

about the world, look
first in
"Learn it and learn
«
4+
Sarn 11
for
everything
'

is in

Even and perhaps especially
if what you want fcQ
understand is not mentioned
explicitly in the pages of
Scripture, the masters of
midrash counsel redoubling
your
ingenuity.
Between the lines, they assure,
you will find
an answer that will guide
you and not mislead.
To be completely relevant,

meaningful, too.

a

text must be completely

The rabbis called the Torah an
ocean of

meaning into which they could plunge
again and again
without ever plumbing its depths. At the

same time, they

assumed categorically that every detail
of the text— not
only its propositions but the order of

the sentences, the

repetition or omission
of words
words, fh
„
the shapes
and numerical
values of the Hebrew
letters, and evenn
the microscopic
flourishes of the f r ^u'
ltl0nal Calli
P h y -held -Portant
messages for the
resourceful rSader
re «fl«
5^h^g_by_cj^
j
„
could have been their
uiutto.
motto
*
*

^

,

1

eacher
:

^

°

f

the 2nd

*>r it [Torah]

Ufe»

(Deut

.

—

-

m

In fact,

«.

is no empty thing

32 47)
:

and commented

on vour aeeonnt,
because you
It."

froffl
„
_

^

'

t0 P

^

that

—

to interpreting Torah,

1=

if

-

the biblical vers
yous

^ ^

^^

^

^

;
'

^ ^

^

The duty of every
ma l e Jew

rabMS

t-

«-

Rabbi
^ AJJ AK1£)
Akih^a, a manor

,

according tQ

^

to devote substantial

£iU i ng

^

its words with meaning
that one eould then
app ly to the directlon
Qf
1
life. 3
"

Now, there is something
paradoxical about the rabbis'
attitude toward Torah to
the modern eye.
if the Torah is
the ground plan for the
world, it must state the
objective
truth, and then how could
it ever be

meaningless?

warning seems misplaced.

Abba's

Surely, a people which believes

in a divine document would
accumulate a body of authori-

tative interpretation.

Turning exegesis into doctrine,
it

would eliminate the danger that the
text would ever stand
empty, or indeed, that believers
could mistake its
14
meaning.
On the other hand, if the truth
of the Torah
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is subjective,

if its meaning is
indeterminate

readers produce that

«*

untu

Of their own thoughts
and

the same energy to
thinking about our
problems airectly
instead of pu2zllng through
archaic
sense of it all?

^

^

^

To the rabbis, apparently,
these were not serrous
Questions, and not because
of blind faith, but
si mp ly
because the questions missed
the point.
Learn it and
learn it": assuming that
every bit of the Torah has
..

meaning (and potentially many
meanings), 15 our knowledge
of what it is saying can
never exhaust what it has to
say.
There is always another
interpretation.

No single reading

can ever replace the text,
and none ever will, because
as
time goes on, changes in our
particular situations may

empower us to recognize something

in the text

which was

closed to us before.
As for the question,

"Why the Torah at all?"

The

rabbis would not answer by asserting the
objective truth
of the Torah, nor even its utility.

They would never

justify Torah study in terms of some less ultimate
end.

Interpreting Torah is maintaining the dialogue with God,
which is humanity's purpose.

The question the rabbis

would resolve by way of midrash was the question that had
formed the covenant between God and humankind" "How shall
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t-t,

„ or lB it in the
readeri

which both are parts.
n^rfc

-aaers

f illed

Reprint,

the

m
t

•

^

^ ^^^^ ^

^
^^
^^^

mid rash, moreover
,

one part Qf

Torah-„i th meaning

»as the beginning of
the answer

.

.

To

_

rabbinio

^

^
^

interpretation, therefore,
would not he an
assertion of
rational autonomy, but a
breakingy ^jof faith
iaitn with
wl< .„ our divine
Partner and with each other.
The rab bis could only
thin,
of deserting the text
as a oo.pletely
irresponsible act.
As if to emphasize the
indispensability of human
action to Torah, both as
text and as divine medium,
the
rabbis came up with a second
story to explain the Torah
's
uniqueness. Going by the biblical
account in Exodus, the
Torah was given to Moses at
Mount Sinai in written form.
The rabbis announced, however,
that in addition to the
Written Torah, Moses had received
an Oral Torah at Sinai:
a torah she b'al peh, an
"instruction by word of mouth."
This oral Torah he had passed on
to his successor
Joshua,

who transmitted it to the elders of the
people, and so on,
until in rabbinic times it had lodged

itself in the rabbis

themselves.

lfi

The Oral Torah was never an esoteric doctrine.

The

rabbis of the third century and onwards spent huge
efforts
trying to disseminate it among the people, even to
make it
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into the common law. 17

The pv
existence of an Oral
Torah,
,

though, did imply that
whoever read frho
the k-vi
bible without it s
rabbinic co^.entary read
only a fractioR
Qf
sm
would co me to consider
the entire text.
This had the
Mediate effect of frustrate
chrrstian prosel ytlZ ers

^^

since the chain of tradition
fro m s.nai showed
that the
covenant between God and
the Je wish people re
m ained
18
_
intact
^

j

,

By settling the question
of rabbinic authority,
however, the doctrine of
an Oral Torah paradoxically
set
rabbinic imaginations free
to interpret the written
text
in creative and innovative
ways.
True, in order to say
something new, the midrashist
had first to refer to
something old. 19 The rabbis mined
the entire bible for
proof texts -with which to support
their readings, sometimes
creating what they themselves called
"a mountain hanging
by a hair."
this manner, though, it was almost
always
possible to find support.
In the end, the acceptance or

m

rejection of

a

midrashic interpretation depended on how

well it played off the traditional themes
to solve

present-day problem.

Breathtakingly

,

a

the rabbis declared,

"All that a serious student will yet expound
before his
[sic]

teacher has already been told to Moses at Sinai." 20
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By our faithfulness
and our

^

T

- tUally

^

^^^^
«.

transcends revelation.

interpretation

Ill

Taking advantaqe
ge of fhp
j
the latitude
that the existence
of an oral tradition
granted the
granted,
*-v^ rabbis
who did midrash
borrowed from a treasury
x of exegetical
exeaetica] <»
h
techniques
to open
the text even wider.
They employed
methods depending „ hether
it was their goal
l

^

l^iha

or aggadah.

Midrash halakhah is the
interpretati on
«* T °rah (or of Mishnah, inquiries
into the rrght oonduot
of daily life by rabbis
liying before

^^ ^

produce praotioal guidance
for all one's activities
that
could be made holy, from ma
king offerings in the
Temple to
eating dinner. Halakha is
often translated as "Jewish
law," but this is misleading,
it means "way of going,"
or
more precisely, of walking, as
in the prophet's injunction,
"Walk humbly before the Lord
your God"
(Micah 6:8).

In order to learn how they
should go,

the rabbis of

the Talmudic period would pose
questions to the text in
order to clarify what, they were already
aware, God asked
of them.
"From what hour may one recite the eveining

prayers?"

(Berakhot 2a), for example, assumes we already

agree we are obliged to pray at fixed times
and we know
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of what the evening
prayers consist
St
Another passage
D
u
(Baba Metzia 2a)
begins, "OneS Wh
who
P
s either cattle
° leave
or
census in a neighbor^ care,
-

,

i

^^_^^

.

tOWard

Mdertake

—
——

nSi9hb0rS

"

Saf

-d

£

-ponsrbiUt.es

^°ngings

^
^

when we

mrdrash will
atte.pt to spell those
responsibiUties
fluties
doing so, midrash
halakhah w
fch6
familiar logical systeH
of Aristotie; however
de
rts
from it in four i mportant
ways .21

m

logic of classes.

.

.

u

^

^

To work wlth it

^

_

^

^

^

&

^

Qne places
w.thin its proper specres,
or a specres within
its genus,
and remembers w hat is
common to the species or
genus as a
whole.
Midrash halakhah does not
drew items into relations
of identity or submerge
an individual within a
class,
its
method is not ta X onomical
instead of ordering things
hierarchically, it juxtaposes them,
finding similarity
across differences, so that what
we know about one item,
we can use to understand
another apparently quite unlike
,

.

it.

Because it is not

a

logic of classes, midrash

halakhah rarely uses the basic unit of
Aristotelian logic,
the syllogism, in its investigations.
The classic

school-

book syllogism is this:
a

"All men are mortal;

man; therefore, Socrates is mortal."

Socrates is

Clearly, once we

have a g ree d that
C0 " ClUSi0n 1S

m

tion.

—

belongs tQ

'tioui,

o D vio us:

midrash halakhah, thouah
tnou 9 n
the syllogism is the
ka^ve-chorner
'
'

in a biblical example

,

Moses

7

it follows b

defini .

fh«
the closest thing
to
i

'

,

-'

'

Here,

cias£

^

or aa.jLortior^
fortin
argument.

^

^

been rebellious against
me; ana how mU ch m
ore after my
death?" (Deut. 31:27)
H erP
Here,
the connection is not
is, not
Entity, but h
In a cruc ai
lLJ
not logical out psychological.
It depends Qn
-Possible only through experience

^

_o^ ^^^

.

^^^
^

in interaction-that
Moses's personal authority
j-ty restrain,
restrains r)lo
the people from insurrection.
Mnqpq did
If Moses
rH^ r^4not realize this, it would
not be
obvious, and it would probably
not be true.
1

•

Unlike Moses, the midrash-maker
confronts, not a
people, but a text.
So, a third difference:
midrash relies
on associations which are
rarely conceptual, often
psychological, but primarily linguistic.
For instance,
using a technique called gezera shavah

("equal injunction"),

Rabbi Hillel in the 1st century BCE
showed that the Paschal
lamb may be sacrificed on the Sabbath,
even though it

involves labor.

Both the laws about the Paschal sacrifice

and those about the daily offering contain
the word
b 'moado

,

"in its appointed season."

Numbers 28:10
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expressly states that
the dailv n **
Sabbath
Sabbath.
,
so,
he argued,

15 br ° U ^ ht on
the

the word b'moado
^JHpado comes to teach
us thaf
that the answer is
the same in each
in.
instance: the lamb
mav be offered
may
because the
LUC ca,
P , »are prmai
<~ases
equal, m.
what is equal
1
q
about them? t s th
Pro
=
there any principle
behind
enind t-ho
the connections
^
For the rabbis, it
does not
nnf seem to
matter.
identity of
expression is reason
enough.

^
«

.

y—i

.

Another techn-irmo
tec h^que, binyan ay,
shows the linguistic
ana psychological
bent of midrash even
raore clgariy
mean, "construction
of a general
k-,-

^m^L

rule."

^ance, its procedure seems
like
First, we find

On first

si mp le inductive
logic

case on which the
halakha is given-say,
that of a person whose
animal causes damaae by
eating
something that belongs to
another person.
Then, we apply
the rulings from that
case to a similar instance-say,
a

that of a person whose
animal rubs against a wall,
causing
it to collapse.
There are two special points
to be noted,
though,
one: the name the halakhah
gives to this whole
category, after the original case,
is -tooth---, concrete
example, not an abstract quality.
Two: in this case
(unlike the gezera shavah just cited),
the interpreter
states what makes the cases similar.
Both involve damage
wreaked by an animal acting for its own
satisfaction. But
this hypostasis never replaces "tooth"; in
fact, "tooth,"
the model case, is consulted to clarify
the definition,
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w^ght, nor do they imply
particular cases.

a

universal1 tr uth
beyond the

fourth d iff erence
between the logic
o£ Aristotle
that of mid rash
halaKhah foll ows
Erectly from this
Point about the general
and the particular,
and it bears
hugely on the
distinctiveness of mid rash
as a style of
interpretation.
Aristotle. log ic forms
true statements by
Scribing (i.e., assigninQ
predicates tQ)

<SSO).

^th

is a matter of the

its essential ceinc.
beinrr

r„+.
But,

„

^

whatnesE „

^

fche

as just mentioned,
midrash

remains agnostic about
essences.

«

finds its truths only
in context and in
situation, and its practitioners
reaard

Philosophical principles as
irrelevant.
words are only names, mere

For Aristotle,

signs of the nature of things

as they are.

Doing midrash, on the other
hand, one
studies "the words of the living
God," real, powerful, and
effective.
One moves, not from signifier
to signified,
but from sense to sense.

Therefore, in contrast to normal
jurisprudence and to
Aristotelian theories of textual interpretation,
midrash
halakhah spends as much time studying those
opinions it

rejects as those it certifies into practice.

The halakhic
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interpreter wants to
understand the lnner
inner lo 9 lc of each.
Tho
The assumption
1

is that all the
S rabblS
r.hh'
Clted

are

„

.

serious students."

•

^

the Mishnah

Their declare
aec larations,
even those not
bindina
ng, still
still ~~
come from Sinai.
Therefore, all
must be studied.
i n the
mn<=4.
6 m
° St *
fam ° US ^stance,
the schools
of Killel and Shammai,
both
otn leading teachers
u
of their day
disagreed on nearly every
Y everv major point
for three long years
Finally, a heavenly
voice intervened
vened
t* announced,
xt
"Both
these and these are the
words
woras of fh.
the n
living God, but the
halakhah is according to
the school of Hillel " 22
The
opinio, of the school of
Shammai, though, was
recorded and
is studied to this day.
no
considered

*.

m*w

-

Divine speakers rarely
intrude on rabbinic
discussion,
though,
and so-remarkably for
what is thought of as a
legal code-midrash halakhah
often leads to an impasse.
Frequently, one simply cannot
tell from the discussion
which
version is valid halakhah.
So, even in this
legalistically-oriented brand of Jewish
hermeneutics the
need to find a solution for the
present moment does not
foreclose the possibility of different
solutions for the
future.
Nor does the methodological strictness
of midrash
halakhah mean it must needs become a closed
system.
,

,

"We

do not enact decrees that the people
cannot live by," a

Talmudic maxim states.

In

fact,

in later years,

custom

acquired the power to

~

course, a new midrash
might arise
as well.
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o nce lt did

^ .^^

of

^

IV

But not all mi a rash
focuses on producing
halakhah
starts frora different
sorts Qf
not "How do we do this?"
but "what does this
m ean?»
Assuming that the Torah
Tnr^h is completely
meaningful, as the
rabbis did, they could ask
about the meaning of any
irregularity in the text and
expect a serious answer.
Did
a sentence contain a
word that could easily have
been
omitted? The rabbinic readers
would want to know why.
Did a word appear in two
dissimilar passages? They might
weave a story to reveal a hidden
link.
Was there a gap
in the narrative that could
not be explained in any other
way? into the breach, the
midrash-makers stepped. They
might take advantage of the way biblical
Hebrew is written,
.

^i^L^aah

*

without vowels or punctuation, to revocalize
words or
recombine sentences. They might trade on the

numerical

value of the Hebrew letters to find hints of
other

messages that would add up to an equal sum.

in effect,

order to find meaning, the rabbis allowed themselves
to
rewrite the text, secure in the belief that they were

in

doing God's work.

"For 11
it 15 no
«„ em
PtY thing from you":
the guarantee takes
on the rorce
force of
nf a command.
Although to the outside
utside reader
rP Q
some of these midrashim
may seem to border on
the arbitrary, the
y cou ld not have
been produced and would
not have been accepted
without a
ser.es of constraints that
made them legitimate
interpretations in the Jewish world
woria.
To k~
begin with,
i

«=

^

'

•

midrash

aggadah is conditioned by
the
tne text itself.
if^ir
loses its plain meaning,"
the rabbis

ruled.

"No text ever
2

However

elaborate the lesson one can
draw from a biblical verse
by
midrash, its more straightforward
message (relatively
speakina) remained; it was never

cancelled, as in allegory.

Moreover, every midrash had to
connect itself, even by a
long and tenuous chain of ideas,
to a verse or several
verses of Torah. Also, no midrash
could successfully clam
to exhaust the meaning of its
text.
it is common,

in fact,

for midrashic anthologies to list
a number of readings on
a verse, sometimes more than
one attributed to the same

source, and to introduce each one simply as
"Another

interpretation.

Beyond the stimulus of the text, however, what really

determined the making of midrash and conferred legitimacy
on its final products was a set of concerns and preoccu-

pations shared by rabbinic writers and their readers

during the Talmudic period.

In his study The Rabbinic

MH£, Max Kadushin

calls these or™
organizing themes
"value•

concepts." 25

Value-concepts
ar P
P

*

"

Values

faetq

significant to

a

opposed to

given set of readers
readers.

Kadushin lists the
rabbinic value-concepts
as the themes
F
th*
of God's
justice, God's love
(or mercy)
mercv)
nv,
u
Torah
and the

mam

"*
,

^rae!.

Midras^^a^

,

mostly addresses

^^

^

and the relations
between them. Mother
way of sayinc
this, and perhaps a
better, is that when
the rabbis would
°° midrash, they would seex out
problems in the text that
might have a bearing on
one of these four.
The value-concepts act
as a complex, organismic
whole
that defines, to a great
extent, what it meant to
be a Jew
during the 3rd-6th centuries
CE.
Both the self
;

and the

"special character of the
group," according to Kadushin,
depended^ largely on "the
transmission of the valuational
terms." 26 They were-and still
are-a large part of
Jewish culture. By pegging
interpretation to these themes,
therefore, midrashists made sure of
their audience, and by
building commentary on commentary, they
guaranteed their
findings a plausibility that mere
pronouncements could
not attain.
But did the rabbis believe their own
midrashim, and

did their audiences believe them?

It depends on what we
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-an

by fcenef.

„

^

^ ^^^^^
^
^

question ahout whether
some event actuauy
choosing a "yes" response
instead of a "no
no
never helieved mid rash

M

lm

either.

- but

^

"

'

a

^

«,
then
Jews have

they

That yes -or-no guestron
rarely troubled the.
Kadushin points out that
m idrash- raak ers often
hear and
acknowledge vaiid o bj eotions
to *eir preferred
readin. and
adhere to it anyway.
"Suoh persistenoe " he
states, "surely
implies a he lief of some kind,
but a belief which
is ]ust
as surely not unqualified." 27
,

.

.

.

A receptive attitude
toward midrash necessarily
involves a state of mind
Kadushin calls "indeterminate

belief."

m

modern philosophical terms,
to engage a
midrash is to bracket questions
of truth in order to seek
meaning.
The midrashist and his or her
readers play with
the text, sometimes 1 ightheartedly
but with
a

,

purpose.

serious

The stories that they foster say
something about

their real and pressing problems;
through midrash, they
gain a deeper understanding of why and
how to act.

If a belief is implicated here,

it is the bedrock

belief in the meaningf ulness of Torah and in the
activity
of interpretation.

To believe is to trust. 28

Doing

midrash, especially aggadic midrash, is like exploring
one

1

s

relationship with another person: knowing objective
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facts about the
other may not move
the
ae relatio
rel ationship
„
alona
lon *
any further.
Through midra
Jews <3 et to know"
.,
God and
he world. Thev
believe „ ln
they
'

^

,.

spared
value?

^^

to that faith,
what importance
has mere

^

V
It is useful to look
at an example of
aggadic midrash

whxoh James Kugel has
analyzed.

Th e text is Psalm
145

one
of many Hebrew poe ms
oo.posed alphabetically,
with each
line beginning with a
new letter of the
alphabet.
The
rabbis noticed, though,
that no line starts
with the letter
it is omitted from
the sequence,
of course, they had
to ask, « Why? .
Rabbi yohanan g ves
explanat
.

^

.

on

_

David, the supposed author
of the Psalms, knew that
in
Amos 5:2, the letter nun
would begin the dire sentence
"She
has fallen (nafelah) and
will no more rise, the virgin
of
Israel." He left out the nun verse
in order to avoid

referring to this prophecy of downfall.

Rabbi Nahman bar

Isaac seconded this opinion, adding
that the next verse
following the omission provides the
antitdote: "The Lord

lifts up all who are fallen, and straightens
up all who
are bent."
So far, this is fairly straightforward

— for

midrash.

True, the question is not one most readers
would have come

136

up with, but the
midrashist is constant
constantly on the
lookout
for such minutiae.
Tru
*-v,^
P
True,
the
answer Rabbi Yohanan
gives
makes David, who lived
long
iy before
oerore Amos, remarkably

precognitive

.

«^

it is 3
a rabb
r-aKK-:

•

^^

dictum, though,
IS "no before or after
in Torah ...30

answer

^^

that there

guestion about another
verse „hole ly disconnected
fro, it.
Kabbi Nahm an.s addendum,
on the other hand,
ta.es
the mere fact of
juxtaposition to warrant his
readinc one
verse into its neighbor.
His interpretation,
together with
the one it builds on,
treats mn-c
God s mo
mercy toward the people
Israel, thus relating two
value-concepts in a wholly
traditional way.
a

,

The sages of Palestine,
though, offer a more daring
reading than these two Babylonian
rabbis, not of Psalm 145,
but of the problematic verse
from Amos.

They divide the

sentence differently, thus: "She
has fallen and will no
more rise, virgin of Israel!"

—

What this midrash does is to suspend
the original
question (and the other answer to that
question) in order
to focus on the real problem: the
catastrophe that has

befallen the Jews' relation with God.

At the time these

rabbis wrote, Judea was an abject tributary of Rome.
Titus had destroyed the Temple in 70 CE and carried many
Jews off into slavery.

A military revolt led by Simon

Bar Kokhba in 135 CE had also been crushed, dashing the
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Messianic expectations
of his followers.
°r
folio
Ten of the most
prominent rabbis of
Palestine
destine had
h*n been
k
tortured to death
by the P.o m ans. Jerusalem
the capital

^^^ ^

,

.eolarea of f - llffiits to
Je ws.
lost m uoh of

The country as

a

whole

Us

population, an d the Jews
for the second
time were dispersed
persed ahma/i
±.u
abroad, with
no imminent prospects
for
return.
One Je wish sect, the
Nazarenes or Christians,
had
used these disasters as
evidence that the relationship
between God and the Jewish
people had come to an end,
and
what they asserted, many
others
.

•

feared.

Against this background,
consider what the Palestinian
sages did and did not do
in their midrash on Amos
5:2.
They did not argue, as they
might have, that Amos's words
only applied to the Babylonian
Exile (586-510 BCE of which
he had been speaking.
Nor did they read "will no more
rise" in a relative sense, as
"not for a long
)

time,"

although this too would have been
possible.

They chose not

to take "Israel" as the northern
kingdom, differentiated

from Judah, though this reading would
have at least mitigated the disaster. Above all, unlike their
prophetic
forerunners, Isaiah and Jeremiah, they refused to
rely on

God's omnipotence and God's capacity to annul
prophecies
of doom out of divine love.

Any of these solutions, in order to reassure, would
have required from the people their full belief: not only

138

belief i„ the vallaity
Qf the lnterpretaUon
crucian,, belief that
what it

^^^

^^^^

'

that God would never
hide
ue his
nis lace
f„ 0 forever
*
ever.
R„f of course,
But
tlu, f.xth was exactly
what was lacking
The
Qf
Palestine chose instead
a solution that
reqUlred onl y the
willing suspension of
disbelief «or what
aisoelief,
Kadushin calls
"
indeterm inate belief
eiief which,
wh-i^h
~
on
occasion, can harden and
become determinate 1,31 Th 0
Th61r ^drash, though
serious, is
at the same time darkly
comic.
It does not need to
be
accepted, only repeated
(as a good jo ke often
is) over and
over, until it becomes
ecomes mrf
part of a= common culture
which
laughs in the face or
x.u
of exil^
m~
exile.
Together
with halakhah,
midrashic stories
t?n^h as these
ones such
gave the Jews the strong
social cohesiveness they
needed
ccueu in order
nrrw to survive in a
world whose meaning they no
longer understood.

^

.

'

•

^

It is the midrashic function
of restoring meaning to

chaotic world which we can find
renewed when Marx does
theory.
a

VI

No one would mistake any writing of
Karl Marx's for a

specimen of the literary genre midrash. 32

Marx is not

writing about Torah; he is commenting on philosophy
and
political economy.

His language is German, French, or

English, never Hebrew or Aramaic.

He does not steer by
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the set of value-concepts
Kadushin enumerates:
he cares
little for God or Israel
except as h.storical
examples and

curiosit.es.

True

,

he is passionate
for play s-on-words

At the height of an
argument, he often throws
readers, such as his
contents in

a

pun at his

^oj^^

that the

Hegelian movement needed to
bathe in a "river of
fire«~in
German, a ^er-bach.
These witticisms make
Marx's
writings memorable, as clever
midrashim do for rabbinic
texts.
But nothing hangs on them.
Marx's argument can go
on perfectly well without
them.
There is more to Marx's theory
than just his argument,
though.
his manner of doing theory,
his activity or
practice of theorizing, we find Marx
doing something we
might call midrashic. As we have
remarked, before Marx
creates his own theory, he reads. His
writing proceeds
from his reading as commentary.
his writing, furthermore, Marx gives an interpretation, or
reading,

m

m

of his

precursors and their texts,
which makes them

say— something

a

peculiar kind of reading

say— or accuses

them of neglecting to

about the themes which seem important to

him (his own "value-concepts").

in the case of Hegel,

he

systematically attacks and transforms the earlier writer's
theory at just those points where it ignores or disagrees
with his own sense of what is real.

And that sense of

reality, as we learned in chapter

is very much tied to

3,
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the worldview of the
Jewish traditio

midraSh " °" HS9el in

-nse:

*

^
he

^^
counts

on

particular bits of the
Hegelian
order
h
own points, and those
points maKe the text
si g ni flC ant for
readers whose persnerH^
perspective continues the
concerns of the
Jewish tradition.

^

^

^

But then, we are faoed
with a paradox. Marx
rejects
Judaism and adopts philosophy
and political economy,
all
the while studying them
as if they were, or
should be,
Torah.
He demands that they mean
something for the story
about the world, humanity,
and history suggested by
his
Jewish sense of the rp^l
t-f *-v,~
real.
if
they do not, he reinterprets
them so that they do. Here is
a strange unconscious
piety,
an unwillino reverence in
the midst of secularity and
socialism.
How can we account for this
mixing of worlds,
which Marx neither announces nor
explains?
In her discussion of modern
thinkers influenced by

midrash, Handelman describes

hermeneutics."

33

a

tendency she calls "heretic

Writers who work in this mode can

simultaneously affirm their identities as moderns
and as
Jews without completely submitting to either.
This
Houdini-like maneuver involves

a

double displacement.

First, the writer leaves the world of Torah behind.

Attention shifts.

For Freud, psychology, and for Bloom

--

rrida

literary theory become
investigation.
lnto these new
heretics po rt the old
,

d

^

objects

^

„ ^^^
s

^

_

^

literature are treated
treated, xn
i„ t.^.
the words of Freud,
"as Ho ly
Writ»-i„ other words, as
T orah.

^.anded, to be meaningful

^

_

They are

tQ their tiniest

The modern critic
interDrPt,
nrerprets them as a
midrash-maker would
do: to make them
significant-Lgmticant n terms s/he
believes the
text and s/he must share.

m
,'

+.

With Marx, we cannot see
the exegetical techniques,
but we can sense the
gravitational pull that m
idrash exerts
in his writings.
.'For it is no empty
thing from you":
Marx attaches himself to
Hegel (and then to political
economy) because their
tantalizing similarities
to the

reality in which he believes
and which he is struggling
to
bring to life will not let him
ignore them.
He can never
fully accept them either; at
best, he can note
them in a

spirit of indeterminate belief.

Eventually, he must

reorder everything, including his own
first readings.
"Of course," Marx wrote in an
afterword to Capital

,

"the method of presentation must differ
in form from that
of inquiry." 34 we have already seen that
the way Marx

presented one central feature of his theory, its
relation
to that of Hegel,

has obscured more than it has helped.

Without explaining midrash, Marx could not explain his
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own activity.

Without recooni**
Bcocmizmathe *demands his
Jewish

hope to fi„a an audience
that would share
concepts.
Yet the Jewish terms
in
hig
hxs philosophy of writing
make sense were foreign
to
Marx's audience and to
Marx himself.
ln the next chapter
we win consider how
this dilemma affects
our reading of
Marx's overaii project,
and we wil l asx how
the aewish
the me of exile, retranslated
by Marx's theory of
alrenatlon, may help us understand
Marx better.
,

^

'

CHAPTER FIVE
ESTRANGEMENT IN A STRANGE
LAND

Everything Marx ever
wrote-philosophy
economics, pities
takes aim at the problem
Qf
0V6rCOming
hl
ical circumstances
which have forced
see of us to work for others,
under

~

—

their control and for
their profit, thus wasting
our own creative powers
and
losing the commodities we
end up spawning, the raw
materials
we might have used, and
the wholeness of self
and society
we need more than anything
but survival itself:
this is

Marx's theme and his goal as
Alienation

a

theorist.

is the key-word of Marx's
early writings,

but it appears over and over in
Capital, too. 1 And well it
might.
For alienation and the transcending
of alienation
both require, in Marx's own words,
"very palpable, material
conditions," and it is to discover the
details of those
conditions that Marx beains his economic
researches at
all.

2

As crucial as alienation is to Marx,

equally troublesome to Marxists.

it has proved

First, they have had to

defend the term from social psychologists and other

researchers

who would set it equal to "dissatisfaction." 3

This apparently value-neutral term in fact strips away
the whole theory of human needs which gives alienation
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T

mSaninq
-

"

Marxi sts furthermore
,

there are those
who woulc resist the
languflge of
aiienation
Preferr ing the more
analyUcal

»ate r ial lsm

.

Thelr choice weights

^

a

,

^ ^^
^

^

deterministic readin of
Marx, which sits
g
pOQrly
Marx's Je wish emphasis
on the rmportanoe
of human action
A thrrd problem arises
in humanist Marxism,
which
casts the distortions
of

^

the self and of« social
relations

produced by capitalism as
mere objects of protest
exemplars of ..man's inhumanity
to man"

[sic].
At its most
basic, the humanist approach
underestimates the power of
economic and institutional
barriers to human freedom,
something Marx never did. 5

We should not be misled by
this multiplicity of
partial readings. None of his
followers have deserted
Marx's struggle against alienation
completely.
As

Alasdair Maclntyre acutely observes,
"When

a

tradition is

in good order it is always
partially constituted by an

argument about the goods the pursuit of
which gives to
that tradition its particular point and
purpose." 6 Using
this standard, the debate about alienation
may
even be a

sign of Marxism's continuing good health.

As long as the

place of alienation still matters to the participants,
the

tradition goes on.
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Yet as Maclntyre
also suqoem-Q
9gStS S ° metlmes
argument
lose, ton
-Loses
h
touch with what it ic
.
abOUt and a
tradition "gets
interpreted and
misinterpreted
PrSted ln
in *
terms of the pluralism
which threatens to
submerge
us 311
9
e
all " 7
Som
e readings of
Marx's theory of
alienation do let usS
learn more and some,
^ferently than others
Faced
ohoose among interpretations,
we should ask:
what version
UnderSt3nd the
with which Marx confronts alienation, For
alienation is no abstract

«

'

'

.

.

.

^

•

. _

.

^

-

Marx: it is more Ufce
aR

^^

>

^

^
^^
^^^

feel that obsession
as Marx did?
SinC e otherwise, we
shall be hard put to say
„e have understood
it at all.
Where shall we searoh for
an understanding of

alienation's profound influence
on our lives according
to
Marx's theory? Let us begin
by ignoring the ongoina
debate on the subject, and
let us continue by setting
aside for the moment Marx's
own writings on alienation.
Marx did not provide us with
the full context we needed
to
understand his midrash on Hegel.
We may also
suspect that

when he writes about alienation,
he is not pausing to
explain what he is doing. We shall have
to imagine that
ourselves.
So, let us approach alienation
circuitously,
edging up to it from an entirely unexpected
direction.

will explore the meaning of alienation via
the theme of exile.

a

midrash on

We
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II

The text we are examining
is the f irst line
of the
boo, of Bereisnit, or
Cenesrs. We are
accustom to t h e

translation which reads
heaven and the earth.

"m
In

k
the beginning
God created the
Now the
ne ear
eart-h
,„
*
th was
formless and
'

,

void ..."
The Torah, though, is
written without vowels or
Punctuation; hence, many
interesting possibilities
occur.
An equally valid reading
would have Genesis 1:1-2
say,
"When God began to create
the heavens and the earth,
the
earth became (havta) formelss
8
and void."
Now, long ago,
in the 16th century CE,
Rabbi Isaac Luria, called the
Lion,
read the verse in just this
manner. And here is the story
he told
°n
G ° d fUled infini ty.
There was no
n ° instant of time, which was
not part
n?\hf
Vln
In ° rdSr to create the world-because
?'
rod was lonely-God
t
God
had first to make room, to with'

dot nf

'

,

draw from infinity and to contract within
himself.

So, the first thing created was the
empty space, the
nothing, the "formless and void." into this
absence,
God emanated pure divine energy.
it was like a river
of light pouring, liquid, into containers
also made
of light.

But the freely flowing emanation could not contain
itself.
The vessels shattered.
The shards fell into
chaos.
And the scraps of the broken vessels came to
encase the light they had held like scars over
wounds, or like thick, woody shells around nuts. 9
All that we now recognize as our world, said Luria

and his followers, is really the jumble that resulted from

the shattering of the vessels.

The world is infinitely

precious-every bit contains
sparks Qf

—

3ust for that reason,
it is direly in

Kabbalah 6XP

^

^

divine __ but

^

Qf

thi. extreme Urgency
by stating
that when the primordial
vessels shattered, at
that same
moment God's imminent
presence
ce
call**
c>, ,v
.
call ed Shekhmah
went into
exile.
God's own self became
divided.
'

,

The

ShekMnah

is exiled here with
us in this reality

which is the only reality,
but which is tragically
unlike^
what it should be. We are
called, the kabbalists would
say,
to redeem the sparks of
divine light by hallowing
every
being.
And they would preface
every religious act-which,
given the task of hallowing
the entire world, included
sitting down to a meal and
putting on

clothes-with the

declaration,

"This is done for the sake
of reuniting God

and His Shekhinah

.

"

what has been fragmented will be
made

whole; what had been exiled will
return.
Like any good midrash, Rabbi Luria's
picks up themes
from the traditional account and deepens
them in unexpected
ways.
The story of the shattering of the vessels
makes

human action absolutely crucial in the universe.
u nderlines

It

God's dependence on humanity, for not only do

we determine the success or failure of divine
purposes: we

mus t heal the divine being.
to us,

God is constituted in relation

and the predicament which imposes God's needs sets

us our task as well.

Furthermore, that task concerns
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^

itself with our day . to .
day existence Md
details of material life
A11 this is traditionai
fits easily yith what
was "told to Moses
at Sinai."
Yet Luria's tale also
revises traditional
Jewi sh
thought in a drastic way.
ln the
.

_

Torah>

to all who call upon
pon Him.
Him
in

it"

the dialogue,

(Exodus 30).

is

"

„

The

^^

^^^

"m,

Thls instruction," God's
voi ce

"in your mouth and
in your heart,

we find no mention of
Go d

to do

s purposes gone
awry, no indication that
we need to know anything
that
Preceded the world in order
to hallow it.
the Torah,
'

m

creation is unfinished because
it is ongoing; in the
Kabbalah, because it is broken
off.

Thus, the exile of the
Shekhinah is a catastrophic
event which disrupts cosmic
purposes and which makes
reality ironic.
it requires our unrelenting
effort to
effect its reversal, to bring God's
presence and ourselves
home from exile.
Short of that return, the Kabbalah
suggests, we cannot know our true
purposes, and we cannot
be whole.
Return and the longing for return become
the

content of life.

In the absence of dialogue,

the need to

restore dialogue establishes what it means in
Judaism to
be a person.''" 0
I

want to propose that Marx's theory of alienation

shares the basic movements of the story of exile and

return we find in Luria, and that the tensions in the
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idea of return
parallel the ten
tension,
sions surrounding
Marx's
concept of revolution
">n.
Takin
t
Taking alienation
truly into
we
have to
erstanding of Marx

wm

IT'
-rote

the Torah

--

,

s

~

in Torah eaeh
recurrence o f a theme
must
f ° rWardS
3 C

^

s

theme Qf

All these convergences
es win
y
Wl11 k«
become more evident
th OUgh , if we go
back to examine other
texts

"

,

fae

^

read

^«

every other episode
wh.ch
it infers,
we will discuss three
bibUcai
which>
though they pertain to
events in Mstory

exe mp l ify

kind of

^

the the m es of exile and
return."

suction,

^^^^

^

Next

,

as .

we will do our own m
idrash on a verse

fro, a 20th oentury Jewish
poet. Then a nd only
then will
we be reedy to disouss
Marx's theory of elienetion
in the
framework of exile.

Ill

Luria's midrash tells us how exile
affects God and the
cosmos; the story of the expulsion
of Adam and Eve from the

Garden of Eden shows how human beings
suffer from it, too.
In order to learn that particular
lesson,
though, we need

first to set aside the Christian reading
with which, since
John Milton, we are so familiar. That
story
speaks not of
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exile but of "Adam's
fall
f0rbi

"

r
t
It

——

^
postulates
e4.

,

that the sin of

~veale d the lnh erent sin-

fulness of human nature,
which man.fested
itself again
directly in Adam and Eve's
descent
scent lnto
inf
sexuality from
their (assumed) previously
spiritual
plane.

Jewish readers havee intpm™t„j
interpreted the story
differently.
in the midrash on
Genesis 2-3, disobedience,
not sexuality
the sin for whioh Adam
and Eve are banished.
Sexuality
IS recognized to be
fraught with m oral
dangers, but it is
is-

also

a

positive commandment: "Be
fruitful and multiply, and
replenish the earth" (Genesis 1-2R1
51s 1-28).
Moreover, at least
one midrashist claxms that
the serpent found Eve
alone
because Adam had "engaged in
his natural functions (an
idiom for intercourse) and
then fallen asleep." 12 clearly,
sexuality was not a consequence
of the serpent's temptation.
Beyond that, Martin Ruber questions
the notion that
sin

(or

"a

decision between good and evil")
is the topic of

the story at all.

Instead, he points out, Adam and Eve

decide for the knowledge of good and
evil— or, better,
knowledge through the categories of good
and evil,

"adequate awareness of the opposites latent in
creation." 13

Arthur Waskow goes on to wonder whether leaving
Eden was
not a punishment but a necessary step toward
maturity—

less

like the shattering of the vessels and more like
that

initial contraction by which (in Luria's story) God
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Prepared for the creation
of the world
xu
seems to contradict

14

This readinq
the text
k
text, but lt
shows how far from
say, Milton's Eden
the Jewish
eh
commentator feels free
to go
Since we are not
compelled to i-eaa
read the story of
the
expulsion as a lesson
about sexuall
sexual itty and
original sin, we
are free to ask what
we can
an learn tfrom it
about the theme
of exile.
Adam and Eve, we are
told ^re driven
forth
from the Garden.
This exil
+->SXlle^ tran sformed
their lives and
those of their descendants,
deqrpn^nf, so much
so that an ancel
with a
flaming sword is a fit
symbol for the
impossibility of
their going on unchanged,
we can ask the text
a new
question, then, about the
con^uences of the expulsion"How does exile affect
human lives? What did
Adam and Eve
lose when they left Eden
behind?"

w

'

-

*.

ma

'

The Torah mentions four
changes that confronted the
first couple when they
departed the Garden. They
became
ashamed before each other and
before God.
They had to work
hard and unrelentingly in order
to survive.
Even "in the
sweat of thy brow,
they could never be sure of
producing
what they needed to live; the earth
from which they sprang
became the adversary. Finally, the
sexual relation and the
act of giving birth became bound up
with pain and travail.
All the activities in which human beings
had engaged in
••

Eden as partners in creation, they now
find themselves
doing under the whip of necessity. The
most basic human

needs, food,

i abor/

and

x

-—
'

u " certainly
'

and in a

——

Can onl be met
y
sometimes,

status as na m ers and
tenders of the worid.

^

3

-«

ity

.

s

original

Exile means

° f est r a„ e ment
g
has

fUtered

to their diaio ue
with Cod which affects
g
hcth Cod and
human.
it cannot be willed
d awav
away, only struggled

gradually, painfully
transcended.

f(

in

with and

But humanity decided
to try for a shortcut.
instead
of learning how to be
human in order to become
God's
Partners once again, they
opted to become gods
themselves
On the plain of Shinar,
the tower went up, story
after
story, an assault on the
heavens.
Building the Tower of
Babel was a truly monumental
effort, spurred on by a fear
of equal proportion: "lest
we be scattered abroad
upon the
face of the whole earth"
(Genesis 11:4).
Ironically, by
their own actions, the builders
provoked the fate they
feared.
The Torah tells that God "did
there confound the
language of all the earth." None
of them could understand
each other.
Their common purpose lost, they
scattered.
Their exile was complete with the
fragmenting of their
shared speech; after that, physical dispersal
was all but
a

foregone conclusion.

The tower-builders had lost sight

of God's purposes in creating human beings
who could act,

and so they lost, too, the ability to frame
common human

purposes of any sort from Babel onwards.

™

^
^^
""^ ^ —

Hence it is the peopl£
Qf
anlty WhlCh

for most of the
biblical story
ry.
<0nCS

"

MbliCal

«—

destructions of the Temple,

not
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repairing the

That nation suffers
exile

with the successive

^

irst by the

om y

do the Jews become
captives, uprooted f rom
their
land; they also undergo
the destruction of
the lecal and
cultural institutions that
had defined everyday
Jewish life
Many of the 613 pitzvot,
or commandments of
the Torah
oould not be carried out
anywhere but in the land
of Zsrael
Others had no application
in the climates and
social
systems the exiles began to
inhabit, while still others
made sense only as directives
to a self-governing people.
With good reason, then, the
Jews of the Diaspora
asked, "How shall we sing the
Lord's song in a strange
land?" Like Eve and Adam, they
had all they could do to
keep themselves alive on alien
and hostile soil.
Like the
shocked crowd at Babel, they were
forced to speak in new
languages, both metaphorically and literally,
which blocked
the expression and even the memory of
what they had been

working at before.

And when they swore, "if

i

forget thee,

0 Jerusalem, let my right hand lose its cunning," they

underscored the tacit truth that henceforth, Jerusalem
might only live as the capital of Jewish life in
memory.

IV

Memory, and the
language which
wnich nr.
y
preserves it, have
become matters of l
ife and death
eath
Jews in exile. As
Harold Bloom writes »t0 ,^„
JeWry can su
without a JeW ish
language. .but not without l
Ut lan 9 u
not without an intense
obsessive concern that far- 4-v
far transcends
what we ordinarily
15
call literacy."
Gestures and rituals
ritual, have the
power to
stir something nameless
=
within
within, and sometimes
to evoke an
unspoken meaning that,
like
HKe a tradition, gives
people their
bearings for a little
while.
in exile,
exilP though,
u
what is
last to give way as the
institutional foundations
of identity crumble is language:
for Jews, the discursive
structures of dialogue.
No m atter what Jews
know or accept of
their religion, when they
address the demand to
hallow the
world through material
action guided by changing
human
needs, they return to the
situation which seems most
real
to them and in which they
feel most right to themselves.
Language helps create a meaningful
world-or destroy
it.
It follows that one aspect
of exile is losing one's
own voice, having to use concepts
that others recognize to
address problems that others deem
significant in order to
say anything at all, even indirectly,
about what concerns
one most. And one route to return
would be to speak in a

"^e

'

„ ^,

.

,

.

v,

,

m

^

voice one can claim as one's own" to tell
the story of
one's estrangement, one's present needs,
and one's
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stutter lng att e mpts to
reshape the world
into . home
tell the story-and
to attract an audience
wMch
t6rmS
SmPathy
'

^

'

^

ab °-

Tq

.

fche

the good will to
hear

As our final midrash
on the theme
us try to listen to
someone trying to he
heard,

^

Jewish poet Charles Reznikoff
writes:
How difficult for me is
Hebreweven the words for mother,
for 'bread
fnr
are foreign.
How
I bee^Hue^

fa^e

^

^t

African

B*.

How difficult for me is
Hebrew": this opening sentence, to any present or
former student, calls up
a vision
which is instantly familiar.
Someone is working hard at
learning a language without having
any real aptitude for it.
Many know how that feels; we
can shake our heads ruefully
and sympathize.
But, this man is a Jew.
The language he
is trying to learn is his own
language.
How can we
"

comprehend that?
For just a moment, imagine yourself
suddenly forgetting
how to speak English. You have to express
yourself now,
say,

in German,

in words that seem strange and
disconnected,

in a grammar you learned out of a textbook.

Not only do

you have to search for words when you try to talk with

other people; in your own mind, you hear yourself in an
alien tongue.
Can you feel that?

The constant groping for vocabu-

lary, the unsureness that you've said what you meant to
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say or that what
vou'vp
yuu
ve said made spnw +.u L
sense, the biting
scorn
°r ooneesce„ dlng
patience Qf

«^

^^^
.

^

halfwit foreigner?

"Difficult
ttrcult,

„

„K
the
poet says.

is not the word for
your condition.

.

Difficult"

But think, instead,
that this ioss of
yours did not
happen yesterday, but a
long
a

^^

as far back as you
can remember
^r.

ever spoke another
language.

^

^

You
you sro
are unaware that you

Only, there are
these caps in
conversation where you know
you want to say
something hut
cannot figure out what,
only that it is i m
portant.
So you
try anyway, hop.ng to
reach someone with a
piece of it, ]
hint, a spark.
To your am aze m ent,
your neighbors hear only
what they expect to hear.
The .old of their o„„„

understandings keeps casting
your tentative, hopeful
messages back into the same
distorted shape. Do you rage
at their obtuseness? Or
blame yourself for this vague
something you cannot seem to say?
This is a dimension of
exile: losing your own thoughts
to a foreign
'

language.

"Even the word for mother, for
bread, for sun/are
foreign." why these words? Why not
bigger, meatier words
like freedom, power Spirit or, for
that matter, alien,

ation?

,

The poet feels estranged precisely from
the

everyday.

If he knew his own language, through
interpre-

tation the tiniest, most personal elements of
his life

would become sources of meaning and chances for
action.
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-cause
to

h».

the terms of his

the poet finds them

» ™cul t;

^

^^^^ ^^^^
„

^

difficult „.. not

problem
prQbie

a

but as a persQn

obstreperouS; Qbstr
txonist, perversely
resisting what
Qbvious
to be done, which i<; +-ho
the hall °W">g of
the everyday

it cannot be done,

^

^

Thls is the secQnd

exUe: when your own needs
see,

_

^

u

everyone and everything,
including

gn

^

^

forergn, and the
difficulty

of an integrated life
confronts you l ike an ene
my
The poet seeks his own
language, his own needs,
and
even his own land.
"How
now rar
far h^,o
k
nave It been
exiled, Zion"the hill country of Ju
dea is the terrain of
Jewish identity.
But exile is not a matter
of geography alone.
This thickwitted Hebrew student could
move to Jerusalem
.

tomorrow-

and be worse off, not better.
not land but life.
Zion,

The State of Israel is not
Zion: in

"the words for mother,

spoken in

His problem, we read, is

for bread, for sun" would be

living communal effort to discover
how to do
that for which we are. No state we
know can
a

do that.

No

country has ever been Zion.
Is this too paradoxical, the poet's
longing to return

to a place he has never been?

On the contrary.

his need be silent until it is fulfilled?

abstraction.

To him,

How can

zion is not an

it is no completely rational

society

158

inhaMted

^

tW

°^—ional

figures.

It is what he

^
now,

perhaps, he is sometimes
there: not in a hi
„•
blinding
flash,
but in the sound of
a still
still, small VQlce
that wMspers tQ
him what his words
might mean. He is
Ca
efl back.
k
„
££lled
.and
Ms return becomes real, and
he starts to Hve
a real life
Following „ar X s poignar
, phrase> he
poetry out of the future.

m

n

^

.

carried him.

The

f amiliar

^^

^

landmarks have

good trying to steer by
them now.
air.

.

^ ^ ^

Fis pleas
pieas rail
fall on; empty
n-Lfa

He is suddenly a man
alone, having trouble
with his

language lessons; while, all
around him float the shibboleths of a country which is
inescapably, inexcusably
foreign.
Being in exile, then, means
trying to sing the
Lord's song in a strange land.
But this brings us to a fourth
dimension of exile, one
that Reznikoff only hints at, so
that we will need the
fine reading skills of midrash to
discover
it.

When the poet says, in the first line,
"How difficult
for me is Hebrew," he is speaking
soliloquy, a form which
heightens the sense of isolation his words
express.

By

the third line, however, he changes his mode
of address.
He employs apostrophe, a figure in which
the person

addressed is not literally there.

"How far have

I

been

—
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a,. hesays

„
,

zion „

Now

anything here that adds
to
beyond simply concluded

,

what of it?

isthere

^^^^^^ ^

exiie
ea that +-ho
the poet knows
his trade?

"Zion."

The apostrophe
calls
xs into
lnto m
P!ay someone who is
not there even when
there means
anS "in
ln the w °rds of
the poem."
speaks to someone
whose name the poet
never utters
"Zion" cannot be the
one meant to hear.
zion is a
Place, a condition for
the task, but not
a partner
The poet is reaching
out metonymically
to someone for
whom his difficulty
matters. t„
To whom is the poet
y matters
speaking?
When, throuqhout
cj. rtr „
gnout hi
T
history,
Jews
haye found themselves
challenged by the need to
integrate all aspects of
their
lives and to dedicate
them to the fulfilment
of the world,
and when, so choosing
and having been chosen,
they asked
how they should begin to
do so, they traditionally
named
the one they questioned,
God.
The name, however, is

^

^ ^

,

unimportant.
poet,

v,

what matters, to Judaism and
to this Jewish

is the act of questioning,
which thrusts the

questioner into the middle of

a

relationship based on

a

shared predicament.
This entering into dialogue is the
beginning of an
exile's return.
it is only a beginning— for the
poet is
still a stranger in a strange land.
But if the motion of

dialogue impels him to build the community
he calls Zion,
it will enable him little by little
to feel

at home in the
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^
-cause
" 0rld

-

dial °- Cal

— —

- a

home for him

it

^

establ.shes the structure
Qf geif(
world on which his
identity
depends.

V

The stories of exile
we have just
explored, f:rom
Luria-s to Beznikoff,.
plumb the meaning
Qf
deeply than any definition
can do.
ine text of
The
n* «,
the Torah,
we remarked earner,
earlipr ls its own best
summary.
Just so the
stories which introduce us
to the theme of exile
also
provide our models of the
condition. No description
or
exposition can do as well, for
none can be sure to reproduce in us the emotional
response which is vital to
knowing
exile from within. We were
able, though, to detect
certain
themes from the Torah narrative
for their pertinence to our
present inquiry, and we can do
the same with our stories
of
exile.
Let us carefully direct our
attention to certain
more clearly universal features
of exile, aspects we may
recognize once again in the lineaments
of Marx's theory of
alienation

^^

i <=

,

We can think of exile in two distinct
but intrinsic-

ally related ways.

Exile may be the burden of some

particular social group, or it may be the condition
of
whole society, affecting all its individual members.

a
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^

certain kinds of groups
wUhin sQciety
expect to apply it
in describina
scribing the
n,
group of left-handed
People, nor redheads,
Dem ocrats, or
Virginians.
Exile
occurs only to groups
which share m0 re exi
s tentiall
y basic
situations, so that the
defining characteristics
of the
^oup also structure the
selves of its meE1 bers.
Most
U*ely, a group ln exile
will possess some
shared
t.. k
the elaboration and
continuous reinterpretation
of
which is a central element
in the constitution
of the croup
Exile, then, affects
people in relation to how
their
identities depend on situations
or purposes shared
in
common within a group.
_

-

^

,

Again, we can stipulate
that a group which finds
itself in exile (in the first
sense) is never the dominant
force in society.
One of the important ways
in which exile
is manifested is in the
relation of the exiles
to the

dominant group and to the parameters
of the self that group
maintains for the whole society.
We might therefore
propose that some group X (e.g., the
Jews)

is in exile

with respect to society Y which it
inhabits (e.g., 19thcentury Germany) as a result of some factor
or factors

Z

which have to do with the self created
by its task or
situation, that task or situation not being
constitutive
of society in general.

It is already
clear,

anal

.

rr
e.

both fr
fm™
° m ° ur Tories
and our
at even a profound

what factor puts

partially constituted
by
„
exile state? Primarily
Y

ma

" Stream

*

-

77

a

non .

C3teg0rieS

°

task or situation
situation, into the
it is
S th
thS 9rou P' s
divergence from
a

—

members construct

*

f

---

dominant sQciai

^ ^ «-*

^

rea itY
;

—
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their task, tbey
tacitly

«

significance
which others do not
use or recognize.
The exiles themselves
may be aware of
the incongruity
°r they may not, and
whether
they are will nave
little

bearing on whether their
differ,
ait fermg sense of
the real
becomes a problem for
them.
lf their group lives
apart
interacting with the larger
society mainly for
instrumental
Purposes, then they can
maintain their understanding
of
self and reality with
little strain.
(The ghetto-dwelling
Jews of premodern Europe
are an example.) 16
If
however
the group lives in and
among its neighbors, partakes
of
their culture, and permits
its members to pursue
goals
extraneous to its existential

"

,

,

task, and yet still forms

its members so they must
respond to that task, then the
scene of a tragic conflict is
set.

The members of such
(and modern Jews,

I

a

group as we have been describing

contend, are such a group) must know

the world and conduct their actions
in society on the
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basis of two different
senses of reality:
that Qf
group ana that of their
general oulture. Both
are their
own.
The individual
identity is incomplete
unless s/he
oan somehow manage to
make sense of herself
or hi ms elf as
a character in both
stories.
Yet
ec a w
worlrf
v.v
°rlo in which
one is
called to do a certain task
may differ from a world
which
demands another direction
to one's efforts.
It is almost
certainly irreconcilable with
a notion of the world
which
gives people no purposes at
all, only arbitrary

^

:

and

contingent desires.
Now, the members of this
group are in exile.
They
lack an ontology which accepts
all their concerns as real,
as well as a language adequate
to express them.
Consequently, they cannot express their
constitutive purposes
and needs, either to outsiders or
to each other.
They

have lost the shared context of meaning
which makes

interpreting one's own experience possible.

Therefore,

they are impeded from formulating their
experience, even
to themselves.

The relation between the exiles and their neighbors
is
not symmetrical.

Most citizens of society possess

language and an ontology sufficient to their needs.

a

They

can make themselves understood by each other and by the

exiles, and in general they can know when they are making
sense: that is, when their statements and claims will be

taken seriously, with

.

good chance Qf

^

those rare occasions when
other members of
SQCiety do
make sense to the exiles,
it is the
c exiies
exiles and not
* society
who are deemed to have
failed, j-u
in societv.
society s judgment
„
and
usually in their own.

^

,

For the exiles, the
discursive norms of society
are the
flawing sword barring their
way.
They can only enter the
garden of relaxed, routine
discussion by leaving i mp
ortant
parts of themselves behind.
And this continues to
be true
as long as they are in any
way part of the group,
until they
have left their specific
situation and task completely
behind

The exile which affects specific
groups is not only a
malaise of discourse; it is the
fingerprint of power. We
can see power at work in the
silencing of the exiles about
their particular experience, the
excluding of their
difference from what society counts as
real, and the

producing of the exiles themselves as persons
who must give
a rational explanation of themselves
and cannot.
Power

operates at the same time to estrange the exiles
from
themselves, from each other, and from other human beings.
The social relations in which they seek fulfillment are

fraught with tensions, instead.

Exile also extends into

the realm of politics as usual.

The particular group which

is exiled cannot use the procedures of liberal democracy

to address its needs:

first, because it
cannot formulate

them;

second, because many of
them deal with what
are
called "private" matters;
third, because the
language of
rights, interests, and utility
cannot justify them; and
fourth, because by admitting
themselves unable to fit the
narrow confines of the rational
individual, the exiles
declare themselves unfit to
participate in public life.
So far, we have spoken only
of exile in the first
sense, as it affects particular
social groups.
We have

outlined it as

a

breakdown in the normal, equal
relations

between members of those groups and
society.

Implicit in

that definition, though, is another
understanding of exile
one which designates a condition
which may affect the whole
of society.
,

Let us assume
do)

(as both Marx and the Jewish tradition

that humanity shares, not a common end, but

purpose.

a

common

Let us further assume that pursuing this task

requires the active development of our human powers.

Any

society which fails to embody this pursuit in its constitution runs the risk of becoming an obstacle to human

development.

It matters naught whether the purpose which

makes us human is defined as hallowing the world or as
realizing human powers, or as love, brotherhood/sisterhood,
community, or spiritual nobility.

The individuals who

compose such a society will
1 be hl
hin.
ndered
their pursuit of
any of these since they
cannot rely on one
another.

m

in some cases,

society which bears this
second sort
of exile will lac, not
only a purpose, but any
notion of
common purpose or why such
a shared pro ect
might be
D
worthwhile.
if a group in exile of
the first sort
inhabited a society of exile
in the second meaning,
the
estrangement of self, group, and
social whole would have
reached its ultimate crazy peak.
a

VI

We can read Marx's theory of
alienation as an attempt
to capture in words the plight
of an exiled group in a

society without purpose: namely, the
workers under capitalism.
The reality of the proletariat, Marx
argues,
is

structured by its members' deep and abiding
need for
creative work. This need is generated by the
task Marx

believes all human beings are drawn to, but in which
the

working class of all segments of society is most
frustrated: the realization of their human powers.
Workers, Marx contends, feel the pull of this aspect of

themselves as something tangible, and they suffer from
not being able to pursue it.

What constitutes the alienation of labor? First,
that the work is external to the worker, that it
is not part of his
sicj nature; and that, consequently, he does not fulfill himself in his work,
[
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but denies himself, has a
than well-being, does not feelinn nf
develop
Y
physical and mental eneroies
il physicall
t
?
1
"
exhausted and mentally debased?^
y

W

TreTlTlV^
-

The misery Marx describes
is partly the result
of
exploitation.
his famous chapter of Capital
on "The
Working Day," he serves an
indictment of capitalism for
laying waste the lives of the
workers with long hours and
brutal conditions. 18 Primarily,
though, we find Marx
attacking the evils of alienation
itself: not the loss of
things, but the catastrophe of
capitalism for human
relations. Alienated labor, writes Marx,
disrupts the self

m

insofar as it prevents the workers from
fulfilling their
task as species-beings, which is essential
to whom they
are.

By the same token, it takes away their
common purpose

by denying it any social importance.
too,

alienated labor reproduces

a

As its end product,

class system and

a

mode

of production which allows no room and provides no

resources for the workers to develop in any direction
that does not boost profit and productivity. 19
If we say,

then, that the working class is in exile

within capitalist society because their sense of the real

requires them to do what capitalism makes impossible, we
will have gone a long way toward showing why the tran-

scending of alienation is what Marx cares about most.
Interpreted as exile, alienation is more than an
injustice: it is a tragedy.

It deprives the workers of
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the ability to make sense
of their world.
ability, none of their
powers matter.

without that

But it is not only the
workers who are alienated.
The Holy Family Marx writes:

m

.

The propertied class and
the cls^ of f u
present the same human
former class finds in this sel f -»7 I^Z
confirmation and its cood?
it a semblance of human
existence. 21

se^aU^at^^K*""'
8

iS^^fi"
;

•

has in

Within the capitalist scheme of
things, the bourgeoisie
holds all the advantages. As
Oilman comments, though,
these privileges "concern registering

a

scale which itself must be condemned." 22

higher score on a
The capitalists

are no more free than the workers
to pursue their human
task.
They, too, inhabit a world in which
commodities and

money rule the uses of human energy, 23
and labor is
treated as a source of a mysterious good

called "value"

instead of as an intrinsically human activity. 24

Workers

and capitalists both conduct their lives according
to the

variations of the market, and its boom-and-bust cycle
(and not their own needs and powers)

supplies the situation

to which they respond and which they search for meaning.

We can summarize this general craziness, this inversion
of human reality, 25 by saying Marx portrays capitalism
as a society in exile.

exile must be ended.

For people to become free, that
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Heading alienation as
an analogue to
exUe>
stand why it is Marx
s Qverriding

„

^^^^

,

^

we
to appreciate the
cruel irony aUenation
infiiota
accordinq to Marx.
Mary
t?v!i«
Exile takes the challenge
of hallowing
the world in dialogue-which
already de ra ands our every
effort-and adds to it the
agonies of distance,

^

^

i

cnanginc
the joys of partnership
i„ creation to the
nu mbinq struggle
of existence.
Likewise, alienation
distances us fro m our
own powers and our own nepdq
needs.
it ™
makes our immediate sense
of what to do unreliable;
our apperception of the
i

real,

ambivalent; and our basis for

unpredictable.

D

oint action,

Neither exile nor alienation
stifle the

call that moves us to realize
our task.

Both, however,

muffle its volume and baffle our
attempts to respond.
If that is so, however, then
Marx finds himself in a
very serious dilemma as a theorist.
On the view of Marx's
ontology we took in chapter 3, he
should strive with his
theory to bring his neighbors back to
an awareness of
their still unmet needs.

He should explain how the social

structures under which they are laboring have
limited their
humanity and stultified their consciousness, and
he should

move them to revolutionize the mode of production in
all
its social ramifications. 26

The theory of alienation, though, suggests that

people's acceptance of their "particular situation" in
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•^e present enslaved
of

-

lng

.

„ rld

.

^

is not

capitallsm £hapes

^

.

beings;
us so stupid.- but
it mak es us,
nevertheless.

1,111

^ reSPMd

t0 hiS

^

^

^

^

Marxis

to shape a m ore h u
ma „ world

They will deny that the
world can be hu man
what it means to be
alienated.

,

for that is

To have the effect Marx
hoped for, his theory
would
have to find an audience
which believed in the
continuing
force of unmet human needs,
which took the answering
of
these needs as an imperative,
and which refused to accept

spiritual solutions as real
satisfaction.
He would have to
reach people who could balance
the pressing demands of the
present capitalist system with
their allegiance to an
absent but humanly necessary order.
Marx's theory requires
adherents who can mount a revolution
(because they
must)

then strive together to accomplish
tasks about the necessity of which they maintain a sense
of humor, in a spirit
of indeterminate belief.

To become fully human, he must

rely on people who can be more human that
their society

permits

^erhaps--just perhaps— we could fulfill Marx's project
if we knew our situation was exile.

to return, we could.

Perhaps if we longed

But no one in Marx's society lived

life every day as a
story
of exil
exileP and return.
x ui
himself did not.
He only wrote as if
he did.

Marx

CONCLUSION
POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN
EXILE

it becomes conscious^
it
it is not a matter
of havT™

±f °^
l^wi^T"
transpire that

^

dividi
between past and future
line
bu? of
ofT**
carrying out the
thoughts of the past
1 WU1 Aspire
that mankind beg?n no
consciously
accomplishes its old worf:
Karl Marx 1
At the beginning of this pc,<= = ,,
tnis essay, we set out
y
to explore
the relation between
Marx's Jewishness and the
structures
of his political theory.
Marx's philosophy of writing,
with its invitation to find
meaning in the gaps of his
written work, gave us our
provisional charter. We asked,
"What Jewish patterns of
thought reappear to us in the
movement of Marx's theory? How
would Marx make more
sense— or a different, more interesting

S^^
—

sense-if we read

him as

a

writer in the Jewish tradition?"

Now, we can summarize what we have
found.

Reading through and beyond what Marx
actually wrote,
we discover that Jewish patterns of
thought do offer an

intriguing perspective on Marx's project.
ontology,

Biblical

for instance, helps bring out the distinctive

features of Marx's sense of the real, which we find not
so

much in his political and economic doctrines as in his
presumptions about the world, the thinker, and the
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relation between the,.

Like the Torah

,

^^^

conceive of reality as that
which merely is
Nor does he
locate human excellence in
seeing reality as it is,
in its
essence.
Instead, he outlines a
theory in which human
beings help to constitute
the world through their
actions
Moreover, in Marx's theory,
people act to appropriate
the
world out of a sense of need
which previous human actions
have helped create and which
will continue to evolve
.

throughout history.

reality (human,

This dialectic of needs insures
that
social reality) will continue
to change,

too.

Therefore, no thinker can stand
outside the currents
of history and declare the
truth, once and for all.

m

order to interpret the world, the
philosopher must contribute to changing it.

Marx thus consciously distances himself
from his
perception of the classical Greek thinkers, and
of most
modern theorists as well. By the same token, but
without
the same degree of awareness, he approaches the
standpoint
of the Jewish tradition.

True, his ontology removes God

from the universe, repositioning all needs and all powers

within species homo sapiens, as the Torah does not.

But

an important effect of his doing so is to free human

beings from the "God's-eye viewpoint" which looks past

material oppression to find purely spiritual solutions.
In his stress on the indispensability of action, Marx

175

echoes the Je wi sh motifs
of

^i22H£.

He takes the

pa^^^hip^creati^

and

Operatives of the aewish situation

as they resound in Tnrsh =
Torah and transposes
them into those of
the species.
*.

This insistent introduction
of Jewish themes appears
to us again when we
examine closely how Marx
treats Hegel.
No simple inversion model
explains what Marx does to the
Hegelian dialectic
rhalilenges,
0 n„ QP
He cnal
corrects, and revises
it at all the key points
where it departs from the
Jewish
•

understanding of reality.

it is just as if Marx were

holding Hegel responsible for
addressing Jewish concerns,
a responsibility he never
explicitly
takes on himself.

Studying the rabbinical mode of
textual interpretation
called midrash, though, we can form
a better idea of what
Marx is doing here. Like a midrashist,
Marx reading Hegel
excerpts particular passages and points on
which to
comment.

He tries to make the earlier writer speak
to his

current preoccupations (his "value-concepts," as
Kadushin
would say)

Marx interprets as if his text must neces-

.

sarily have meaning for him and his particular questions.
The rabbis, who assumed the divinity of their text, did
the same.

Furthermore, we see Marx at work breathing new

life into Hegel through his reinterpretation

Hegel's texts

a

,

making

necessary corridor to reach his own.

Lenin wrote in 1914:

As
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It is impossible
completph;

"

+-«
"" de tand ««x s
giPital, and especially
ill
f?
chapters, without
having thoroughly studied
^
,ni
Hegel's Logic!
Wh0le
later none oTThe Conseouently^lf
Marxist's unalrstooa
MarxT^
indeed, understanding
Marx must have been
a nightmare
for his oolleagues and
contemporaries.
Our findings
'

^^

f

suggest that to appreciate
what Marx was doing,
Marx's
readers would have to
employ Hegelian dialectics,
biblical
ontology, and midrashic
ingenuity, all at once.
Compared
to the classics of
Western thought, all Marx's
writings
(and not just the Grundrisse,
as Martin Nicolaus

claims)
are "altogether unique and
in every sense strange
product! s] of the intellect,
and must have appeared
like
reflections of some man from a
distant planet." 3 Yet
Marx labored over these writings,
and he clearly meant them
to be read.
Hence, we confront the paradox
of a man
striving energetically to communicate
with an audience that
is nowhere at hand.

Once more, it is the Jewish tradition
which hints at
the possibility of such an estrangement.
The theme of
exile portrays the breakdown of meaning
between self,

situation, and other that recurrently plagues

people which is partially constituted by
purpose.

a

a

group of

compelling

When changes in the world they inhabit make the

tasks belonging to such

members suffer.

a

group impossible to fulfill, its

They are injured in their identity, in
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their claim to social
resources that they
need and in
their ability to
participate in everyday
social life
freely and as whole selves.
Most poignantly, though,
the
notion of exile i mp lies
that memb ers of such
a group will
find them selves dispossessed
of the language they
need in
order to formulate and c
0mm unicate their
predicament. They
are psychically isolated,
as well
wen as socially
,nn1»n adisempowered.
The theme of exile
immediately alerts
us to some

important aspects of Marx's
theory of alienation, aspects
not often discussed.
Alienation means more than the
brute
exploitation of the workers, and
certainly more than dissatisfaction with one's work.
Alienation is a disaster to
the self and the species because,
according to Marx, part
of what makes us human is being
caught up in a web of

intrinsic relations to the world and
to each other.
Because of alienation, the strands of
this web are severed.

Alienation is not the opposite of possession,
therefore; nor of power, at least in its sense
as "domination."
Rather, alienation is the opposite of dialogue.

It

derails the dialectic of human need so that we mistakenly
pursue what will injure us, so that we choose death
instead of life.

The model of exile illuminates these

most tragic traits of alienation.

The model of return

suggests that revolution, Marx's remedy for alienation,

works to restore the unimpeded exchange between human
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beings and their needsneeds, nnt
not an end to history,
but
renewal
In capitalist society,

a

all1 hun^n
human beings are in
exile,

but the working class
suffers it1 mOSt
most
a
As
a group, though,
they do have the power
to rise up etna
p and alter t-w
their condition,
Karl Marx, too, seems to
suffer exile as his
personal fate,
Yet up until now he has
apparently been powerless
to achieve
the conditions of his
repatriation.
*

We have found that reading
Marx through the prism of
the Jewish tradition makes
us aware of certain underlying
dynamics in his work, patterns
and problems which crop up
again and again. Marx alludes
to this texturing of his
thought, but he never reflects on
it: that is left for us,
his readers.
Consider, though, what kind of reader
he
needs.
First, Marx requires us to be
familiar with the

Western tradition of political thought.

His theory could

not exist without the writings of the
philosophical canon:
he constructs his whole project of
research and exposition

in reference to them.

Much of what Marx has to day, however, he conveys by
how he diverges from previous writers, explicitly or
implicitly.

To understand Marx,

it is not enough to read

his statements about this topic or that.

It is not even

enough to compare them side by side with the propositions
that other thinkers have put forth.

We have to measure
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^^

the specific differenoe
„hlch aetemines

tions he performs on the
text he reads.
The reader Marx recuires,
then, must he ahle
to imagine
theory as theory,
as a kind Qf
S/he must also be m
motivate
°tivated <-„
to ask questions
about Marx's
Practice in the belief that
the answers will
teach us all
something significant: that
is, something which
bears more
than an arbitrary connection
to what Marx wrote and
which
addresses the present needs
and difficulties of
those who
are now reading him.

^

Besides

grounding in Western philosophy
and an
interest in the practice of doing
theory, Marx's reader
would also do well to know something
about Jewish thought.
It is not impossible that
one could trace the trajectory of
Marx's revision of Hegel, for instance,
and work it backward
until one came up with approximately
the structures of
Jewish thought we used to interpret Marx
a

with— but

believable?

is it

Generally, we do not think to ask how

philosophers depart from the Greco-Christian tradition
in
political thought, because they do not.

Our task instead

is to locate them within the flows and eddies of
that

tradition
If a reader were familiar with Jewish thinking,

as well as Western philosophy, and were accustomed to

though,
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ght sense attit

--

- «~

ative move£ that
^ai.
seemed framiiiar
^
a
ar from
another place
Ce
q/v^
P
u
s
/ he might
even beain
to wonder about
Marx and his
personal Jewish
Tp
„
question
But we have done
this kinrf
klnd ° f dicing
and wondering
ourselves: at the very
beginning of this
tins essay,
essav when
h
we
explored Marx's
declaration
»t »»,
"° Marxist -"
The playful
explanatron at which we
arrived-that Marx's theory
is left

r m

-

i

i

.

•

'

-3

reCOPiZe

^

3

°f

"1 through the body of
this work, we have
been el aborating on
Qf
tatron.
We used our initial
oonoeption of how Marx
writes
to ma ke sense of his
key theoretioal
demarches against the
Greeks, Bauer, and Hegel,
we laid out his ontology
to
deepen our understanding
of the direction he is
takina
More than the doctrines
he enunciates, we wrestled
with the
problems he tackles, central
among them the struggle to
make what is important to
him important to his readers.

^^

In short,

we have done what we argued
Marx requires
his readers to do a midrash
cn the interference between
:

the Greco-Christian political
tradition which Marx addresses
and the Jewish tradition which
helps construct his message.
We established the context which
gives the Jewish question
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a^t

Marx its meaning

.

rn

^

Marx from exile.

"

^

^ ^
^
^

exile is the name of
the SQcial
separates Marx f rom his
potential audience, what
are the
soc.al forces which
sustain i t? why is it
difficult for us
to read Marx as we
conclude he needs to he
read? It would
be presu.ptuous to try
to answer the question
fully, here:
that calls for an
investigation all its own.
There are two
factors, though, that any
answer would have to take
into
account
The first is the persistence
of antisemitism in modern
political thought: not virulent
Jew-hatred, but the genteel
and generally quite unconscious
assumption that nothing
about Jews or Jewishness matters.
We saw this assumption
at work in mainstream
interpretations of "On the Jewish
Question," and we saw there how it obscured
Marx's point.
When Marx wrote, of course, this assumption
was quite

explicit and only barely detached from its
theological
moorings.

Furthermore, Marx shared many of the anti-Jewish

and antisemitic prejudices of his day.

in order to develop

his critique of "Christian" politics, he had to invent
an

"everyday Judaism" from which religion was methodologically
excluded, and then proceed by negation.

It follows that
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nis own work
in the way
uu ln
we have.
But even in rec ent
ti m es mos t
co^entators nave not
been prepared to
as, the Jewish
question about Mar,
-ssi bly thls inabUity
refiects

^^^^ ^^^^^

,

^

Sunaay-sohooi Xessons that
God hro.e off with
the Jews to
ooiieot a new Xsraei
throu g h the christian
churoh.
Possibl _
thou gh the theorists.
ne g ieot represents
their ae.ocratie
and not their Christian,
faith. As Jean
.

,

Paul Sartre writes:

The democrat, like the
scientist tails
<
f ai c to
use the
particular case- t-n him 7
7?'
C
the
[
individual
is only
an ense.b e
;n e
l t
l3
trait
It follows that
his defense of thP iff
J.
95
and annihila^es^L^:
Tel** nTs defe
deT^
se
15 to Persuade
individuals that thev exilt 'in f
?
S
°
hted
state
"There are no Jew
h
/
h 8re 15 no Jewi sh
Question. " This
fh J u
Wants to separate the
Jew irom
ucw
from nis
his religion,
*
rP
from his family from hie
1

•

,

l

Ln!
il

sr^s^jss.f-

^^

soiit

-y

W

V

•

partic?:

ssr-s

-

Sartre's shrewd observation leads
on to the second
reason we find it difficult to do
midrash on Marx's
Jewishness: the definitions of self,
knowledge, and freedom
which have marked off the modern age and
which have
set

their imprint on liberal notions of democracy.

Before

modern times, as Charles Taylor points out,
to be in touch
w1th one's true self, one sought to find
one's place
in a

me aningful cosmic order using one's God-given
powers of
reason.

The intellectuals of the 17th century Enlighten-

ment more or less reversed this conception.

They put forth
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back from the world

,

refusing to

outside
for Meaning, and observing
the physical and social
univer se

1,1

dStached

3

both.

5

-

objective way in order to
gain mast ery over

This deliberate setting
of boundaries between
the self
and the outside world ushered
in what we have come
to know
as the modern age
Certainly, not everyone has
completely
aooepted what Taylor calls "the
self -defining subject/'
even in theory, but no one
today can entirely escape its
influence: it is our tacit
understanding of what it means
to be a person.
Thinking of ourselves this way,
though,
prevents us from understanding any
theory which finds a
.

meaning to human life anywhere but in
the arbitrary
impulses of the individual. We have
committed ourselves as
moderns to the idea that there is not and
cannot ever be a
meaning which human beinas did not wholly
create.
The modern view of the person as a self -defining

subject insures that when we do run into purposes
larger
than ourselves, we are most likely to regard them as

threats to our freedom.

Freedom, in the modern world,

consists first and foremost of the rejection of anything

vaguely resembling
claims on us.

a

meaningful order which could impose

This defensive stance, moreover, sets

certain unspoken limits on what can count as knowledge in
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m° dernity

Kn

-

»

°—

is "f the world,
by the knowgr

—^

universaUy applicable and
communicable

kn ° Wr

'

S

SitUati °"

•

P-

then i„ ^dernity we
regard
tainted, biased,

^

^

^

^

o f how s/he knows

^
,

^

irrational.

Against this background,
how to do a midrasbic
readinq of Marx"?
-;^4Marx.
to interpret
Marx as we have done
is to
place him within a context
mntpvt of meaning which
goes on beyond
the individual: not a
cosmic
order, but an

structure resembling it
closely enough tQ
bells in the modern mind.

^

If „ arx raakes sense

light of

^
^

interactive
Qff

^

certain tradition, then by
modern standards he
is not free, and how
shall we learn about
freedom? Further
more, on our account, Marx
calls us to pay attention
a

to

human need,
to be human.

a

product of our evolving sense
of what it is
Surely, this call infringes
on the right of

every subject to define his or
her needs autonomously.
On top of all this, our midrash
blends Marx's situ-

ation with his theory and our own with
our understanding
of it.

Unless we are familiar with Jewish
thought and

not troubled by the question of what it
is to do theory,

chances are we would never arrive at
one.

a

reading like this

Does that not show we are reading into Marx
what we

want to hear, projecting what we want to see?

How can we

call the outcome of such an inquiry "knowledge"?
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If we can do so,

^^

be9innlnS

^

Z

^ ^
^
^^^^

submit, the

l0SS itS

-iP

^

°n our senses of
reality

Possibly lt had never
fuUy triumphed; pQssibiy
notrons of self, freedom
and kno
,

as disciplinary ideas,
never fully achieved
in practice
in any event, two
movements, one theoretical
and one
primarily social, have eroded
them in the twentieth
century.
The first is the
deconstruction Qf

^

When Freud traced our
patterns of thought and
behavior bac k
to their oriains in early
childhood, and when Nietzsche
analyzed the irrational basis
of our values and the covert
influence of the will to power
on our senses
of the real,

they raised doubts from which
the modern self has never
recovered
The women's movement, meanwhile,
has heightened our
awareness of difference, making it
clear that being a

particular person is not less than being
subject, but more.

a

sel f -defining

The strain of feminism known as

"identity politics" has sought within each
person's

reference as
a

a

White woman,

a

Black woman, a Jewish woman,

Christian woman, to find authentic ways of understanding

the world and acting in it.

6

Many contemporary students of politics remain committed to modernity.

They take notice of the fading of

the modern subject only to deplore it.

Those who find
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these

develops encoding,

however, mu£t now revive
the aU estion asKed by
another interpreter
Qf
&
be ao„e ? In the late part of

-

^

^^^^^
^

twentiefch

that guery resolves
itself into the Je w ls
h guestion of „„
times.
In „ arx s Ger[panY;
the jewish questi
conceraed ^
People unfitted to be free,
whose existence helped
give
3
the ° ry ° f
ipation. Today, it me ans,
" How may ,, e all
become free, excluding
none of us ? How may
we liberate our whole
selves, ceasing to reject
the parts
of our humanity which are
neither rational, autonomous,
polite, orderly, or eternal?"

^

.

^

—

^

In the first place,

become better readers.

as political theorists, we
can

The midrashic mode we have used

with Marx fits his writings well,
but we cannot transpose
it into Mill, or Arendt, or de
Beauvoir, and expect the

same results.

That does not mean, though, that
we have to

go back to asking solely after the
intentions of the

author, or constructing and deconstructing
texts in

vacuum.

a

With each thinker, we can ask if he or she
is

somehow in exile, how that condition is maintained,
and to

what promised land he or she is trying to return..
This way of talking about exile expands its meaning

somewhat.

It includes groups which face a common situa-

tion that restricts their development of their human
powers, whether or not they are constituted by

a

task
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which exile frustrates.

^^^

We can recognize
r.no
such groups by
the conditions of
their social being

tions on their discourse

.

when we reaa a

renects the situation of berng

^^^^

a Jew.

. woman
etc ., we
oan re-reaa their theory
as a response to that
situation
and see how that affeots
our understanding of
what they
have said.
Jus t as i.portant,
though: we oan ask how
the
effect of their theoretioai
„ves is to allow then,, as a
Jew or a ,o Mn to enter
polities as more nearly whole
persons, and we can seek
successful strategies to repeat.
Not just how we read but
whom we read can make a
difference. when we went
searching for a Jewish conception
of reality, we did not find
it in philosophy but in
Torah.
In order to understand what
oppresses and what liberates,
we will need tc explore fiction,
drama, and poetry, listen
to songs and street conversations.
We will have to pay
,

,

attention to the self-understandings
of people who do not
often speak for themselves in academic
circles: workingclass people, Jews, Blacks, women, gay men
and lesbians,

and an immense cast of characters classroom
teaching of
theory usually leaves waiting in the wings. We
need not

abandon the classics, only recognize that, however
brilliant, this handful of men represents only
of the experience of being human.

a

fraction

The logic of other

lives may be as different from theorists' notions of
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SUbjeCti ' ity 35 m

"" Sh

is

^ema!

^

critioue

Put our theoretical
skills to use to
logics instead of to
disqualify the™.

?e
W(

.

can

What all this. suggests
and what, ulti ma tel
y we can
learn from Marx, is
that political theory
tneory, in „
„
order
to help
us all become free,
should mG ve in the
direction of
dialogue.
Theorists know how to
,

m

speak;

we mU st learn how

to listen.

we can write for each
other, but the real
challenge is to make our
ideas accessible to
others who
oo not share our
experience in reading theory.
Any one can
tell people how the world
is, and anyone else
can disagree
but our real challenge
lies in exploring our
various worlds
together.
To coin a phrase, theory
is too important
to be

only for theorists.

It must give way as a
professional

activity to make room for theorizing
as
the property of all.

a

social practice,

Of course, as Marx would never
let us forget, no

amount of "shoulds" and "musts" can
change the reality of
our working conditions as academics.
If we seek to create
dialogue in the larger polity, we will need
to change the

material conditions we immediately face.

Few of us, no

matter how dedicated, would lose their
livelihoods for
political ends, too few to make a difference.
How
to

change the academy in order to be able to interpret

the

world: that is one humble place for dialogue to begin.
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Let us return to the
words of Charles Reznikoff
one
last time:

oreign.

How far have

I

beiTTiJiled, zT^n

When we take up those
difficult words, when we speak
of families and peoples,
nourishment and survival,
power
and joy in one breath,
our political discourse
will beg i n
to return us from exile.
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